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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• In 2002, 22.7% of Nebraskans over the age of 18 were current smokers, accounting for
approximately 389,000 smokers.
• Since 1995, the prevalence of adult tobacco use in Nebraska has remained about 1 percentage
point below the national average, but per capita tobacco consumption in Nebraska has been falling
more slowly than the Unites States as whole.
• The tobacco industry has directly been a major political force in Nebraska through lobbying and
campaign contributions. The tobacco industry spent over $1,027,000 on lobbying from 1997-2002.
The tobacco industry made direct campaign contributions to the members of the 2003- 2004
Nebraska Legislature totaling almost $93,000 over the course of their legislative careers.
• Only 20 of the 49 members of the 2003-2004 Legislature have never accepted money from the
tobacco industry.
• The tobacco industry has also worked to increase its political influence in Nebraska by
recruiting, often through financial contributions, third-party allies such as the Nebraska Restaurant
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Association, the Nebraska Chamber of Commerce, the Nebraska Retail Grocers Association,
the Nebraska Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association, the Nebraska Retail
Federation, the Nebraska Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors and the Nebraska
Licensed Beverage Association.
• Despite opposition from the tobacco industry and its allies and the lack of a well-established
grassroots tobacco control community, Nebraska was an early leader in passing statewide clean
indoor air laws. Due largely to the efforts of state Senator Shirley Marsh, the Nebraska Legislature
passed its first clean indoor air law in 1974, only one year after Arizona passed the first law in the
nation that required smoking restrictions in some public places.
• In 1979, the Nebraska Legislature passed the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act, which was
sponsored by state Senator Larry Stoney. The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was stronger than
similar legislation that was proposed in New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts at the same
time. The tobacco industry and its allies responded by mobilizing against the implementing rules
and regulations for the Act and succeeded in weakened these regulations.
• The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was not strengthened for 20 years until 1999 when the
Legislature passed a bill that required that almost all state buildings and vehicles become
smokefree.
• From 2000 -2003, the Legislature also strengthened the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act
by requiring that commercial daycare facilities be smokefree and extending its enforcement
provisions to include business owners. • From 1999-2004, the Nebraska Legislature has rejected
three different attempts by state Senator Nancy Thompson to make restaurants throughout
Nebraska smokefree. • Using tobacco settlement money, in 2000, the Nebraska Legislature
approved $7 million per year for three years to increase funding for a preexisting state tobacco
control program, Tobacco Free Nebraska.
• Due to pressure from tobacco control advocates, the Nebraska Legislature approved a $0.30
cigarette excise tax increase in 2002, but the Legislature was only willing to pass this increase
during a budget crisis and no earmark was provided for tobacco control.
• Citing budget concerns in 2003, the Legislature cut funding for Tobacco Free Nebraska from $7
million per year to $405,000, despite several different options for continuing funding for tobacco
control.
• In 2003, the Lincoln-Lancaster County Health Department led the push to pass Nebraska first
comprehensive smokefree workplaces ordinances, but due to pressure from the tobacco industry
and its allies, the Lincoln City Council passed a weakened and confusing ordinance that exempted
bars and allowed separately ventilated “smoking rooms.”
• Tobacco control advocates have made progress in Nebraska, but they have not yet mobilized
the political resources necessary to avoid suffering significant defeats at the hands of the tobacco
industry.
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3EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
• In 2002, 22.7% of Nebraskans over the age of 18 were current smokers, accounting for
approximately 389,000 smokers.
• Since 1995, the prevalence of adult  tobacco use in Nebraska has remained about 1
percentage point below the national average, but per capita tobacco consumption in
Nebraska has been falling more slowly than the Unites States as whole. 
• The tobacco industry has directly been a major political force in Nebraska through
lobbying and campaign contributions.  The tobacco industry spent over $1,027,000 on
lobbying from 1997-2002.  The tobacco industry made direct campaign contributions to
the  members of the 2003-2004 Nebraska Legislature totaling almost $93,000 over the
course of their legislative careers.  
• Only 20 of the 49 members of the 2003-2004 Legislature have never accepted  money
from the tobacco industry.
• The tobacco industry has also worked to increase its political influence in Nebraska by
recruiting, often through financial contributions,  third-party allies such as the Nebraska
Restaurant Association, the Nebraska Chamber of Commerce, the Nebraska Retail
Grocers Association, the Nebraska Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store
Association, the Nebraska Retail Federation, the Nebraska Association of Tobacco and
Candy Distributors and the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association.
• Despite opposition from the tobacco industry and its allies and the lack of a well-
established grassroots tobacco control community, Nebraska was an early leader in
passing statewide clean indoor air laws.  Due largely to the efforts of state Senator
Shirley Marsh, the Nebraska Legislature passed its first clean indoor air law in 1974, only
one year after Arizona passed the first law in the nation that required smoking restrictions
in some public places.
• In 1979, the Nebraska Legislature passed the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act, which was
sponsored by state Senator Larry Stoney.  The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was
stronger than similar legislation that was proposed in New York, Connecticut and
Massachusetts at the same time.  The tobacco industry and its allies responded by
mobilizing against the implementing rules and regulations for the Act and succeeded in
weakened these regulations.
• The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was not strengthened for 20 years until 1999 when
the Legislature passed a bill that required that almost all state buildings and vehicles
become smokefree.  
• From 2000 -2003, the Legislature also strengthened the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act
by requiring that commercial daycare facilities be smokefree and extending its
enforcement provisions to include business owners. 
4• From 1999-2004, the Nebraska Legislature has rejected three different attempts by state
Senator Nancy Thompson to make restaurants throughout Nebraska smokefree.
• Using tobacco settlement money, in 2000, the Nebraska Legislature approved $7 million
per year for three years to increase funding for a preexisting state tobacco control
program, Tobacco Free Nebraska.
• Due to pressure from tobacco control advocates, the Nebraska Legislature approved a
$0.30 cigarette excise tax increase in 2002, but the Legislature was only willing to pass
this increase during a budget crisis and no earmark was provided for tobacco control.
• Citing budget concerns in 2003, the Legislature cut funding for Tobacco Free Nebraska
from $7 million per year to $405,000, despite several different options for continuing
funding for tobacco control.
• In 2003, the Lincoln-Lancaster County Health Department led the push to pass Nebraska
first comprehensive smokefree workplaces ordinances, but due to pressure from the
tobacco industry and its allies, the Lincoln City Council passed a weakened and
confusing ordinance that exempted bars and allowed separately ventilated “smoking
rooms.”
• Tobacco control advocates have made progress in Nebraska, but they have not yet
mobilized the political resources necessary to avoid suffering significant defeats at the
hands of the tobacco industry.     
5TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
POLITICS IN NEBRASKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
A Unicameral Legislature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Nebraska’s Legislative Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Term Limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
TOBACCO INDUSTRY POLITICAL EXPENDITURES IN NEBRASKA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Data on Political Expenditures in Nebraska . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Tobacco Policy Scores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Legislative Officeholder and Candidates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Elected Officials Receiving the Highest Amounts of Tobacco Industry Contributions
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Elected Officials Who Did Not Accept Tobacco Industry Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Relationship Between Campaign Contributions and Legislative Behavior . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The Nebraska Legislature Versus the United States Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Legislative Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Legislative Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Committee on Committees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Committee on Enrollment and Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Committee on References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Committee on Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Committee on Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Committee on Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Committee on Health and Human Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Committee on Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Constitutional Officers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Lobbying Expenditures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
CLEAN INDOOR AIR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
The First Clean Indoor Air Legislation - LB 600 (1974)  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
First Attempt to Enact the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act  - LB 648 (1978) . . . . . . . . . 31
Passage of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act - LB 344 (1979) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
Fighting Effective Implementing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Twenty Years of No Change to the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Smokefree State Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
A Smokefree Restaurant Bill - LB 750 (1999 -2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Smokefree Daycare Facilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Second Attempt at Smokefree Restaurants - LB 227 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Tobacco Free Hall County’s Media Campaign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Tri-Cities Implement Smokefree Parks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Improving the Implementing Regulations for the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act . . . . 55
Improving Enforcement of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act - LB 45 (2003) . . . . . . 56
Third Attempt at Smokefree Restaurants - LB 546 (2003; carried over to 2004) . . . . . . 58
6Lincoln’s 2003 Attempt to Pass a Comprehensive Smokefree Workplace Ordinance . . 59
ADVERTISING AND SAMPLING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Nebraska Attempts Warning Labels - LB 368 (1963) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Free Samples of Spit Tobacco Prohibited - LB 48 (1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
Efforts to Prohibit Tobacco Advertising at the Local Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
YOUTH ACCESS RESTRICTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Cigarette Vending Machine Restrictions - LB 130 (1991) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Omaha's Controversial Youth Access Law - Ordinance #32972 (1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
Vending Companies’ Lawsuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
The Baker’s Supermarkets Lawsuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
Cooperation from State Officials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
Philip Morris’ Attempt to Pass Preemption - LB 1350 (1996) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
The Rudman Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
Youth Possession Ordinances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
Plattsmouth & Omaha Pass Youth Access Ordinances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
EARLY CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX INCREASES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
Nebraska Clean Environment Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
1993 Excise Tax Increases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
Early Conflict Concerning a Lawsuit Against the Tobacco Industry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
The Global Settlement Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
Collapse of the Global Settlement Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
Signing the Master Settlement Agreement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
USE OF THE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT FUNDS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
The Establishment of Trust Funds for the Tobacco Settlement Money - LB 1070 (1998)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
Developments Regarding the Tobacco Settlement During 1999 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
Funding for Tobacco Free Nebraska - LB 1436 (2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
Settlement Funding for Health Improvements - LB 692 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
2001 and 2002 Budget Shortages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
CITIZENS FOR A HEALTHY NEBRASKA’S EXCISE TAX INCREASE ATTEMPTS . . . 113
First Attempt for a Tax Increase - LB 505 (1999 - 2000) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
Second Attempt at Passing a Large Excise Tax Increase - LB 792 (2001) . . . . . . . . . . 117
Passage of a $0.30 Excise Tax Increase - LB 1085 (2002) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
HUGE FUNDING CUT FOR TOBACCO FREE NEBRASKA IN 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Governor Johanns’ Budget . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
Funding Source Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
Funding at $405,000 Per Year . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
CONCLUSIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
7REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
APPENDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
8
985.989.9
86.6
77.3
90.05
81.05
74.6
103
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Pa
ck
s P
er
 C
ap
ita
NE US
Figure 2: Per Capita Cigarette Consumption in US
and NE, 1990-2002 (Source: Tobacco Tax Burden,
2002)
1 7 .4 %
1 9 .3 %
2 2 .7 %2 2 .1 %
2 5 .4 %
2 3 .0 %2 3 .2 %2 2 .7 %
2 3 .0 %
0 %
5 %
1 0 %
1 5 %
2 0 %
2 5 %
3 0 %
19
90
19
92
19
94
19
96
19
98
20
00
20
02
Pr
ev
al
en
ce
 R
at
e
N E U S
Figure 1: Smoking prevalence in US and NE, 1990-
2002 (Source: Centers for Disease Control, BRFSS)
INTRODUCTION
Nebraska is located in the heart of the United States covering 76,878 square miles.1  The
state has a population of 1.7 million people with 89% of the population being white and
approximately 26% of Nebraskans are under the age of 18. For Nebraskans over the age of 18,
22.7% were current smokers as of 20022, accounting for approximately 389,000 smokers. Since
1990, the prevalence rate of tobacco use has fluctuated from a high of 25.4% in 1990 to a low of
17.1% in 1992 and then reaching a plateau of about 22% through the late 1990s and early 2000s
(Figure 1). Since 1995, the prevalence of adult  tobacco use in Nebraska has remained about 1
percentage point below the national average. Per capita tobacco consumption in Nebraska has
been falling more slowly than the Unites States as whole (Figure 2).
For decades, the tobacco industry has opposed any meaningful efforts to protect the
health of Nebraskans through tobacco control.  They have weakened efforts to keep tobacco out
of the hands of children (See Youth Access section), opposed any attempt to increase the excise
tax on cigarettes (See Excise Tax sections) and
fought against laws to protect the public from exposure to secondhand smoke (See Clean Indoor
Air section).  The tobacco industry regularly spends large amounts of money to employ the most
influential lobbyists in the state, as well as to make direct contributions to candidates and elected
officials (See Appendix).  They have also established close relationships, often by providing
money, with other business groups such as the Nebraska Restaurant Association, the Nebraska
Chamber of Commerce, the Nebraska Retail Grocers Association, the Nebraska Petroleum
Marketers and Convenience Store Association, the Nebraska Retail Federation, the Nebraska
Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors and the Nebraska Licensed Beverage
Association.3-5  It is a common strategy of the tobacco industry to mobilize third party allies to
mask its own involvement in opposing tobacco control progress. 
In the 1970s, Nebraska lacked a substantial tobacco control community and, therefore,
lacked community-based political pressure to enact policy changes.6  Despite this hindrance, two
state senators, Shirley Marsh of Lincoln and Larry Stoney of Omaha, were successful in
establishing Nebraska as an early leader in passing clean indoor air legislation (See Clean Indoor
Air section).  The Nebraska Legislature passed its first clean indoor air law in 1974, one year
after Arizona passed the first law in the nation that required separate smoking and nonsmoking
sections in some public places.6, 7  Nebraska followed in the footsteps of Minnesota, which
10
enacted the nation's first comprehensive clean indoor air law in 1975, when the Legislature
passed the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act in 1979, which required separate nonsmoking and
smoking sections in almost all public places.8, 9  This law was stronger than similar legislation
that was proposed in New York, Connecticut and Massachusetts at the same time.10  
Despite the early success seen in Nebraska, a lack of commitment from the Legislature
resulted in a lull in tobacco control policymaking in Nebraska during the 1980s.6  Legislators, led
by Shirley Marsh, tried numerous times to strengthen the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act,
especially its enforcement provisions, but they were unsuccessful due to opposition from the
tobacco industry.11 
Since that time, the tobacco control community in Nebraska has grown extensively, both
in numbers and in organization.  Since 1989, the Smokeless Nebraska coalition and its offshoot,
Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska, were formed as was the much smaller grassroots group, Group
to Alleviate Smoking Pollution (GASP) of Nebraska.12, 13  During that same time period, local
coalitions were formed in Nebraska’s larger cities and the Nebraska Health and Human Services
Department formed a statewide tobacco control division, Tobacco Free Nebraska.  While the
emergence of these groups resulted in much more activity around tobacco control during the
1990s, including youth access legislation at both the local and state level (See Youth Access
section), a petition-based initiative to increase the state’s cigarette excise tax (See Early Excise
Tax section), and several different efforts to protect the public from the secondhand smoke (See
Clean Indoor Air section), the decade was mostly a series of victories for the tobacco industry
and its allies because they were successful in defeating or weakening almost all of the proposed
tobacco policies. The major exception was the Legislature’s decision in 1999 to make almost all
state buildings and vehicles smokefree, which represented the first change to the Nebraska Clean
Indoor Air Act in almost 20 years of existence.14, 15  The reason for the success of this measure
was largely the determination of Senator Don Preister of Omaha (a member of the Legislature
who refused to accept tobacco industry campaign contributions) who pushed for over five years
to get state buildings smokefree (See Clean Indoor Air section).  
Between 2000 and 2003, there was a series of highs and lows for tobacco control, due
largely to a budget crisis that afflicted the state.  In 2000, health advocates were successful in
getting the Legislature to fund tobacco control at $21 million over three years but this amount
was cut by 94% in 2003, leaving only $405,000 per year for tobacco control (See Funding Cut
section).  In 2000 and 2001, attempts by Senator Nancy Thompson of Papillion (another
legislator who refused tobacco industry campaign contributions) to broaden the Nebraska Clean
Indoor Air Act to make restaurants smokefree were defeated, but she was successful in 2003 in
getting the Act’s enforcement provisions strengthen so that the Act can be enforced against
business owners (See Clean Indoor Air section).  In 2000 and 2001, health advocates were
unable to convince the Legislature to pass a large cigarette excise tax increase, but in 2002, a
$0.30 increase was approved (See Citizens’ Excise Tax Section).  In 2003, the Lincoln-Lancaster
County Health Department attempted to pass Nebraska’s first local 100% smokefree workplace
ordinance, but the City Council gave in to pressure from the tobacco industry and bar owners to
pass a confusing ordinance that was weakened to allow smoking in bars and separately ventilated
breakrooms and “smoking rooms” (See Clean Indoor Air section).  The beginning of the new
millennium was a series of three steps forward, two steps back for tobacco control in Nebraska.
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POLITICS IN NEBRASKA
A Unicameral Legislature
Nebraska is the only state in the United States to have a single-house legislature, also
known as a unicameral system. Nebraska’s legislature is also unique in that it is nominally
nonpartisan.  While state senators may be affiliated with a political party, this information is not
listed on the election ballot and leadership positions are not determined by political party such as
in the common majority-minority system.  In this report, the political affiliation of legislators
that are in office as of 2003 (as designated in the legislative biographies contained in the
Nebraska Blue Book) are listed.1  The Nebraska Blue Book is published biennially by the Clerk
of the Legislature and contains copious amounts of information about Nebraska.  Much of the
information about Nebraska legislative process and its history is discussed in the Nebraska Blue
Book; therefore, unless otherwise indicated, the information provided in this section is from the
Nebraska Blue Book.1 
Both of Nebraska’s unique legislative features came about on November 6, 1934, when
voters approved a constitutional amendment that eliminated the previous bicameral system in
favor of a unicameral one.  Thus, the form of the Nebraska Legislature shares more in common
with local governing bodies than the federal system.
There are benefits of Nebraska’s unicameral system over the two-chamber system. First,
the relative simplicity of the unicameral system makes the legislative process more transparent.
For example, there are no conference committees in the unicameral system.  Conference
committees are usually formed in an ad hoc manner in order to resolve any differences that exist
between similar bills passed by both houses.  This role often makes conference committees
extremely powerful in bicameral legislatures because of its members’ role in determining the
final language of a bill and because there is little oversight of their activities.  While the
Nebraska Legislature does utilize committees to conduct public hearings and to decide whether a
bill will be sent for debate on the floor of the full Legislature, it is the responsibility of the full
Legislature to finalize the language of a bill, not that of a particular ad hoc committee.
Second, a unicameral system is smaller and less expensive than a bicameral system.
When the unicameral system was implemented in 1937, the number of Nebraska legislators,
dropped from 133 to 43, committees were reduced from 61 to 18, half as many bills were
introduced but more bills were passed and the session was shorter by 12 days.  The cost of the
last bicameral session in 1935 was $202,593.  The first unicameral session almost halved this
amount with a final cost of $103,445.  Over sixty years later, the number of legislators has only
risen by six, to 49, and there are still only 18 committees: 14 standing committees that hold
public hearings on bills and 4 select committees that conduct administrative tasks for the
Legislature. 
The most common criticism leveled against unicameralism is that one house is not
capable of maintaining checks and balances.  However, it should be remembered that legislative
bodies at the local level do not usually consist of two separate bodies.  Also, the governor’s veto
and the ability of the judicial branch to deem laws unconstitutional are in place to check the
power of the Nebraska Legislature.
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Nebraska’s Legislative Process
The Legislature meets every year beginning on the first Wednesday after the first
Monday in January.  During odd-numbered years, it meets for a 90-day session; for even-
numbered years, the session lasts 60 days.  During 90-day sessions, bills that are not advanced
but are not killed are carried over to the following 60-day session.  Most bills are introduced
during the first 10 days of the session.  All legislators in Nebraska are referred to as state
senators. 
Introduction of a bill occurs when it is filed with the Clerk of the Legislature, who reads
the title of the bill into record and then assigns it a number.  Bills are usually abbreviated LB (for
Legislative Bill) followed by this number.  
After a bill has been introduced, the nine-member Reference Committee assigns it to one
of the 14 standing committees.  Committees are required to conduct a public hearing for almost
all bills.  It is at the public hearing that individuals or groups may testify for or against a
particular bill.  After listening to public comments on a bill, the committee may advance an
amendment to the bill by a majority vote.  It is also the committee’s role to decide whether or not
to advance the bill to General File, where it is debated on the floor of the full Legislature.  On the
floor of the Legislature, it takes a majority of the full Legislature (25 votes) to advance a bill or
adopt an amendment.
It is usually after a bill has been placed on General File that a senator or committee
decides to designate it as a priority bill.  Priority bills are debated by the full Legislature before
other bills so designating a bill as a priority helps to ensure that it will be debated during the
current legislative session.  Each senator is allowed one priority bill, each committee may select
two, and the Speaker of the Legislature, who introduces bills at the request of the governor, may
designate 25 priority bills.  The reason why senators wait until a bill has been placed on General
File before designating it a priority bill is because designating a bill as a priority bill does not
ensure that it will advance out of committee and if this bill died in committee the senator would
lose his or her priority bill for that legislative session.
If a bill is advanced at the General File stage, it goes on Select File.  Select File is the
term for the second time in which a bill is read, debated and voted on by the full Legislature.
Once again, 25 votes are required to adopt a new amendment or to advance the bill to Final
Reading.
The legislative bill may not be debated or amended when it is on Final Reading, but it
may be returned to Select File.  Bills may not be passed until at least five days after they were
introduced and at least one day after it was advanced to Final Reading.  
Final passage of a bill requires more than the normal 25 votes if it contains an emergency
clause.  An emergency clause allows the bill to take effect immediately after it is signed by the
governor or the governor’s veto is overridden by the Legislature.  Bills that contain an
emergency clause require 33 votes (two-thirds) to be sent to the governor. 
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Once the governor receives the bill, he or she has five days (excluding Sundays) to sign
the bill, veto it, or decline to act on it.  If he or she signs it or declines to act on the bill, it
becomes state law, but if the governor vetoes it, 30 votes are required for the Legislature to
override the veto.  Bills that do not contain an emergency clause usually go into effect three
calender months after the Legislature adjourns.      
The tobacco industry recognized the unique structure of the Nebraska Legislature and
recognized that it created special opportunities and difficulties for the industry.  One of these
features is the fact that legislation can be brought up for debate and amended at any time while
on General File or Select File if 25 senators vote in favor of such as action.  Because of this
aspect of Nebraska’s system, the tobacco industry and its lobbyists  must remain vigilant in
monitoring the status of bills in which they take an interest.  The tobacco industry recognized
this fact in a 1987 State of the States Report that stated, “The most unnerving aspect of this
system is that legislation can be reconsidered by a simple majority vote at any step before Final
Reading.”11
 
The smaller size of Nebraska’s Legislature also has consequences for the tobacco
industry.  An R.J. Reynolds’ State Tax Plan from 1989 noted that “Nebraska’s unique
unicameral legislation reduces the number of legislative contacts that have to be made for a
successful effort.  Conversely, with only 49 senators, efforts to block legislation can be difficult
if an issue has momentum.”16
Term Limits
During the 1990s, citizens throughout the U.S. that were dissatisfied with the current
political climate attempted to enact some measure of reform by limiting the number of terms that
could be served by state and federal elected officials.  Proponents argued that term limits would
help prevent elected officials from becoming professional politicians who had lost touch with
their constituents.  Opponents believed that term limits would lead to inexperienced, and thus
ineffectual, leadership. 
During this time period, Nebraskans passed three separate constitutional amendment
voter initiatives in 1992, 1994 and 1996 that would have set term limits on state senators, but
each time the measure did not survive the courts.17  The Nebraska Supreme Court threw out the
first vote when it was later determined that not enough signatures had been collected to put it on
the ballot, while the other two votes were deemed unconstitutional as part of rulings by the U.S.
Supreme Court.17  Attempts to get the Nebraska Legislature to pass term limit legislation also
failed.  In 2000, Guy Curtis, the lawyer who led the Nebraska Term Limits Committee, observed
“We’ve been trying to get legislators to enact term limits for years, but a hog won’t butcher
itself.”18  
In 2000, however, voters approved Initiative Measure 415, which limits state senators to
no more than two consecutive four-year terms.17  As of 2003, these term limits have not been 
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Bill Filed with Legislative Clerk (Bill # assigned)
Reference Committee Assigns Bill to One of 14 Committees
Agriculture
Appropriations
Banking Commerce & Insurance
Business & Labor
Education
General Affairs
Government Military & Veterans' Affairs
Health & Human Services 
Judiciary
Natural Resources
Nebraska Retirement Systems
Revenue
Transportation &
Telecommunications
 Urban Affairs
Public Hearings within the Assigned Committee
Majority Vote within the Committee Advances a Bill to the General File
Bill is Debated on the Floor of the Full Legislature
Majority Vote of the Full Legislature Advances Bill to Select File
Bills from Select File are Debated on the Floor of the Legislature
Majority Vote of the Full Legislature Advances Bill to Final Reading
Majority Vote of the Full Legislature Advances Bill to the Governor
(Bills with Emergency Clauses Require Two-Thirds Vote to Pass)
Bill Passes if Governor Signs the Bill 
or Takes No Action
If Governor Vetoes Bill, 30 Votes from the
Legislature Override the Veto
Figure 3: Summary of Nebraska's Legislative Process
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Company
Legislature, 
1999-2000
Lobbying, 
1999-2000
Legislature, 
2001-2002
Lobbying, 
2001-2002
Constitutional 
Officers, 1999-2002
1999-2002 
Grand Total
Philip Morris (PM) $12,750 $129,515 $7,500 $103,391 $500 $253,656
     Kraft $0 $0 $0 $0 $12,500 $12,500
     Miller $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,500 $2,500
RJ Reynolds (RJR) $18,000 $75,932 $21,049 $101,063 $500 $216,544
Brown & Williamson (BW) $0 $41,058 $0 $35,009 $0 $76,067
Lorillard (LOR) $0 $0 $0 $25,000 $0 $25,000
Smokeless Tobacco Council 
(STC) $0 $0 $0 $15,100 $0 $15,100
U.S. Tobacco (UST) $4,800 $102,000 $1,000 $102,782 $0 $210,582
NE Restaurant PAC $2,878 $0 $1,100 $0 $0 $3,978
Others $21,256 $0 $9,523 $0 $7,560 $38,339
TOTALS $59,684 $348,505 $40,172 $382,345 $23,560 $854,266
Note: Others includes contributions from the Petroleum and Retail Political Action Committees, Nebraska Association of Candy and 
Tobacco Distributors and Walter Radcliffe.
Table 1: Tobacco Industry Expenditures to Influence Policy Making in Nebraska, 1999-2002
deemed unconstitutional.  The term limits will apply for the first time in the 2006 election. This
will apply to legislators that were elected in 1998 and again in 2002. 
As a result of the term limits that go into effect in 2006 over one-third of the current
Legislature will have to be replaced.  The effect this will have on the makeup of the Legislature
is uncertain, but it is clear that the Legislature will be less stable due to the many years of
experience will be lost.  It remains to be seen whether the effect of the shake-up to the
Legislature will have positive or negative effects for tobacco control in Nebraska.   
One major consequence of term limits for both tobacco control advocates and the tobacco
industry will be the need to invest more resources toward educating new legislators on tobacco-
related policies.  It is likely that the future of tobacco control in the Nebraska Legislature will
largely be determined by whether the tobacco industry or health advocates are more successful in
educating the large number of incoming senators on the issue of tobacco. 
TOBACCO INDUSTRY POLITICAL EXPENDITURES IN NEBRASKA
The use of political expenditures in Nebraska is a key way for the tobacco industry to
exert influence over tobacco-related policy making. The tobacco industry spent a total of
$422,517 in Nebraska during the 2001-2002 legislative session (Table 1), which includes
campaign contributions to individual legislators and legislative candidates and lobbying
expenditures. This represents a $41,034  increase (11%) from the previous legislative session
during which the tobacco industry spent $381,483. In addition, the tobacco industry and its allies
spent an additional $23,560 on contributions to constitutional officers between 1999 and 2002. 
Political expenditures by the tobacco industry in Nebraska have consistently increased by
about 10% during the last two legislative sessions, from a total of $346,111 in campaign
contributions and lobbying expenses in 1997/98 to $408,189 in 1999/2000 and $422,517 in
2001/02 (Figure 4).
16
$346,111
$408,189
$422,517
$0
$75,000
$150,000
$225,000
$300,000
$375,000
$450,000
1997-1998 1999-2000 2001-2002
Legislative Session
Po
lit
ic
al
 E
xp
en
di
tu
re
s
Figure 4: Trend in Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions and Lobbying Expenses, 1997/98
- 2001/02
Data on Political Expenditures in Nebraska
According to the Institute on Money in State Politics, a nationwide, nonpartisan,
nonprofit organization that seeks to document and research campaign finance at the state level,
the average amount of money raised by the winner of Nebraska Legislature elections in 2002
was $41,576.19  This level of campaign contributions is far less than many larger states, such as
California, so the amount of money received from the tobacco industry is correspondingly
smaller than for many other states.
         The data on political expenditures made by the tobacco industry in the state of Nebraska
were collected from disclosure statements filed with Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure
Commission.  The following organizations were included and defined as “tobacco industry”
sources of funds: Brown and Williamson, Lorillard Tobacco Company, Philip Morris Inc. (which 
changed its name to Altria in 2003), R.J. Reynolds, Smokeless Tobacco Council, the Tobacco
Institute, and US Tobacco.  Kraft and Miller Brewing (both owned by Altria) were also included
for state constitutional officers because these two companies did not make any substantial
contributions to state legislators but large contributions were made to members of the executive
branch.  
The contributions from organizations that were included as tobacco industry allies were
the Nebraska Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors, the Nebraska Petroleum
Marketers and Convenience Stores Association, the Nebraska Restaurant Association and the
Nebraska Retail Federation.  Other tobacco industry allies such the Nebraska Licensed Beverage
Association were not included because they made almost no campaign contributions.  Campaign
contributions from tobacco industry lobbyists and their lobbying companies were included in
Others except for contributions from Walt Radcliffe or Radcliffe and Associates which was give
its own column due to the level of contributions (generally over $2,000 per election cycle). 
Contributions from the Nebraska Retail Grocers Association (which made large contributions to
one legislator) can also be found under Others.  These groups were identified as third-party allies
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of the tobacco industry based on internal tobacco industry documents describing them as such.3-5,20
The information provided in this report includes contributions to individual legislators,
legislative candidates, state constitutional officers and candidates and expenditures made for
lobbying legislative and administrative officials. We collected contribution data on candidates
and elected officials from the Legislature between the 1979-1980 election cycle and the 2001-
2002 election cycle. Data on constitutional officers were collected for the same time period,
however, this information was reported on a four year cycle as this reflects the election cycle for
constitutional officers. Lobbying expenditures were collected from 1997 to 2002.  A complete
list of all candidates and elected officials for the 2003 election and their tobacco industry
campaign contributions, as well as lobbying expenditures are listed in the Appendix.
It should be noted that the time period for which data were collected was a period in
which the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission was expanding and refining the
level of information collected on campaign contributions.  As a result, the election cycle for
1981-1982 shows substantially lower levels of contributions ($3,950 total amount of
contributions) compared to 1983-1984 ($22,844 total amount of contributions), which is likely to
be an indication of the level of reporting that was required at that time rather than the level of
campaign contributions that were given by the tobacco industry and its allies.21, 22
For the 1999-2000 and the 2001-2002 election cycles, the Nebraska Accountability and
Disclosure Commission changed the level of contribution that had to be reported from greater
than $100 to greater than $250 as part of its decision to report campaign contributions online at
http://nadc.nol.org/.  Given that the typical tobacco contribution increment for Nebraska during
these years was $500, it is unlikely that this change had a substantial effect on the amount of
contributions reported. For the election cycles of 1999-2000 and 2001-2002, campaign
contribution data were collected from this online source; for earlier years the information was
collected from biannual reports published by the Commission.21-29
Lobbying expenditures were collected from the reports that are filed quarterly by
lobbyists and principals with the Clerk of the Legislature and maintained by the Nebraska
Accountability and Disclosure Commission.30
Tobacco Policy Scores
In order to relate the information on political expenditures by the tobacco industry to
legislative behavior, “tobacco policy scores” were created for each member of the 2003
Legislative Session (Appendix A). The score was obtained from polling six individuals with
extensive knowledge of policy making in Nebraska. Each legislator was evaluated based on a
scale of 0 to 10. A score of 0 represented an extremely pro-tobacco legislator and a score of 10
represented an extremely pro-tobacco control legislator. The average for each legislator is
reported. Legislators with scores ranging from 0.0 to 3.9 are considered pro-tobacco industry,
scores ranging from 4.0 to 6.0 are considered neutral, and scores ranging from 6.1 to 10.0 are
considered pro-tobacco control.
The legislators in office during the 2003 legislative session were scored and the
Legislature received an average tobacco policy score of 5.0.  It should be remembered that
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Nebraska legislators are officially nonpartisan but that party affiliations were determined from
biographies in the Nebraska Blue Book.1  Among the 13 Democratic legislators, the average
tobacco policy score was 5.8; the 3 Independent legislators received an average score of 5.9; and
the 33 Republican legislators received an average score of 4.6.  The lowest tobacco policy score,
indicating a pro-tobacco industry position, was 1.5 and was received by Douglas Cunningham
(R-Wausa; 1.5 policy score; $2,449 lifetime industry total), Ramon Janssen (D-Nickerson; 1.5
policy score; $8,550 lifetime industry total), and Gene Tyson (R-Norfolk; 1.5 policy score; $250
lifetime industry total). The highest tobacco policy scores was 8.8 and was received by Donald
Preister (D-Omaha; 8.8 policy score, $0 lifetime industry total), who is also the Vice
Chairperson of the Committee on Committees.
Legislative Officeholder and Candidates
During the 2001-2002 legislative cycle, the tobacco industry and its allies contributed a
total of $31,472 to 29 legislators. Of this group of legislators, nine accepted contributions
totaling $3,920 from tobacco industry allies but not tobacco companies themselves. This is a
$11,657 decrease from the previous legislative session when a total of $43,129 was contributed
by the tobacco industry and its allies to 26 legislative office holders or candidates (Table 2). The
average tobacco policy score for the 2003 legislature was 5.0.  Ten of the thirteen Democratic
legislators accepted a total of $8,876 for an average tobacco industry campaign contribution of
$683. One of the three Independent legislators accepted $1,000 in tobacco industry campaign
contributions. Finally, 18 of the 33 Republican legislators accepted a total of $21,596 for an
average contribution of $654.
Elected Officials Receiving the Highest Amounts of Tobacco Industry Contributions
Table 3  lists Nebraska legislators and candidates who accepted $1,000 or more from the
tobacco industry and its allies during the 2001-2002 legislative session. Among these 16
legislators, the average tobacco policy score was 3.2. Four of the legislators were Democrats
(25%), one was Independent (6%), and eleven were Republican (69%). Both Speaker Curt
Bromm (R-Wahoo; 4.5 policy score; $6,550 lifetime industry total) and Chairperson of the
Executive Board Pat Engel (D-South Sioux City; 3.2 policy score; $5,750 lifetime industry total)
accepted $1,500 in tobacco industry campaign contributions and Speaker Bromm accepted an
additional $250 from a tobacco industry ally.  Among the leadership of the individual
committees, the following individuals were top recipients: Chair Pedersen (R-Elkhorn; 3.5
policy score; $7,600 lifetime industry total) of the Committee on Committees, Chair Engel and
Vice Chair Cudaback (R-Riverdale; 2.5 policy score; $5,350 lifetime industry total) of the
Committee on Reference, Chair Hudkins (R-Malcolm; 4.2 policy score; $6,000 lifetime industry
total) and Vice Chair Baker (R-Trenton; 2.0 policy score; $4,000 lifetime industry total) of the
Committee on Rules, Vice Chair Pederson (R-North Platte; 5.2 policy score; $2,000 lifetime
industry total) of the Committee on Appropriations, and Vice Chair Maxwell (I-Omaha; 4.6
policy score; $2,000 lifetime industry total) of the Committee on Education. 
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Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
Lifetime 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Aguilar, Ray 35 R 5 $0 $1,026 $0 $0 $0 $1,026 $0 $1,026 8.2
Baker, Tom 44 R 5 $1,500 $2,500 $1,500 $2,699 $3,000 $5,199 $4,000 $6,721 2.0
Beutler, Chris 28 D 21 $0 $500 $0 $250 $0 $750 $5,000 $6,827 8.0
Bourne, Patrick 8 D 5 $2,000 $2,000 $1,500 $1,716 $3,500 $3,716 $4,000 $4,468 1.8
Brashear, Kermit 4 R 9 $1,500 $2,000 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,500 $7,000 $8,551 2.8
Bromm, Curt 23 R 11 $2,000 $2,800 $1,500 $1,750 $3,500 $4,550 $6,550 $8,050 4.5
Brown, Pam 6 D 9 $250 $250 $0 $350 $250 $600 $2,750 $4,152 7.3
Burling, Carroll 33 R 3 $0 $500 $0 $0 $0 $500 $0 $500 4.4
Byars, Dennis 30 R 13 $1,250 $1,250 $500 $750 $1,750 $2,000 $3,150 $4,178 7.7
Chambers, Ernie 11 I 33 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 7.7
Combs, Jeanne 32 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 4.2
Connealy, Matt 16 D 5 $500 $500 $500 $900 $1,000 $1,400 $1,500 $2,050 7.2
Cudaback, Jim 36 R 13 $1,500 $1,500 $1,000 $1,000 $2,500 $2,500 $5,350 $6,151 2.5
Cunningham, Doug 40 R 3 $1,400 $9,946 $1,049 $2,506 $2,449 $12,452 $2,449 $12,452 1.5
Engel, Pat 17 D 11 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,000 $5,750 $6,045 3.2
Erdman, Philip 47 R 3 $0 $0 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 1.8
Foley, Mike 29 R 3 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 5.0
Friend, Mike 10 R 1 $0 $0 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 3.0
Hartnett, Paul 45 D 19 $0 $770 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,770 $1,750 $3,840 2.3
Hudkins, Carol 21 R 11 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $6,000 $6,357 4.2
Janssen, Ray 15 D 11 $2,300 $2,600 $500 $800 $2,800 $3,400 $8,550 $9,798 1.5
Jensen, Jim 20 R 9 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $427 8.5
Johnson, Joel 37 R 2 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 7.7
Jones, Jim 43 R 11 $750 $1,250 $0 $500 $750 $1,750 $1,500 $3,050 4.8
Kremer, Bob 34 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $541 $0 $541 $0 $875 4.7
Kruse, Lowen 13 D 3 $0 $0 $500 $733 $500 $733 $500 $773 7.6
Landis, David 46 D 25 $0 $0 $0 $327 $0 $327 $3,550 $6,910 5.4
Louden, LeRoy 49 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 4.0
Maxwell, Chip 9 I 3 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 4.6
McDonald, Vickie 41 R 3 $0 $0 $0 $500 $0 $500 $0 $500 6.2
Mines, Mick 18 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $700 $0 $700 $0 $700 3.8
Mossey, Ray 3 R 2 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 3.4
Pedersen, Dwite 39 R 11 $2,650 $4,029 $1,000 $1,500 $3,650 $5,529 $7,600 $11,612 3.5
Pederson, Don 42 R 8 $500 $500 $500 $1,098 $1,000 $1,598 $2,000 $2,840 5.2
Preister, Donald 5 D 11 $0 $679 $0 $0 $0 $679 $0 $2,284 8.8
Price, Marian 26 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $252 $0 $252 $0 $352 7.7
Quandahl, Mark 31 R 5 $1,400 $2,617 $1,500 $1,800 $2,900 $4,417 $2,900 $4,417 2.6
Raikes, Ron 25 I 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $750 $1,899 5.5
Redfield, Pam 12 R 6 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 6.8
Schimek, DiAnna 27 D 15 $0 $300 $0 $0 $0 $300 $1,550 $5,215 8.0
Schrock, Ed 38 R 13 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $100 5.8
Smith, Adrian 48 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $300 1.7
Stuhr, Elaine 24 R 9 $500 $500 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000 $1,250 $1,492 4.3
Stuthman, Arnie 22 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 2.7
Synowiecki, John 7 D 3 $0 $0 $1,000 $1,300 $1,000 $1,300 $1,000 $1,300 5.7
Thompson, Nancy 14 D 7 $0 $371 $0 $0 $0 $371 $0 $926 8.7
Tyson, Gene 19 R 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $250 $250 1.5
Vrtiska, Floyd 1 R 11 $0 $1,241 $0 $0 $0 $1,241 $1,100 $2,265 6.2
Wehrbein, Roger 2 R 17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $50 7.5
TOTALS $23,500 $43,129 $22,049 $31,472 $45,549 $74,601 $92,749 $144,703 5.0
Table 2: Tobacco Industry Contributions to Members of the 2003 Nebraska Legislature
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Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002
1999-2002 
Total
Lifetime 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Baker, Tom 44 R 5 $1,500 $2,500 $1,500 $2,699 $3,000 $5,199 $4,000 $6,721 2.0
Cunningham, Doug 40 R 3 $1,400 $9,946 $1,049 $2,506 $2,449 $12,452 $2,449 $12,452 1.5
Friend, Mike 10 R 1 $0 $0 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 3.0
Quandahl, Mark 31 R 5 $1,400 $2,617 $1,500 $1,800 $2,900 $4,417 $2,900 $4,417 2.6
Bromm, Curt 23 R 11 $2,000 $2,800 $1,500 $1,750 $3,500 $4,550 $6,550 $8,050 4.5
Bourne, Patrick 8 D 5 $2,000 $2,000 $1,500 $1,716 $3,500 $3,716 $4,000 $4,468 1.8
Brashear, Kermit 4 R 9 $1,500 $2,000 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,500 $7,000 $8,551 2.8
Engel, Pat 17 D 11 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,000 $5,750 $6,045 3.2
Pedersen, Dwite 39 R 11 $2,650 $4,029 $1,000 $1,500 $3,650 $5,529 $7,600 $11,612 3.5
Synowiecki, John 7 D 3 $0 $0 $1,000 $1,300 $1,000 $1,300 $1,000 $1,300 5.7
Pederson, Don 42 R 8 $500 $500 $500 $1,098 $1,000 $1,598 $2,000 $2,840 5.2
Cudaback, Jim 36 R 13 $1,500 $1,500 $1,000 $1,000 $2,500 $2,500 $5,350 $6,151 2.5
Erdman, Philip 47 R 3 $0 $0 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 1.8
Hartnett, Paul 45 D 19 $0 $770 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,770 $1,750 $3,840 2.3
Hudkins, Carol 21 R 11 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $6,000 $6,357 4.2
Maxwell, Chip 9 I 3 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 4.6
TOTALS $17,950 $32,162 $19,549 $24,369 $37,499 $56,531 $61,349 $87,804 3.2
Table 3: Top Recipients of Campaign Contributions from the Tobacco Industry in Nebraska,
2001-2002
Elected Officials Who Did Not Accept Tobacco Industry Contributions
Table 4 lists the legislators and candidates who did not accept tobacco industry campaign
contributions during the 2001-2002 legislative session. The average tobacco policy score for
these 20 legislators was 5.8. Three legislators were Democrats (15%), two were Independents
(10%), and the remaining 15 were Republicans (75%). In addition, there were eight legislators
who accepted contributions from tobacco industry allies, but not directly from the tobacco
companies, including: Mick Mines (R-Blair; 3.8 policy score, $0 lifetime industry total), Bob
Kremer (R-Aurora; 4.7 policy score; $0 lifetime industry total), Jim Jones (R-Eddyville; 4.8
policy score; $1,500 lifetime industry total), Vickie McDonald (R-Rockville; 6.2 policy score;
$0 lifetime industry total), Pam Brown (D-Omaha; 7.3 policy score; $2,750 lifetime industry
total), David Landis (D-Lincoln; 5.4 policy score; $3,550 lifetime industry total), Marian Price
(R-Lincoln; 7.7 policy score; $0 lifetime industry total), and Chris Beutler (D-Lincoln; 8.0 policy
score; $5,000 lifetime industry total).
Relationship Between Campaign Contributions and Legislative Behavior
Previous research has demonstrated a relationship between campaign contributions from
the tobacco industry and policy making behavior among legislators.31, 32  We sought to test this
relationship in Nebraska using the 2001-2002 campaign contribution data. The hypothesis was
that tobacco industry campaign contributions were associated with sympathetic behavior towards
the tobacco industry and that the tobacco industry may continue to provide or increase
contributions to legislators who have acted in the tobacco industry's best interest in the past.
Simultaneous regression equations using two stage least squares was used to test the hypothesis.
The simultaneous equations regression model consists of two equations. The first
equation predicts the tobacco policy score received in 2001-2002 from the total tobacco industry
campaign contributions received during the 2001-2002 election cycle and political affiliation.
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Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
Lifetime 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Aguilar, Ray 35 R 5 $0 $1,026 $0 $0 $0 $1,026 $0 $1,026 8.2
Burling, Carroll 33 R 3 $0 $500 $0 $0 $0 $500 $0 $500 4.4
Chambers, Ernie 11 I 33 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 7.7
Combs, Jeanne 32 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 4.2
Foley, Mike 29 R 3 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 5.0
Jensen, Jim 20 R 9 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $427 8.5
Johnson, Joel 37 R 2 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 7.7
Louden, LeRoy 49 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 4.0
Mossey, Ray 3 R 2 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 3.4
Preister, Donald 5 D 11 $0 $679 $0 $0 $0 $679 $0 $2,284 8.8
Raikes, Ron 25 I 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $750 $1,899 5.5
Redfield, Pam 12 R 6 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 6.8
Schimek, DiAnna 27 D 15 $0 $300 $0 $0 $0 $300 $1,550 $5,215 8.0
Schrock, Ed 38 R 13 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $100 5.8
Smith, Adrian 48 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $300 1.7
Stuthman, Arnie 22 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 2.7
Thompson, Nancy 14 D 7 $0 $371 $0 $0 $0 $371 $0 $926 8.7
Tyson, Gene 19 R 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $250 $250 1.5
Vrtiska, Floyd 1 R 11 $0 $1,241 $0 $0 $0 $1,241 $1,100 $2,265 6.2
Wehrbein, Roger 2 R 17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $50 7.5
TOTALS $0 $4,117 $0 $0 $0 $4,117 $3,650 $15,242 5.8
Table 4: Elected Officials and Candidates Who Did Not Accept Tobacco Industry Campaign
Contributions, 2001-2002
The second equation predicts the total tobacco industry campaign contributions received during
the 2001-2002 election cycle from the tobacco policy score and political affiliation. The total
campaign contributions used here include contributions from the tobacco industry as well as
tobacco industry third party allies.
Table 5: Relationship Between Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions and Legislative
Behavior During the 2001-2002 Nebraska Legislative Session
Variable Coefficient Standard Error t-value p
Dependent Variable = Tobacco Policy Scores (0-10)
Constant 7.06 0.61 11.56 <0.0001
Contributions 
(dollars in thousands)
-1.81 0.52 -3.51 0.001
Republican -0.66 0.31 -2.13 0.039
R2=0.27
Dependent Variable = Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions (dollars in thousands)
Constant 3.51 0.81 4.32 <0.0001
Tobacco Policy Score -0.49 0.13 -3.70 0.0006
Republican -0.32 0.17 -1.84 0.0726
R2=0.23
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Senate Candidate Party 2001-2002 1999-2000 1997-1998 1995-1996 1993-1994 1991-1992 1989-1990 Total
Hagel, Chuck R $10,000 $1,000 $15,000 $10,000 $36,000
Nelson, Ben D $5,500 $11,000 $12,500 $29,000
Kerrey, Bob D -$1,000 $10,750 $2,000 $3,000 $23,500 $12,250 $50,500
Exon, Jim D $500 $11,999 $12,499
Stenberg, Donald R $2,000 $2,000
Moore, Scott R $1,000 $1,000
Total Senate 
Contributions $14,500 $25,750 $17,000 $25,500 $23,500 $12,750 $11,999 $130,999
House Candidate Party 2001-2002 1999-2000 1997-1998 1995-1996 1993-1994 1991-1992 1989-1990 Total
Terry, Lee R $500 $500 $1,000
Bereuter, Doug R $2,050 $3,000 $2,000 $1,000 $900 $1,000 $9,950
Barrett, Bill R $1,000 $2,000 $1,500 $1,800 $2,250 $8,550
Christensen, Jon R $3,500 $3,500
Davis, James Martin D $500 $500
Hoagland, Peter D $6,000 $1,500 $1,500 $9,000
Total House 
Contributions $500 $2,550 $4,000 $8,000 $8,500 $4,200 $4,750 $32,500
Total Congressional 
Contributions $15,000 $28,300 $21,000 $33,500 $32,000 $16,950 $16,749 $163,499
Table 6: Tobacco Industry Contributions to Nebraska's Congressional Delegation, 1989-2002
The results of this analysis are presented in Table 5 demonstrate strong relationships
between legislative behavior and tobacco industry campaign contributions. First, for every
$1,000 increase in the campaign contributions received by the tobacco industry, the legislator's
tobacco policy score decreased (i.e., became more pro-tobacco industry) by an average of 1.8
points. On average, Republican legislators had tobacco policy scores that were 0.66 points below
their Democratic colleagues receiving the same amount of tobacco industry campaign
contributions. Second, on average, for every one point increase in a legislator's tobacco policy
score, tobacco industry campaign contributions decreased by $490. While most of the findings
were statistically significant (p<0.05), the overall fit of the models was low due to a small
sample size (n=49).
The Nebraska Legislature Versus the United States Congress
In 2001-2002, the tobacco industry contributed more money to the Nebraska Legislature
than Nebraska’s candidates for the U.S. Congress.  During the 2001-2002 legislative session, the
tobacco industry contributed a total of $15,000 to members of Nebraska's Congressional
delegation, while it contributed $40,172 to the Nebraska Legislature. Both of Nebraska’s current
U.S. Senators (as of March 2004), Republican Chuck Hagel ($36,000 lifetime industry total) and
Democrat Ben Nelson ($29,000 lifetime industry total (as U.S. Senator)), have accepted money
from the tobacco industry (Table 6).  Two of Nebraska’s three current members of the U.S.
House of Representatives, Republican Doug Bereuter (District 1 - $9,950 lifetime industry total)
and Lee Terry (District 2 - $1,000 lifetime industry total), have received tobacco industry
contributions.  Only Republican Congressman Tom Osborne (District 3) has not taken tobacco
industry contributions out of Nebraska five members of the U.S. Congress. 
Legislative Leaders
During 2003, the Nebraska Legislature was dominated by individuals identifying
themselves as Republicans. As such, the Speaker of the Legislature was Republican Curt Bromm
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Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
Lifetime 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Bromm, Curt          
(Speaker) 23 R 11 $2,000 $2,800 $1,500 $1,750 $3,500 $4,550 $6,550 $8,050 4.5
Engel, Pat                   
(Chair of Exec. Board) 17 D 11 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,000 $5,750 $6,045 3.2
TOTALS $3,500 $4,300 $3,000 $3,250 $6,500 $7,550 $12,300 $14,095 3.8
Table 7: Tobacco Industry Contributions to the 2003 Nebraska Legislative Leadership
who accepted a total of $1,750 during 2001-2002 and a total of $8,050 during his political career
from the tobacco industry and its allies. Senator Bromm received a neutral tobacco policy score
of 4.5. Chairperson of the Executive Committee Pat Engel received $3,250 from the tobacco
industry and its allies during 2001-2002 and a total of $6,045 during his political career. Senator
Engel received a pro-tobacco industry policy score of 3.2. (Table 7)
Legislative Committees
In addition to the influence that may be exerted by legislative leadership, the leadership
and individual members of select committees can also play a significant role in tobacco control
policymaking. The organizational committees, including the Committee on Committees,
Enrollment and Review, Reference and Rules, may determine the fate and direction of tobacco-
related legislation. During the late 1990s and into the 2000s, there were also several committees
that reviewed tobacco-related bills, including the Committee on Appropriations, Revenue,
Health and Human Services, and Education.  The Appropriations Committee and the Revenue
Committee deal with the budget for the state with cigarette excise tax increase proposals being
assigned to the Revenue Committee.  The Health and Human Services Committee has reviewed
proposed legislation on clean indoor air and youth access to tobacco.  The Education Committee
was responsible for LB 1436, the legislative bill which eventually granted $7 million for each of
three years to tobacco control in Nebraska.
Committee on Committees
Chairperson of the Committee on Committees, Dwite Pedersen, accepted $1,500 in
contributions from the tobacco industry during 2001-2002 and received a tobacco policy score of
3.5. The Vice Chairperson, Donald Preister, did not accept any contributions from the tobacco
industry and received the highest tobacco policy score of anyone in the legislature, 8.8.  Nine
members of the Committee on Committees accepted a total of $9,086 during the 2001-2002
legislative session and received an average tobacco policy score of 5.3 Contributions ranged
from $1,716 accepted by Patrick Bourne (D-Omaha; $4,000 lifetime industry total) who received
a tobacco policy score of 1.8 to a low of $252 accepted by Marian Price who received a tobacco
policy score of 7.7. In addition, three members of the committee (Jim Jensen (R-Omaha; 8.5
policy score; $0 lifetime industry total), DiAnna Schimek (D-Lincoln; 8.0 policy score; $1,550
lifetime industry total) and Ed Schrock (R-Elm Creek; 5.8 policy score; $0 lifetime industry
total) did not accept any donations from the tobacco industry (Table 8). 
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Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
Lifetime 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Engel, Pat 
(Chairperson) 17 D 11 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,000 $5,750 $6,045 3.2
Cudaback, Jim        
(Vice Chairperson) 36 R 13 $1,500 $1,500 $1,000 $1,000 $2,500 $2,500 $5,350 $6,151 2.5
Beutler, Chris 28 D 21 $0 $500 $0 $250 $0 $750 $5,000 $6,827 8.0
Bromm, Curt 23 R 11 $2,000 $2,800 $1,500 $1,750 $3,500 $4,550 $6,550 $8,050 4.5
Chambers, Ernie 11 I 33 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 7.7
Janssen, Ray 15 D 11 $2,300 $2,600 $500 $800 $2,800 $3,400 $8,550 $9,798 1.5
Jones, Jim 43 R 11 $750 $1,250 $0 $500 $750 $1,750 $1,500 $3,050 4.8
Thompson, Nancy 14 D 7 $0 $371 $0 $0 $0 $371 $0 $926 8.7
Tyson, Gene 19 R 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $250 $250 1.5
Wehrbein, Roger     
(ex officio) 2 R 17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $50 7.5
TOTALS $8,050 $10,521 $4,500 $5,800 $12,550 $16,321 $32,950 $41,147 5.0
Table 9: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to the 2003 Committee on References
Name of 
Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
Lifetime 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Pedersen, Dwite 
(Chairperson) 39 R 11 $2,650 $4,029 $1,000 $1,500 $3,650 $5,529 $7,600 $11,612 3.5
Preister, Donald 
(Vice Chairperson) 5 D 11 $0 $679 $0 $0 $0 $679 $0 $2,284 8.8
Bourne, Patrick 8 D 5 $2,000 $2,000 $1,500 $1,716 $3,500 $3,716 $4,000 $4,468 1.8
Brashear, Kermit 4 R 9 $1,500 $2,000 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,500 $7,000 $8,551 2.8
Bromm, Curt 23 R 11 $2,000 $2,800 $1,500 $1,750 $3,500 $4,550 $6,550 $8,050 4.5
Cudaback, Jim 36 R 13 $1,500 $1,500 $1,000 $1,000 $2,500 $2,500 $5,350 $6,151 2.5
Jensen, Jim 20 R 9 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $427 8.5
Jones, Jim 43 R 11 $750 $1,250 $0 $500 $750 $1,750 $1,500 $3,050 4.8
Kremer, Bob 34 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $541 $0 $541 $0 $875 4.7
Landis, David 46 D 25 $0 $0 $0 $327 $0 $327 $3,550 $6,910 5.4
Price, Marian 26 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $252 $0 $252 $0 $352 7.7
Schimek, DiAnna 27 D 15 $0 $300 $0 $0 $0 $300 $1,550 $5,215 8.0
Schrock, Ed 38 R 13 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $100 5.8
TOTALS $10,400 $14,558 $6,500 $9,086 $16,900 $23,644 $37,100 $58,045 5.3
Table 8: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to the 2003 Committee on Committees
Committee on Enrollment and Review
In 2003, there was one member of the Committee on Enrollment and Review:
Chairperson Ray Mossey (R-Papillion; 3.4 policy score; $0 lifetime industry total). Senator
Mossey did not receive any contributions from the tobacco industry during 2001-2002 and had
not accepted any tobacco contributions throughout his political career. However, Senator
Mossey received a pro-tobacco industry policy score of 3.4.  Senator Mossey was appointed to
his position after the previous senator, Jon Bruning (Sarpy County - $1750 lifetime industry total
(as state Senator)/$1,000 lifetime industry total (as Attorney General)), resigned to run for
Attorney General; therefore, Senator Mossey has yet to participate in an election.
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Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
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Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Wehrbein, Roger 
(Chairperson) 2 R 17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $50 7.5
Pederson, Don     
(Vice Chairperson) 42 R 8 $500 $500 $500 $1,098 $1,000 $1,598 $2,000 $2,840 5.2
Beutler, Chris 28 D 21 $0 $500 $0 $250 $0 $750 $5,000 $6,827 8.0
Cudaback, Jim 36 R 13 $1,500 $1,500 $1,000 $1,000 $2,500 $2,500 $5,350 $6,151 2.5
Engel, Pat 17 D 11 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,000 $5,750 $6,045 3.2
Kruse, Lowen 13 D 3 $0 $0 $500 $733 $500 $733 $500 $773 7.6
Price, Marian 26 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $252 $0 $252 $0 $352 7.7
Synowiecki, John 7 D 3 $0 $0 $1,000 $1,300 $1,000 $1,300 $1,000 $1,300 5.7
Thompson, Nancy 14 D 7 $0 $371 $0 $0 $0 $371 $0 $926 8.7
TOTALS $3,500 $4,371 $4,500 $6,133 $8,000 $10,504 $19,600 $25,264 6.2
Table 11: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to the 2003 Committee on Appropriations
Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
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Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Hudkins, Carol 
(Chairperson) 21 R 11 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $6,000 $6,357 4.2
Baker, Tom        
(Vice Chairperson) 44 R 5 $1,500 $2,500 $1,500 $2,699 $3,000 $5,199 $4,000 $6,721 2.0
Beutler, Chris 28 D 21 $0 $500 $0 $250 $0 $750 $5,000 $6,827 8.0
Bromm, Curt         
(ex officio) 23 R 11 $2,000 $2,800 $1,500 $1,750 $3,500 $4,550 $6,550 $8,050 4.5
Pedersen, Dwite 39 R 11 $2,650 $4,029 $1,000 $1,500 $3,650 $5,529 $7,600 $11,612 3.5
Stuhr, Elaine 24 R 9 $500 $500 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000 $1,250 $1,492 4.3
TOTALS $7,650 $11,329 $5,500 $7,699 $13,150 $19,028 $30,400 $41,059 4.4
Table 10: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to the 2003 Committee on Rules
Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
Office
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Tobacco 
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
Lifetime 
Tobacco 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Grand 
Total
Policy 
Score
Landis, David 
(Chairperson) 46 D 25 $0 $0 $0 $327 $0 $327 $3,550 $6,910 5.4
Connealy, Matt   
(Vice Chairperson) 16 D 5 $500 $500 $500 $900 $1,000 $1,400 $1,500 $2,050 7.2
Baker, Tom 44 R 5 $1,500 $2,500 $1,500 $2,699 $3,000 $5,199 $4,000 $6,721 2.0
Bourne, Patrick 8 D 5 $2,000 $2,000 $1,500 $1,716 $3,500 $3,716 $4,000 $4,468 1.8
Hartnett, Paul 45 D 19 $0 $770 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,770 $1,750 $3,840 2.3
Janssen, Ray 15 D 11 $2,300 $2,600 $500 $800 $2,800 $3,400 $8,550 $9,798 1.5
Raikes, Ron 25 I 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $750 $1,899 5.5
Redfield, Pam 12 R 6 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 6.8
TOTALS $6,300 $8,370 $5,000 $7,442 $11,300 $15,812 $24,100 $35,686 4.1
Table 12: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to the 2003 Committee on Revenue
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Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years in 
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Tobacco 
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1999-2000 1999-2000
Tobacco 
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
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Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
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Tobacco 
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Total
Lifetime 
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Jensen, Jim 
(Chairperson) 20 R 9 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $427 8.5
Byars, Dennis       
(Vice Chairperson) 30 R 13 $1,250 $1,250 $500 $750 $1,750 $2,000 $3,150 $4,178 7.7
Cunningham, Doug 40 R 3 $1,400 $9,946 $1,049 $2,506 $2,449 $12,452 $2,449 $12,452 1.5
Erdman, Philip 47 R 3 $0 $0 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 1.8
Johnson, Joel 37 R 2 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 7.7
Maxwell, Chip 9 I 3 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 4.6
Stuthman, Arnie 22 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 2.7
TOTALS $3,650 $12,196 $3,549 $5,256 $7,199 $17,452 $8,599 $20,057 4.9
Table 13: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to the 2003 Committee on Health and
Human Services 
Committee on References
Six of the ten members of the Committee on References accepted tobacco industry
campaign contributions from the tobacco industry in 2001-2002 and the committee received an
average tobacco policy score of 5.0. Both Chairperson Engel and Vice Chairperson Cudaback
accepted tobacco industry donations, $1,500 and $1,000 respectively, and received pro-tobacco
industry policy scores, 3.2 and 2.5, respectively (Table 9).
Committee on Rules
All six members of the Committee on Rules accepted tobacco industry contributions
during the 2001-2002 legislative session, ranging from a high of $2,699 to a low of $250,
earning the committee an average tobacco policy score of 4.4. Chairperson Hudkins accepted
$1,000 and received a tobacco policy score of 4.2. Vice Chairperson Baker accepted $2,699 and
received a tobacco policy score of 2.0. Of the remaining members of the committee, only one
member (Senator Beutler) received a pro tobacco control policy score (8.0) (Table 10).
Committee on Appropriations
Seven of the nine members of the Committee on Appropriations accepted tobacco industry
campaign contributions for a total of $6,133. The committee received an average tobacco policy
score of 6.2.  Chairperson Wehrbein (R-Plattsmouth; 7.5 policy score; $0 lifetime industry total)
did not accept any contributions and received a pro tobacco control policy score of 7.5, while
Vice Chairperson Pederson accepted $1,098 from the tobacco industry and received a tobacco
policy score of 5.2. The remaining members of the committee accepted a high of $1,500 (Pat
Engel) to a low of $252 (Marian Price). Senators Cudaback and Engel were the only members to
receive pro tobacco industry policy scores (Table 11).
Committee on Revenue
Six of the eight members of the Committee on Revenue accepted tobacco industry
contributions during 2001-2002, totaling $7,442. The committee received an average tobacco
policy score of 4.1. Chairperson Landis accepted $327 and received a tobacco policy score of 5.4
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Raikes, Ron 
(Chairperson) 25 I 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $750 $1,899 5.5
Maxwell, Chip      
(Vice Chairperson) 9 I 3 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 4.6
Bourne, Patrick 8 D 5 $2,000 $2,000 $1,500 $1,716 $3,500 $3,716 $4,000 $4,468 1.8
Brashear, Kermit 4 R 9 $1,500 $2,000 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,500 $7,000 $8,551 2.8
Byars, Dennis 30 R 13 $1,250 $1,250 $500 $750 $1,750 $2,000 $3,150 $4,178 7.7
McDonald, Vickie 41 R 3 $0 $0 $0 $500 $0 $500 $0 $500 6.2
Schrock, Ed 38 R 13 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $100 5.8
Stuhr, Elaine 24 R 9 $500 $500 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000 $1,250 $1,492 4.3
TOTALS $6,250 $6,750 $5,000 $5,966 $11,250 $12,716 $18,150 $23,188 4.8
Table 14: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to the 2003 Committee on Education
and Vice Chairperson Connealy (D-Decatur; $1,500 lifetime industry total) accepted $900 and
received a tobacco policy score of 7.2. Of the remaining four members who accepted tobacco
industry contributions (ranging from $2,699 to $800), all four members received pro tobacco
policy scores (Table 12)
Committee on Health and Human Services
Four of the seven members of the Committee on Health and Human Services accepted a
total of $5,256 in campaign contributions from the tobacco industry and the committee received
an average tobacco policy score of 4.9. Both Chairperson Jensen and Vice Chairperson Byars
(R-Beatrice; $3,150 lifetime industry total) received pro-tobacco control policy scores of 8.5 and
7.7, respectively. However, Vice Chairperson Byars accepted $750 from the tobacco industry
during 2001-2002.  Two of the remaining committee members who accepted tobacco industry
donations, Cunningham and Erdman (R-Bayard; 1.8 policy score; $1,000 lifetime industry total),
also received pro tobacco industry policy scores. The final recipient of tobacco money (Chip
Maxwell) received a neutral tobacco policy score of 4.6 (Table 13).
Committee on Education
Of the eight members of the Committee on Education, only two members did not accept
tobacco industry contributions: Chairperson Ron Raikes (I-Lincoln; 5.5 policy score; $750
lifetime industry total) and Senator Ed Schrock. The remaining members of the committee
accepted a total of $5,966 in contributions from the tobacco industry during 2001-2002. The
committee received an average tobacco policy score of 4.8. Vice Chairperson Chip Maxwell
received $1,000 in campaign contributions from the tobacco industry and a tobacco policy score
of 4.6. The remaining five legislators received tobacco industry contributions ranging from
$,1716 to $500 (Table 14).
Constitutional Officers
Constitutional officers and candidates for the 1999-2002 term accepted a total of $1,000
from the tobacco industry and an additional $22,560 from tobacco industry allies. Attorney
General Jon Bruning ($1,000 lifetime industry total (as Attorney General) was the only
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Tobacco Company 1997 Total 1998 Total 1999 Total 2000 Total 2001 Total 2002 Total Grand Total
Philip Morris $56,336 $75,671 $61,692 $67,823 $38,667 $64,724 $364,913
R. J. Reynolds $35,707 $38,501 $35,301 $40,631 $55,063 $46,000 $251,202
United States Tobacco $45,000 $45,000 $54,000 $48,000 $51,000 $51,782 $294,782
Lorillard $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $25,000 $25,000
Brown & Williamson $0 $0 $22,558 $18,500 $10,000 $25,009 $76,067
Smokeless Tobacco 
Council $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $15,100 $15,100
Total Lobbying 
Expenditures 
Reported $137,043 $159,172 $173,550 $174,954 $154,730 $227,615 $1,027,064
Table 16: Tobacco Industry Lobbying Expenditures in Nebraska, 1997-2002
Name of Candidate Party 1999-2002 Industry Total 1999-2002 Total
Governor
Johanns, Mike R $0 $14,871
Dean, Stormy D $0 $0
Rosberg, Paul I $0 $0
Lt. Governor
Heineman, Dave R $0 $2,500
Chesterman, M. D $0 $0
Richards, Barry I $0 $0
Attorney General
Bruning, Jon R $1,000 $2,324
Meister, Mike D $0 $0
Auditor of Public Accounts
Witek, Kate R $0 $2,000
Wilken, D. D $0 $0
Rosberg, Kelly I $0 $0
Secretary of State
Gale, John R $0 $1,865
Stoddard, Jay D $0 $0
Rosberg, Jos. I $0 $0
Lewis, Tudor I $0 $0
State Treasurer
Byrd, Lorelee R $0 $0
Sheckler, Bob I $0 $0
Total $1,000 $23,560
Table 15: Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Constitutional Officers and Candidates,
1999-2002
constitutional officer to accept a donation from the tobacco companies. Governor Mike Johanns 
($0 lifetime industry total) accepted the highest amount of contributions from tobacco industry
allies: $14,871, which includes $9,500 and $1,000 from tobacco company-owned Kraft and
Miller Brewing, respectively.  In addition, Lt. Governor Dave Heineman, Attorney General Jon
Bruning, Auditor of Public Accounts Kate Witek, and Secretary of State John Gale accepted
contributions from tobacco industry allies. All of the candidates who accepted contributions
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from the tobacco industry or tobacco industry allies were Republicans. Only candidates for the
office of State Treasurer did not accept tobacco company or tobacco ally contributions (Table
15).
Lobbying Expenditures
In addition to a total of $40,172 in campaign contributions to elected officials and
candidates, the tobacco industry and its allies in Nebraska spent $382,345 on their lobbying
efforts in 2001-2002 (Table 16). 
Since 1997, the tobacco industry has steadily increased its lobbying expenditures. There was a
16% increase in expenditures between 1997 and 1998, which then slowed to a 9% increase
between 1998 and 1999 and a less than 1% increase between 1999 and 2000. Between 2000 and
2001, lobbying expenditures actually decreased by $20,000 (11% decrease) and then rebounded
in 2002, when the there was a 47% increase in expenditures. 
The tobacco industry lobbyists, especially Walt Radcliffe, are among the most powerful
lobbyists in the state and several of them have been working for the tobacco industry for over 15
years.  As a result, they can be very effective in opposing tobacco control legislation in
Nebraska.  It is not surprising that the tobacco industry spends so much money in lobbying
expenditures in comparison to direct campaign contributions.
CLEAN INDOOR AIR
The First Clean Indoor Air Legislation - LB 600 (1974)  
The first major clean indoor air legislation passed in Nebraska occurred in 1974 during
the first term of state Senator Shirley Marsh (Lincoln; $0 lifetime industry total), who would be a
major proponent of tobacco control throughout her 16 years serving in the Legislature.6  At the
time, Senator Marsh was the only female legislator; she was also the wife of the lieutenant
governor33.  After being elected, Senator Marsh attended a conference for the Order of Women
Legislators during the summer of 1973 where she learned about the first statewide smoking
restriction that had just passed in Arizona.6, 34  Because Senator Marsh had asthma and allergies
which made her very sensitive to tobacco smoke, the idea presented in the Arizona legislation of
restricting the number of areas where smoking was permitted appealed to her greatly and she
made the decision to introduce a similar bill in Nebraska during the next legislative session.6
When the legislative session began, Senator Marsh introduced LB 600, which stated
Whereas smoking of tobacco in any form is dangerous to the health and welfare of each
person, and whereas such smoking if done in any elevator, indoor theater, library, art
museum, concert hall, or bus which is used by or open to the public is harmful to the
public health, smoking of tobacco in any form in any area specified in this section is
prohibited, except that such prohibition shall not apply in any area designated as a
smoking area.7
  Since it is not possible to establish a smoking area in such a confined space, one effect of this
bill was to make elevators smokefree.   
30
The only change that was made from the Arizona legislation came from the passage of
an amendment that made LB 600 stronger.  The amendment added patient rooms in hospitals
as another area were smoking was not permitted unless it was specifically designated as a
smoking area.6, 7
LB 600 also provided for a penalty for smoking in a nonsmoking area.  Such an action
made the individual that was smoking guilty of a misdemeanor which was punishable by a fine
of not less than ten dollars but not more than one hundred dollars7.
While Senator Marsh was the driving force behind LB 600, she also gained the support
of  health workers.  At the public hearing before the Public Health and Welfare Committee,
Marjorie Bartels, who was the Executive Secretary of the Lancaster County Tuberculosis and
Respiratory Disease Association and was also representing the American Lung Association of
Nebraska testified in favor of the bill as did Helen Paetzel, a nurse, who was concerned about
the effect of smoking in hospitals35.
Testifying against the bill was a former Nebraska Governor Robert Crosby. A
Republican governor from 1953-1955, Crosby was representing the interests of the Nebraska
Association of Tobacco Distributors at the hearing.1, 35  He argued that this issue was often
addressed at the local level by city ordinances; therefore, it was unnecessary for the state to
take any action on clean indoor air35.  In fact, there were no local ordinances in effect in
Nebraska at this time that dealt with clean indoor air.
Despite the opposition from a former governor, Senator Marsh was successful in
passing LB 600.  The way that the bill was worded meant that any area within the locations
designated was to be a nonsmoking area unless it was specifically designed a smoking area.  In
principle, this meant that smoking was not permitted in patient rooms, elevators, indoor
theaters, libraries, art museums, concert halls and on buses unless signs were posted to
establish that location as a smoking area, but the law did not require the posting of “no
smoking” signs.  Because the failure of the law to require posting “no smoking” signs,
combined with the fact that smoking everywhere was the norm, the law had little practical
effect.
The importance of LB 600 came in its significance as Nebraska first clean indoor air
law and not in the level of protection that it initially provided from secondhand smoke. As
Senator Marsh stated when asked to comment on the fact that no fines were actually levied
during the first year of LB 600, she said, “My intent was not to have people arrested, it was to
raise the social awareness that nonsmokers also have rights.  To a great extent the law has done
that.”36  Due to the limitations of LB 600, it became necessary to clarify the distinction
between smoking and nonsmoking areas in later bills.
     
The first attempt to remedy this problem occurred the next year, in 1975.  According to
a bulletin released by the Tobacco Merchants Association of the U.S.,37 a bill numbered  LB 75
was passed to require the posting of “no smoking” signs in elevators but not in the other
locations mentioned in LB 600.  While representing a modest improvement in the signage
requirements, LB 75 also removed the penalty for smoking in nonsmoking areas, which had
been a $10-$100 fine, effectively negating any effort at meaningful enforcement of the limited
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provisions in LB 600.  It was not until 1977 that a penalty re-codification measure, LB 38,
passed to reestablish a penalty.37  Once again, smoking in a nonsmoking areas became a
misdemeanor punishable by a fine. 
First Attempt to Enact the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act  - LB 648 (1978)
The first attempt to significantly expand Senator Marsh’s clean indoor air bill occurred
in 1978, when Senator Larry Stoney (Omaha) sponsored LB 648, his first bill to establish the
Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.38  The major thrust of this bill was to include restaurants and
bars and other workplaces as public spaces in which smoking was prohibited except in
designated smoking areas.  According to Senator Marsh, Senator Stoney was a nonsmoker who
wanted to be able to eat in a restaurant without being subjected to secondhand smoke.6  Senator
Stoney had based his bill on the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act, which had passed in 1975.39,
40  The Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act was the nation’s first comprehensive clean indoor air
law in that it required separate smoking and nonsmoking sections in almost all public places
and it has passed rather easily because the tobacco industry was largely caught off-guard by the
developments in Minnesota.9  The passage of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act would be
under much more difficult circumstances because the tobacco industry was now prepared to
fight the passage of such laws. 
The purpose of Senator Stoney’s bill was to “protect the public health, comfort and
environment by prohibiting smoking in public places and at public meetings except in
designated smoking areas” which included, but was not limited to, “restaurants, retail stores,
offices and other commercial establishments, public conveyances, educational facilities,
hospitals, nursing homes, auditoriums, arenas, and meeting rooms,” but excluded  “private,
enclosed offices occupied exclusively by smokers even though such offices may be visited by
nonsmokers.”38
On January 23, 1978, a hearing was held on LB 648 before the Public Health and
Welfare Committee.  Testifying for the bill were doctors, individuals that were allergic to
tobacco smoke, the Women’s Christian Temperance Union, the American Lung Association,
and the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Council.40  The Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Council was an
early attempt to create a grassroots tobacco control coalition in Nebraska, but it received little
support and was subsequently dissolved.  Bess Popp, a Lincoln woman who stated that she had
a severe allergy to tobacco testified that secondhand smoke made her so sick that her “lifestyle
is severely limited” and she also stated that current restrictions on secondhand smoke were
inadequate.40, 41  Patrick Lynch, the chairman of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Council, told
the committee that, in addition to people with allergies, children and all nonsmokers needed to
be protected from tobacco smoke.40 He said, “I believe the state and the municipalities have the
duty to intervene in our behalf.”41 
Despite this support, LB 648 was not able to withstand  the opposition that the tobacco
industry brought to bear on it.  The bill was once again opposed by the former governor,
Robert Crosby, who was now representing the Tobacco Institute.40  In addition, the bill was
also opposed by the Police Officers’ Association of Nebraska, the mayors of Lincoln and
Crete, the Nebraska Restaurant Association, and Ray Oliverio, the Director of Public Affairs
for the Tobacco Institute.40  
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Table 17: History of Clean Indoor Air Activity in the Nebraska Legislature (Key Bills from 1974-2003) 
Year Bill Primary Sponsor Description Status
1974 LB600 Sen. Shirley Marsh
(Lincoln)
Prohibited smoking in elevators, indoor theaters, libraries, art museums, concert
halls, or buses unless it was specifically designated a smoking area; an
amendment was added to include patient rooms in hospitals.  Nebraska’s first
statewide clean indoor air law.
Passed 
1978 LB648 Sen. Larry Stoney
(Omaha)
First attempt to include restaurants, bars and other workplaces as public spaces
in which smoking was not allowed except in designated smoking areas.
Failed
1979 LB344 Sen. Stoney Included restaurants, bars and other workplaces as public spaces in which
smoking was not allowed except in designated smoking areas.  Designated the
Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.
Passed
1994 LB1064 Sen. Donald
Preister (Omaha) 
First attempt to make state buildings and vehicles smokefree. Failed
1995 LB121 Sen. Preister Second attempt to make state buildings and vehicles smokefree. Failed
1997 LB375 Sen. Preister Third attempt to make state buildings and vehicles smokefree. Failed
1999 LB211 Sen. Jerry Schmitt
(Ord)
Introduced as a bill to make only the Capitol smokefree.  Amended to make
almost all state buildings and vehicles smokefree.  First change to the Nebraska
Clean Indoor Air Act in 20 years of existence.
Passed
1999 LB750 Sen. Nancy
Thompson
(Papillion)
First attempt to amend the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act to make all
restaurants in Nebraska smokefree.
Failed
2000 LB 1194 Sen. Thompson Amended the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act to make commercial daycare
facilities smokefree.  
Passed
2001 LB227 Sen. Thompson Second attempt to make all restaurants in Nebraska smokefree. Failed
2003 LB45 Sen. Thompson Extended enforcement provisions of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act to
include businesses. 
Passed
2003 LB546 Sen. Thompson Third attempt to make all restaurants in Nebraska smokefree. Undecided
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Crosby argued that LB 648 “is an example of very excessive intervention in the
business of private citizens,” and continued, “My granddaughter has an allergy to milk; I don’t
propose to outlaw milk.”41  Don Dunn, who represented  the Police Officers’ Association at the
hearing, claimed that the bill would be unenforceable and that it would distract law
enforcement from more important duties.40  These claims were also echoed by Ray Oliverio,
the executive from the Tobacco Institute.41  Over the next two years, Oliverio would be heavily
involved in opposing the passage of clean indoor air legislation in Nebraska.  
These arguments were part of a well-coordinated attack on the feasibility of LB 648
orchestrated by the Tobacco Institute.  In a letter sent out to 23 other tobacco industry
executives three days after he testified before the Public Health and Welfare Committee,
Oliverio spoke about the plan that was organized to defeat LB 648.42  He wrote to these
executives saying, “In preparation for the hearing we contacted and enlisted the support of the
Police Officers’ Association of Nebraska, the Tobacco Wholesalers’ Association of Nebraska,
the Nebraska Restaurant Association, and the Liquor Wholesalers’ Association.”42  Don Dunn,
who served as the lobbyist for the Police Officers’ Association at the committee hearing, also
represented the Tobacco Wholesalers’s Association of Nebraska and the Nebraska Restaurant
Association.43  
The concerted attack on LB 648 at the hearing had the tobacco industry’s desired
effect.  As Oliverio relates in his letter to fellow Tobacco Institute executives three days after
the hearing, “The day following that hearing the Committee met in executive session and voted
5 to 1 not to report the bill out of committee.  Significantly, the only senator on the Public
Health and Welfare Committee to vote in favor of reporting the bill out of committee was not
present at the hearing on the previous day.”42
The success of the tobacco industry against LB 648 may have led them to become
overconfident in their attitude towards future legislative attempts at clean indoor air laws in
Nebraska.  As Oliverio wrote to senior executives throughout the tobacco industry, “LB 648 is
dead for this year and because of the overwhelming vote (5 to 1) against it we are hopeful that
it will not be reintroduced next year.”42  The head of the Public Health and Welfare Committee
apparently did nothing to dissuade this opinion.  Richard Safley, the Field Sales Manager for
Lorillard Tobacco stated in a letter sent on October 24, 1978, to Art Stevens, a member of the
Legal Department at Lorillard, “The opinion expressed by the Committee Leader was that
unless stimulated by anti-[smoking] group movements, the bill probably would not be
introduced at the next session.”43  This would not be the case;  at the next session, Senator
Stoney would sponsor LB 344, which was passed as the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.       
Passage of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act - LB 344 (1979)
Despite the failure of LB 648 to be voted out of committee, Senator Larry Stoney
introduced a similar bill on January 16, 1979.  The only differences between the two bills were
some minor alterations to the wording, but in effect, no substantial changes were made. 
Similar to the smoking restrictions that had previously been established by Senator Marsh’s
bill7, LB 344 was worded so that the entirety of a public place was assumed to be nonsmoking
unless it was specifically designated as a smoking area.44  As of 2004, this same assumption
applies in Nebraska. 
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In the original version of LB 344, the State Board of Health had the responsibility of
developing rules and regulations to implement the law.44  This section was later amended so
that the Department of Health was responsible for developing these regulations.8  The State
Board of Health was a politically appointed body while the Department of Health consisted of
government employees.  This section was also amended so the Department of Health was
required to “consult with interested persons and professional organizations before
promulgating such rules and regulations.”8  These changes to LB 344 would have major
ramifications for developing these implementing rules and regulations..  
While a concerted effort was made to prevent the passage of this bill, the tobacco
industry’s strategy seemed to differ from the previous year.  Instead of utilizing an impressive
list of individuals to testify before the Public Health and Welfare Committee, the tobacco
industry turned to the Tobacco Action Network (TAN) to provide most of the opposition to LB
344.
TAN was organized by the tobacco industry to create a network of tobacco industry
workers that could be mobilized to oppose any tobacco control activities.  As Philip Morris’
manual for employee participation in this organization explained, “TAN is an umbrella
organization formed by the member companies of the Tobacco Institute (TI).  Its purpose is to
bring together and coordinate all segments of the tobacco family – growers, manufacturers,
wholesalers, retailers, and vendors – as well as our allies.”45  A different version of the same
manual explained that the purpose of TAN was to “oppose the enactment of restrictive laws
and the imposition of punitive taxation.”46  This version also detailed how the organization was
structured:
TAN is headed by a national director in Washington. D.C.  The national director works
closely with a TAN Corporate Coordinators Committee made up of senior executives
from each of the major participating cigarette manufacturers.
TAN is also organized on the state level in many states.  Each TAN organization is
headed up by a state director ...  The State TAN Director works closely with a State
TAN Advisory Committee made up of representatives from each segment of the
tobacco industry in the state or area, including representatives from the participating
cigarette manufacturers and the Tobacco Institute legislative counsel for that state.”46
In stark contrast to the previous year, the tobacco industry did not effectively mobilize
until after LB 344 had been reported out of committee.  It was not until LB 344 was scheduled
for its first reading before the full Legislature, over a month after it been voted out of
committee by a 5-4 vote, that the tobacco industry became very active in voicing their
opposition to the new bill.  On March 28, Raymond Oliverio, the man who had testified against
LB 648 the previous year, sent a letter to the six Corporate Coordinators for TAN concerning
LB 344.47  The Corporate Coordinators were all senior executives in the companies that
participated in the Tobacco Institute: Phillip Morris, Brown & Williamson, Lorillard, Liggett
& Myers, United States Tobacco, and R.J. Reynolds.  At the time, five of the six members of
the Corporate Committee also served on the Board of Directors of the Tobacco Institute.48 
In his letter, Oliverio requested that a letter-writing and telephone campaign conducted
by tobacco company sales personnel commence immediately.  He also included the arguments
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the participants should make when contacting their state senators.  The arguments proposed by
Oliverio were:
• “LB 344 is an attempt to legislate courtesy.”
• “There is no estimate of the cost involved to implement LB 344.”
• “There is no medical evidence of a health problem associated with secondhand
tobacco smoke.”
• “This is a further example of government intrusion into the private sector.”47
He also stated, “All of these arguments play well in Nebraska, and these letters should
commence immediately.”47  These arguments would be repeated throughout the campaign
against LB 344 and have continually been used in Nebraska against any clean indoor air efforts
such as during Lincoln’s attempt to pass a comprehensive local smokefree workplace
ordinance in 2003 (See Below).
On April 3, the day after LB 344 passed its first reading on the floor of the Legislature,
the Lincoln law firm of Ryan and Matt sent out a legislative bulletin to all tobacco distributors
and wholesalers in Nebraska.49  The bulletin points out that it requires 25 votes for a bill to
pass and LB 344 had only received a vote of 25-10 to pass its first reading.  It also goes on to
state, “According to information received from sources, the Clean Air Act in Minnesota has
resulted in a reduction of the sale of cigarettes by about 6 percent from 1975 to 1977, or
5,475,000 cartons.”49  Since the enactment of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act would likely
lead to similar reductions in cigarette consumption throughout the state and harm the industry's 
bottom line, the distributors and wholesalers were urged to voice their opposition to LB 344 by
contacting their state senators before a second vote took place later that week.
That same day a note was sent from J.R. Cherry, the Senior Associate General Counsel
for Lorillard, to A.J. Stevens, a Tobacco Institute Board of Directors member. Cherry informed
Stevens that Ray Oliverio’s assistant had called to request that they start the calls against LB
344 since it had passed its first reading on the floor of the Legislature.50  It appears that no calls
had been initiated before this time.
Three days later, on April 6, Cherry sent a letter to Safley, the Field Sales Manager for
Lorillard, which included contact information on Nebraska legislators and informed Safley,
“Now would appear to be the appropriate time for our people to register their opposition.”51 
The letter also included the same four talking points detailed by Oliverio.
While TAN was working behind the scenes in contacting state senators, the Nebraska
Restaurant Association was successful in getting an amendment added to the bill that allowed
restaurants with less than 1,200 square feet of dining space to be exempted from having a
nonsmoking section; thus, these restaurants were permitted to have smoking in their entirety. 52
On April 21, the Omaha World-Herald took an official position against LB 344 in an
editorial entitled, “Smoke Bill Goes Too Far.”53  The editorial stated that the bill “ventures a
good deal farther into authoritarianism than can be countenanced in a free society.”  It agreed
with Senator Stoney’s claim that LB 344 protects both the rights of smokers and nonsmokers,
but stated that the World-Herald found the bill objectionable because it went too far in telling
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private citizens how to control their private property.  The editorial concluded by saying LB
344 “represents a benign tyranny, but a tyranny nonetheless.”53  It should be remembered that
the primary effect of LB 344 was to establish separate smoking and nonsmoking sections in
public places. 
Before the final vote, State Senator Rex Haberman (Imperial; $2,300 lifetime industry
total) sent a letter to the Attorney General Paul Douglas’ office requesting a decision on  the
constitutionality of LB 344.  Haberman was opposed to the bill and was attempting to derail
the bill by questioning its constitutionality.6  
On May 9, 1979, Attorney General Douglas (R-$0 lifetime industry total), and
Assistant Attorney General Lynne Fritz, sent a response to Senator Haberman.54  The first part
of the letter was a response to Haberman’s concern that the title of LB 344 did not adequately
express the content of the bill.  Article III, Section 14, of the Nebraska Constitution stated, “. . .
No bill shall contain more than one subject, and the same shall be clearly expressed in the title.
. . .”54  Haberman seemed to believe that LB 344's title, “FOR AN ACT to adopt the Nebraska
Clean Indoor Air Act,” did not adequately express that the purpose of LB 344 was to limit
smoking in public places.  The Attorney General disagreed saying, “In our opinion, the above
mentioned sections of the act are germane to its general purpose.”54  
Senator Haberman’s other area of concern regarding LB 344 was that the bill delegated
legislative authority to the Department of Health in a manner that violated Article II, Section 1,
of the Nebraska Constitution.54  In this area, the Attorney General’s office sided with Senator
Haberman and concluded that LB 344 was “constitutionally suspect.”54  The two sections
discussed in the Attorney General’s response were Section 10 and Section 11 of LB 344. 
Section 10 of LB 344 stated:
The Department of Health shall, not later than January 1, 1980, adopt and promulgate
rules and regulations necessary and reasonable to implement the provisions of this act. 
The Department of Health shall consult with interested persons and professional
organizations before promulgating such rules and regulations.54  
In Section 11 it was written:
The Department of Health may, upon request, waive the provisions of this act if it
determines there are compelling reasons to do so and a waiver will not significantly
affect the health and comfort of nonsmokers (emphasis in original).”54  
The emphasis in both quotes was added by the Attorney General’s office because it was
this wording that was key to their decision.  Based on previous court decisions, 
the question to be resolved is whether sections 10 and 11 of LB 344 contain sufficiently
clear and definite standards so as to guide the agency in determining how to administer
the power which it is granted.  In our opinion, the act does not meet this requirement.54  
After receiving this response, Senator Haberman used the opinion of the Attorney General to
argue against passage of LB 344 on the floor of the Legislature.
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While the tobacco industry was still concerned about LB 344 because of the strength of
the bill, this legal decision by the attorney general only increased the tobacco industry’s
confidence that the bill would be defeated.  In a memo dated May 11, 1979 from J. Kendrick
Wells, a lawyer for Brown & Williamson, to numerous executives within his company, Wells
points out that LB 344 would have a broader reach than legislation that was pending in New
York, Connecticut and Massachusetts.  He goes on to say, “Important Nebraska allies joined
the tobacco industry’s opposition to the bill during the week of May 7 and, although the nose
count is close, we do not expect the passage of the Nebraska bill.”10  Although it is not clear if
Wells meant the Attorney General when he referred to new allies, his memo indicated that the
tobacco industry still thought LB 344 would be defeated.    
Not to be outdone, Senator Stoney asked the Judiciary Committee Staff to review the
constitutionality of the bill.  On May 14, the Judiciary Committee Staff disagreed with the
finding of the Attorney General that Section 10 and 11 were constitutionally suspect and
commented, “There is . . . convincing case law to the contrary which would indicate that the
language of LB 344, uses language which would meet constitutional guidelines.”55  In the same
memo, the Judiciary Committee Staff cited court cases from four other states and one case
from Nebraska which they believed supported their claim that LB 344 did not violate the
Nebraska Constitution by improperly granting legislative authority to the Department of
Health.  
The day after the Judiciary Committee Staff issued their opinion, LB 344 was passed
by a vote of 30-18-1.56  While the Attorney General stated  that the language of LB 344 was
constitutionally suspect because the bill was too vague and thus granted legislative authority to
the Department of Health, this did not prevent its passage by the Legislature.  However, this
was an argument that would be used later to weaken the rules and regulations that were
adopted by Department of Health.
After losing in the Legislature, the tobacco industry set their sights on convincing
Governor Charles Thone (R) to veto the bill.  Once again, the services of the law firm of
Crosby, Guenzel, Davis, Kessner & Kuester were utilized to write a four page letter on behalf
of the Tobacco Institute that was to be hand delivered to the governor.56  It was also blind
carbon-copied to the Tobacco Institute's Raymond Oliverio.  
Since Oliverio was directly involved with the effort to get LB 344 vetoed, it is not
surprising that the arguments in the letter correspond to talking points drafted by Oliverio early
on in the campaign against LB 344.  For example, the fifth paragraph of the letter from the
Lincoln law firm states, “Although the possibility of enforcing such an unrealistic extension of
governmental regulation is virtually nonexistent, such an analysis clearly shows the
unprecedented reach of the government of the State of Nebraska into the private lives of its
citizens.”56  This argument refers to two of the four talking points that Oliverio said would play
well in Nebraska, specifically, “There is no estimate of the cost involved to implement LB
344,” and “This is a further example of government intrusion into the private sector.”47
Another talking point was used when the letter claims, “For many years activist anti-
smoking groups have asserted that non-smokers are harmed by smokers.  Such an assertion has
never been supported by credible evidence.”47, 56  This tactic of attacking science that shows a
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link between secondhand smoke and negative health outcomes, such as lung cancer and heart
disease, has often been used by the tobacco industry.957-59  In line with Oliverio’s argument that
“LB 344 is an attempt to legislate courtesy,” the letter to Governor Thone also states,
“Eliminating the health issue leaves the bill only protecting the “comfort” of the nonsmoker
from a possible annoyance not wholly unlike an alcoholic breath, a sweating body, a cheap
perfume, a crying baby or an undisciplined child.  If the State chooses to take this
unprecedented step into the area of protecting some persons from annoyances by others, where
do we reasonably and responsibly draw the line?”47, 56
The letter also indicated that the Tobacco Institute might sue if the Nebraska Clean
Indoor Air Act was adopted, after citing the opinion of the Attorney General: “Our Courts are
presently burdened enough without creating additional legislative problems, particularly when
we are forewarned that the legislation is constitutionally suspect.”56 (While the tobacco
industry often makes such threats, it is rarely successful in challenging clean indoor air
legislation in court, and then only when challenging local ordinances where there is a clearly
preemptive state law.60)
Despite the arguments posed in the letter and threat of a lawsuit, Governor Thone
signed LB 344 on May 21, 1979, thus adopting the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.61 
According to a 232 page legislative report prepared by Brown & Williamson Tobacco, the
passage of LB 344 represented the “biggest setback of the year” in the United States for the
tobacco industry.62
Fighting Effective Implementing Regulations
While the passage of LB 344 was harmful to the tobacco industry, they regrouped and
quickly set about the task of weakening the effect of the law.  The same day that the governor
signed LB 344, Oliverio issued a Legislative Bulletin to senior executives in the tobacco
industry regard this development.63  In his bulletin, he stated why the tobacco industry had not
fought harder to prevent passage.  He wrote:
We had been virtually assured that the bill would not be passed and forwarded to the
Governor this legislative session after the Nebraska Attorney General issued an opinion
on May 9, 1979, asserting that LB 344 “. . . improperly delegates authority [to the
Department of Health] and is constitutionally suspect.63  
Oliverio’s bulletin also discussed plans for weakening the impact of the Nebraska Clean Indoor
Air Act which involved the help of governor.  He stated, “We have been informed that
Governor Thone believes that the bill is too broad, but that he will work with the Department
of Health to limit its scope.”63 
Also written on May 21 was a memo from Alexander King, the Tobacco Institute’s
Public Affairs Manager - Northwest, to Michael Kerrigan, a Tobacco Institute vice president. 
In the memo, King questioned Kerrigan on how to best use the Attorney General’s opinion to
the advantage of the tobacco industry.  King wrote, “Based on his conclusion regarding
improper delegation of legislative powers, can we consider, [sic] legal challenge?  If
successful, a challenge may render LB 344 invalid, and/or at least give us an opportunity to
delay an effective date until we consider the pros & cons of going back for a repeal.”64  The
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courts were not the forum that the tobacco industry eventually used to weaken the effect of LB
344.  Their strategy was to weaken the bill by challenging the attempts by the Department of
Health to adopt rules and regulations for the implementation of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air
Act.
  As required by LB 344, the next step to putting Nebraska’s new law into effect was
for the Department of Health to develop the regulations that would actually detail how
businesses were to comply with the law.  For example, LB 344 required the posting of signs
and the arrangement of seating to limit the amount of smoke to which individuals in the
nonsmoking section were exposed, but the law did not specify where signs were to be posted
or what constituted an acceptable seating arrangement.8  After being signed into law, the task
of developing such rules and regulations fell to the Department of Health.  
Initially, the Department of Health decided to utilize the rules and regulations that were
adopted in Minnesota for their clean indoor air law.65  Since the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air
Act had been modeled on its Minnesota counterpart and the rules and regulations developed
for Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act had been implemented with little controversy,9 it was
reasonable for the Department of Health to use the Minnesota regulations as a template.  
It was at the Department of Health’s first public hearing that the tobacco industry’s
strategy became clear.  The Nebraska Restaurant Association and the Nebraska Licensed
Beverage Association mobilized to fight against the effectiveness of the new law.65  At the first
hearing, the contested issue was what constituted an “acceptable smoke-free area.”66, 67  In the
first draft, the Department of Health modeled their rules and regulations on Minnesota’s so that
nonsmoking areas were to be separated from smoking areas by at least a 56 in high barrier or a
4 ft wide space.  This requirement was supported by Senator Stoney and the Nebraska chapters
of the American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society.65 
The Nebraska Restaurant Association, the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association,
and other business groups’ idea of a nonsmoking area was an area where signs were posted
designating it as such or an area that was mechanically ventilated.67  They argued that
requiring restaurants and bars to create a physical barrier using a 56 in high barrier or a 4 ft
wide space would be prohibitively expensive.  This argument ignored the fact that the 4 ft wide
space could still contain tables where patrons could be served, but the buffer area would not be
considered part of the acceptable smoke-free area and individuals seated within this section
could not smoke.  Echoing the Attorney General’s decision, these tobacco industry allies told
officials from the Department of Health that requiring physical barriers exceeded their
authority.65, 66  At the first hearing on July 24, 1979, the opposition to the physical barrier
requirement was so vehement that the Department of Health removed it from their second
draft.66 
At the second public hearing in August, it was the tobacco control advocates’ turn to
attack the rules and regulations.  Presented with the second draft which did not contain the
physical barrier requirement, Senator Stoney and the health groups protested.  At the hearing,
Stoney said  a “well-organized and handsomely paid” group of opponents were trying to
“destroy the intent” of his bill by watering down its provisions.66  Alan Wass, Director of the
American Lung Association of Nebraska, commented on the new draft saying, “The Nebraska
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Clean Indoor Air Act would be emasculated by this second draft.”65  He also stated his
opposition to the ventilation provision because he said that ventilation does not address the
issue of the health effects of carbon monoxide present in secondhand smoke that would not be
removed by ventilation.65    
As a result of the efforts by Senator Stoney and the health advocates, the third draft of
the Department of Health’s rules and regulations contained the physical barrier provision but it
also allowed for an exemption to this requirement if:
The ventilation system in the room containing both a smoking-permitted and no-
smoking area has total air circulation (recirculated plus outside air) of not less than six
air changes per hour including supply of tempered outside air.68
While the reinstatement of the physical barrier provision was a significant
accomplishment, the insertion of the ventilation exemption was a win for the tobacco industry
and its allies and meant that this third draft still remained weaker than the implementing
regulations for the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act.69      
In September the first public hearing on the third draft was still so contentious that
Department of Health officials began to talk about sending the issue to the more powerful State
Board of Health for a resolution.67  Jack Daniel, Assistant Director of Housing and
Environmental Health for the Department of Health, told the World-Herald that in his ten years
of working for the Department of Health he had never seen such divisive disagreements over
rules.67  More hearings were held throughout the state, but an acceptable compromise was not
reached so the third draft was not revised by the Department of Health.  Instead, another public
hearing was scheduled for October 26, 1979.
In order to ensure that the tobacco industry had a presence at this meeting, Jack Kelly,
National Director of the Tobacco Action Network (TAN) sent a memo to all the TAN
Corporate Coordinators.  The memo began:
This is to request your authorization to have your employees who live or work in the
Lincoln and Omaha, Nebraska area to attend [sic] a public hearing that will be held by
the Department of Health of the State of Nebraska on Friday, October 26, 1979, ... for the
purpose of considering the adoption of proposed regulations for the implementation of
the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act (LB 344, 1979 Laws).70
According to an R.J. Reynolds Tobacco summary of the proceedings that focused on
the activities of the tobacco industry’s allies, Richard Lutz of the Nebraska Restaurant
Association stated that his organization was considering court action against the state if the
final rules and regulations were not satisfactory.71  The R.J. Reynolds summary also reported
that James Moylan of the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association, J.T. Frazier of the
Nebraska Council of Commerce and Industry, George Dudley of the Norfolk Chamber of
Commerce and Calvin Robinson of the Woodmen of the World Insurance Society also stated
their opposition to the third draft of the rules and regulations.  Moylan would later become the
lobbyist for R.J. Reynolds in Nebraska and continues to be the lobbyist for both R.J. Reynolds
and the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association as of 2003.30 
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The implementing rules and regulations for the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act were
stalled in Fall 1979.  The intense opposition from the tobacco industry and their allies had
prevented the Department of Health from creating regulations to implement the new law so the
responsibility fell to the State Board of Health. It was at this venue that the tobacco industry
was able to finally eliminate the physical barrier requirement.61, 72
On March 15, 1980, the Public Affairs Department of Philip Morris released a
summary report on recent legislation that included a description of recent activity regarding the
Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.  It stated:
On January 22, the Nebraska State Board of Health adopted a set of substantially
watered-down regulations for the implementation of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air
Act.
The approved regulation defines a “designated smoking area” to be “reasonably proper
to the users and so located as to obtain the maximum effect of existing physical barriers
and ventilating system”. [sic]
On March 7, the State Attorney General vetoed the proposed regulations.  The
Nebraska State Board of Health must now promulgate new guidelines.72
In the rules and regulations that were finally adopted in June, 1980 –  over five months
late –  there was no requirement for any type of physical barriers to separate the smoking and
nonsmoking sections.61 
While rules and regulations that were adopted had been weakened to exclude physical
barriers, the signage provisions remained similar to Minnesota’s law.  The regulations for both
states required the posting of both “smoking permitted” and “no smoking” signs at the
entrances of separate smoking and nonsmoking sections to distinguish these two areas.
While Nebraska was quick to follow the lead of Minnesota and was successful in
passing a statewide clean indoor air bill that was stronger than similar legislation in New York,
Connecticut and Massachusetts,10 the tobacco industry and its allies were able to weaken the
effect of this law by mobilizing against the rules and regulations to implement the 1979
Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.  It would not be until January 2003, that stronger rules and
regulations for the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act would be adopted.
Twenty Years of No Change to the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act
During the early 1980s, it became clear to pro-tobacco control legislators that the
biggest weakness in the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was its enforcement provisions.6 
Specifically, the law only provided for fines for individual smokers that violated the law and
had no enforcement mechanism for businesses that failed to comply with the law.13, 15  By
1987, five attempts had been made by legislators, including Shirley Marsh, to strengthen the
Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act but were unsuccessful.11  It was not until 1999, with the
passage of LB 211, which made state facilities and vehicles smokefree, that the law was
broadened.14  It was not until 2003, with the passage of LB 45, which allowed an injunction to
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also be brought against businesses and not just individuls, that the enforcement provisions of
the law were strengthened.73
Smokefree State Property
The first change to the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act did not occur until 20 years later
when, in 1999, the Legislature passed a bill that required that almost all state facilities and
vehicles to be smokefree. 
Achieving smokefree state facilities in Nebraska was not a short process.  One of the
first steps occurred in 1993 when several state senators sought to prohibit smoking in the
legislative chamber of the State Capitol Building.  This effort was headed by Senator C.N.
“Bud” Robinson who had the lung and kidney ailment called Wegener’s disease.74  Robinson
and several others surveyed the senators to see if they would support a rules change to
accomplish this goal.  The Rules Committee oversees such actions and 30 votes are required
for a rules change.  One of the senators that was highly supportive of such an action was Don
Preister who was a first-year senator in 1993.  Preister had been a victim of carbon monoxide
poisoning and was sensitive to secondhand smoke.74  Throughout the years, he would be a key
proponent of smokefree state facilities.  Robinson and Preister were successful in garnering
wide support for making the Legislative Chamber smokefree and over 30 senators sponsored
the rules change which passed by a vote of 40-1.      
While these actions were proceeding in the Legislature, the student government of the
University of Nebraska - Lincoln (UNL), following a trend for universities around the country, 
formally urged the administration to make university buildings smokefree; however, the
student body president stated the resolution did include  dormitory rooms.75  At the time,
UNL’s smoking policy limited smoking to designated areas in dormitories and building lounge
and private offices that contained a filtering device.75  After some consideration and
consultation with the student government and school officials, Chancellor Graham Spanier
announced that smoking and smokeless tobacco would be prohibited in all university buildings
and vehicles.76
Of particular note was the fact that Spanier’s initial plan was to include Memorial
Stadium, home field for the Nebraska Cornhuskers.  After receiving some complaints from
smokers about including Memorial, Spanier weakened the changes so that smoking would be
permitted in designated areas that were inside the stadium but were not near seating areas.76
In 1994, Senators Preister and Robinson again sought to strengthen smoking
restrictions regarding state facilities.  They sponsored LB 1064 which would have made
virtually all state buildings and vehicles smokefree.77  The bill included any buildings or
vehicles that were owned, leased or occupied by the state.78  Preister told reporters that his
main reason for sponsoring this legislation centered on children.  He said, “I am particularly
concerned about children who come to the Capitol to view the Legislature.  They pass through
the Rotunda, which on a given day is filled with smoke.”78  Preister said that he was also
concerned about the example that this set for these schoolchildren and about the damage cause
to the Capitol and its artwork by the smoke.  Despite the efforts of Senator Preister and Senator
Robinson, LB 1064 was not successful.  
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The next year, in 1995, Senator Preister introduced another bill that was very similar to
LB 1064.  Designated LB 121, it prohibited smoking within 50 feet of the entrance to a state
building in addition to making most state buildings and vehicles smokefree.79  University
residence halls, veterans’ homes, state prisons and overnight facilities at state parks were
exempted.  At its hearing before the Health and Human Services Committee, LB 121 was
supported by the American Lung Association.  It was opposed by Bill Peters, a lobbyist for the
Tobacco Institute, who cited the tobacco industry’s claim that accommodation is the proper
stance for governments by stating that there was no need to change the law because both
nonsmokers and smokers were accommodated by the current situation.79  LB 121 was
advanced out of committee by a vote of 4-1 but after being debated for three straight days, it
fell short of passing the first round by four votes.79, 80
In 1996, officials at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln decided to make Memorial
Stadium smokefree.81  Three years earlier, the chancellor attempted  to make Memorial
Stadium smokefree along with the rest of the University but he had decided to allow
designated smoking areas away from the seating areas after receiving complaints about the
new policy. According to Butch Hug, the Director of Events for the Athletic Department, the
decision to make the stadium smokefree had been in response to repeated complaints from fans
that the smoking areas were not honored.  The decision was first announced as part of a high
school all-star game.  “When it was announced, it was received very well,” said Hug.  “As I
recall, there was a lot of applause.”81  While making a stadium smokefree may not seem highly
significant, the home games for the Nebraska Cornhuskers football team represent an
extremely popular sporting event in the state so making Memorial Stadium smokefree
represented an important event in tobacco control in Nebraska.
In 1997, Senator Preister again attempted to make state buildings and vehicles
smokefree.  LB 375, which was very similar to previous bills, advanced out of committee by a
vote of 6-0 but once again, did not survive the floor of the Legislature.82
State buildings and vehicles finally became smokefree in 1999 after five years of
attempting to pass such legislation.14  This time around Senator Preister did not introduce the
bill.  Senator Jerry Schmitt introduced LB 211 with a much more modest goal: he was only
seeking to make the State Capitol Building smokefree to halt the damage that was being done
to the Capitol and its artwork due to tobacco smoke.83  The Health and Human Services
Committee advanced LB 211 by a vote of 6-0 after hearing testimony from Cathy Shipp of
Metro Omaha Tobacco Awareness Coalition (MOTAC), Susie Dugan of PRIDE-Omaha and
Leon Vinci of the Lincoln-Lancaster County Health Department.84  No one testified against LB
211.84  MOTAC and PRIDE-Omaha are both health organizations located in Omaha that work
closely together with MOTAC focusing on tobacco and PRIDE-Omaha working to decrease
the use of alcohol, tobacco and other drugs (ATOD).  In 1999, many other tobacco control
advocates were focusing on an cigarette excise tax bill and were not heavily involved with
supporting LB 211 (See Citizens’ Excise Tax section).   
On the floor of the Legislature, state senators went to work trying to expand the scope
of LB 211.  During the first round of debate, an amendment proposed by Senator Gene Tyson
was adopted which included all state buildings in the bill.  The amendment was so broadly
worded that senators felt it was necessary to propose additional amendments to clarify the
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intent and scope of the bill.85  Another amendment that was offered during the first round of
debate by Senator Chris Beutler of Lincoln would have also included any buildings leased to
the state or building leased by the state to other institutions, such as fraternities or sororities,
but this amendment failed after Senator Landis of Lincoln expressed concerns that the
amendment was too broad to pass without conducting a public hearing to determine the legal
ramifications.83  LB 211 passed the first round by a vote of 28-6 with Tyson’s amendment
attached.
   During the second round of debate, another amendment was introduced by Senator
Preister that attempted to clarify the scope of LB 211.  The amendment sought to make all state
owned vehicles and almost all state owned buildings smokefree.86  The buildings that were
exempted from being completely smokefree were veterans homes, private residences, buildings
under the control of Health and Humans Services, lodging facilities run by the Game and Parks
Commission, facilities at the State Fair that possessed a liquor license and residential housing
at state universities; however, it was designated in the amendment that no more than 25% of
the overnight facilities, 50% of the beer halls at the Fair and 40% of the university housing
could permit smoking.87  It also prohibited smoking within 10 feet of a state-owned building. 
This final provision regarding the 10-foot barrier proved to be a sticking point in the debate
over the amendment and it was only able to received 21 votes so it failed to be adopted.86, 87   
Two weeks later in March, 1997, Senator Preister sponsored a very similar amendment
that had the 10 foot buffer area removed.87  This amendment was adopted by a vote of 33-0 and
LB 211 was enacted by the Legislature by a vote of 43-0 and was subsequently signed by
Governor Johanns.88  There was no opposition to Senator Preister’s amendment in this last
round of debate. 
The final outcome of LB 211 was that the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was amended
so that the majority of state buildings, including the Capitol, and all state-owned or state-leased
vehicles were made smokefree.  The passage of this bill represented the first time in twenty
years that the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was strengthened.
A Smokefree Restaurant Bill - LB 750 (1999 -2000)
In 1999, Senator Nancy Thompson (D - Papillion; 8.7 policy score; $0 lifetime industry
total) introduced a bill in the Nebraska Legislature with the primary intention of making
restaurants smokefree by revising the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.89  Senator Thompson
appreciated that by 1999 much more was known about the dangers of secondhand smoke than
in 1979 when the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act was passed and felt it only made sense to
change the state law to coincide with current scientific understanding.90  At the time, four
states, California, Utah, Maine and Vermont, had enact statewide smokefree restaurant laws.91 
The most substantial change to be made by LB 750 was that it would have made the
Nebraska’s restaurants (except for bar areas) smokefree.  The language in LB 750 regarding
public places stated:
 
There shall be no designated smoking areas: (a) In a common area of an enclosed,
indoor place of public access, including, but not limited to, hallways, restrooms,
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lobbies, waiting areas, entries, exits, and check-out counters; and (b) In a enclosed,
indoor area of a restaurant, except (i) in a full-service retail area of an establishment
required to have a Class C, I, or M license for the sale of alcoholic liquor for
consumption on the premises under the Nebraska Liquor Control Act if such an area is
separate from the restaurant and (ii) that the owner or proprietor may allow smoking in
an adjoining party or meeting room used for private parties or private social functions.89
LB 750 also sought to make two other substantial changes to the Nebraska Clean
Indoor Air Act.  First, it sought to eliminate the exemption that allowed a restaurant that had a
serving area of less than twelve hundred square feet to be considered a smoking area in its
entirety.  LB 750 also sought to clarify the definition of a public place by including grocery
stores, convenience stores, assisted-living facilities and bowling centers within the definition
of a public place.89  The inclusion of bowling centers resulted in several bowling groups
joining together with the Nebraska Restaurant Association and the Nebraska Licensed
Beverage Association to ally themselves with the tobacco industry. 
Beginning first in the 1970s, when clean indoor air laws concerning public places first
began appearing through the country, the tobacco industry has worked to convince the
hospitality industry (restaurants, bars, bowling centers, casinos, etc.) that any limitations on
smoking would cut into the hospitality industry’s profits.92  While a large number of studies
have shown that smokefree laws have either no effect or a positive effect on business
revenues,93 the tobacco industry has been successful in convincing members of the hospitality
industry to oppose smokefree legislation.92  In this manner, the tobacco industry, which has
little public credibility, can remain behind the scenes by allowing the hospitality industry to
serve as the public face of the opposition to smokefree laws.  This pattern would occur in the
debate over three smokefree restaurant bills proposed in the Legislature and a smokefree
workplace ordinance that was attempted in Lincoln.       
At the public hearing for LB 750, held before the Health and Human Services
Committee, three individuals representing bowling interests testified again Senator
Thompson’s smokefree bill.94  These individuals were Butch Rasmussen of Cedar Bowl, Inc.,
Jim Dill of the Nebraska Bowling Proprietor’s Association and Steven Sempeck of Bowling
Centers and the Nebraska Bowling Proprietor’s Association.  An internal Philip Morris
document listed Dill and his organization, Nebraska Bowling Proprietors’ Association, as
hospitality industry allies.95  While only three people testified, there were over a dozen bowling
center owners or managers that attended the hearing in opposition to LB 750.96
These bowling groups mobilized under false pretenses.  It was their understanding that
the addition of the term bowling alleys to the definition of public places meant their status
under the Nebraska Clean Indoor Act changed but these was not the case.96  As Senator
Thompson explained during the hearing, the only effect that LB 750 would have had on
bowling centers was to clarify that they were included in the definition of a public place.96 
Senator Thompson had consulted with the Department of Health and Human Services and was
informed that LB 750 would not change the smoking status for bowling centers or other places
that would have been explicitly included in the definition of public places.96  
Also testifying against LB 750 were two individuals from more traditional allies of the
tobacco industry.94  Jim Moylan stated that he was representing the Nebraska Licensed
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Beverage Association but Moylan was also a lobbyist for R.J. Reynolds as well (see  Lobbyist
Expenditures);  Mark Lutz of the Nebraska Restaurant Association also spoke against the bill.94 
The Nebraska Restaurant Association has a long history of opposing clean indoor air
legislation dating back to the first introduction of clean indoor air bills in Nebraska and at this
time, had receiving money from the tobacco industry at least as recently as 1997.4, 92
Oddly, bowling proprietors outnumbered health advocates testifying in favor of LB
750.  Susie Dugan of PRIDE-Omaha and Mark Welsch of the Group to Alleviate Smoking
Pollution (GASP) of Nebraska were the only tobacco control advocates that testified in favor
of LB 750 at the committee hearing.94  PRIDE-Omaha was a grassroots organization of parents
and community health groups formed to lower drug use by youth in Omaha including tobacco
use and GASP of Nebraska has focused primarily on reducing exposure to tobacco smoke. 
Both groups were still active as of 2003.  None of the large health groups (i.e., American
Cancer Society, American Heart Association, American Lung Association) spoke out in
support of the bill.
The failure of Nebraska's tobacco control advocates – particularly the large established
health groups – to provide support for LB 750 also manifested itself in newspaper accounts
throughout the course of the bill.  While Senator Thompson’s position (and the opinion of the
Nebraska Restaurant Association) was often quoted, voices from the tobacco control groups in
Nebraska were largely unheard.90, 9791, 98
Health advocates were not more supportive of LB 750 for two reasons.  First, the
tobacco industry is more powerful at the state level so in virtually all states, there is a strong
view that working to pass local smokefree ordinances is a more productive strategy in the long
run.99-101  At the very least (unless there is state preemption), local ordinances are usually
passed before attempting a state law. 
The second reason was that many health advocates  were fighting for the passage of LB
505, a bill that sought to raise the state’s excise tax from $0.34 to $1.00 and would also have
provided funds for tobacco control efforts (See Citizens’ Excise Tax section).102  The most
prominent coalition in the state was SmokeLess Nebraska, which was a recipient of a
Smokeless States grant from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation and was comprised of the
Nebraska divisions of the American Cancer Society, the American Heart Association, the
American Lung Association, Health Education Inc., PRIDE-Omaha, the Nebraska Association
of Hospitals and Health Systems, the Nebraska Dental Association and the Nebraska Medical
Association.103  Prior to the 1999 legislative session, the members of SmokeLess Nebraska
decided to form a second coalition that would focus primarily on increasing the state’s excise
tax.12  This new coalition was named Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska.  
Despite the lack of active support by most of the health community,  LB 750 was voted
out of committee by a vote of 5-1.94
 No action was taken on LB 750 by the full Legislature during the 1999 session so the
bill was carried over until the 2000 session.  It was on January 18 that LB 750 came up for
debate.104  The week prior to the floor debate on LB 750, the excise tax increase, LB 505,
which had also been carried over to the 2000 session, was rejected by the Legislature.98  The
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fate of LB 750 was also disappointing for tobacco control in Nebraska.  It failed to advance to
the second round of debate by a vote of 23-19105, two short of the number required to advance a
bill.  If LB 750 passed, Nebraska would have become only the fifth state - behind California,
Utah, Maine and Vermont -  to have statewide smokefree restaurants.91   
Smokefree Daycare Facilities 
While the smokefree restaurant bill was not passed in 2000, Senator Thompson was
successful on another front.  During the 2000 session she introduced two bills that were
eventually incorporated in the annual clean-up bill for the Health and Human Services
Committee as amendments.106  The first amendment, initially introduced as LB 1194, made it
illegal to smoke in commercial daycare facilities.106, 107  Daycare facilities that were operated
out of the home of an individual were exempted from this regulation.  The second amendment,
introduced as LB 1033, required that the 10 feet in front of an entrance to a state building be
made smokefree.106, 108 (The year before, when state facilities were made smokefree, the 10 foot
barrier had been an area of contention had been dropped.)  
The reason why these amendments were significant was because when LB 1115, the
Health and Human Services clean-up bill, was passed, they represented only the second time in
the twenty year history of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act that it had been strengthened.   
Second Attempt at Smokefree Restaurants - LB 227 (2001)
In the 2001 legislative session, Senator Thompson again introduced a bill to make
restaurants smokefree.109  The language in LB 227 which would have made restaurants
smokefree differed very little from the language in LB 750, which had failed to advance by
two votes in 2000.  Restaurants with a liquor license were still allowed to have smoking in a
room separate from the restaurant and a party or meeting room could be designated as a
smoking area in a restaurants if the room was being used for a private function.109  
LB 227 did contain two notable additions.  The first was an anti-preemption clause
which stated, “Nothing in the act shall be construed to restrict or prohibit a governing body of
a county, city, or village from establishing and enforcing ordinances at least as stringent as, or
more stringent than, the provisions of the act.”109 State preemption of local ordinances is a
major tobacco industry strategy110 and LB 227 was  designed to make it absolutely clear that
there was no such preemption in Nebraska.
The second major addition was the definition of a bar:
Bar means a business establishment devoted primarily to providing entertainment,
dancing, and the sale of alcoholic beverages to the public and not devoted primarily to
the service of food.  The revenue generated from the sale of food shall be less than the
revenue generated from the sale of alcoholic beverages plus the revenue generated from
the provision of entertainment and dancing.109      
Defining a business as a bar or restaurant based on the percentage of its revenues that
come from the sale of food is a relatively common practice for smokefree laws, but it has
several disadvantages.  For example, it is unclear how new businesses are to be defined since
they haven’t established a revenue pattern.  Also, enforcement is more difficult because the
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line between a restaurant or bar is only distinguished by financial records.  In a subsequent bill,
Senator Thompson would change the definition of a bar to avoid these problems.   
A notable omission was that LB 227 did not contain language that sought to include
other types of businesses within the definition of public spaces.  In Senator Thompson’s
previous bill, the attempt to include bowling centers within the definition of a public space had
created opposition from bowling associations even though their inclusion within the definition
would not have produced any change in their status under the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.  
As a result of this change in LB 227, the bowling associations did not testify against LB
227 at the public hearing which was once again heard by the Health and Human Services
Committee.  The individuals who did oppose LB 227 were Jim Moylan, a lobbyist for R.J.
Reynolds, but who testified for the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association and Mark Lutz of
the Nebraska Restaurant Association.111  Along standard tobacco industry lines, they argued
that the passage of LB 227 would represent a economically detrimental form of government
inference into the rights of business owners.112  
The health advocates that testified in favor of LB 227 were Mark Welsch and Phyllis
Vosta, who were both with GASP of Nebraska, and Dr. Dan Noble of the Nebraska Medical
Association and the Lancaster County Medical Society.111, 112 Dr. Noble said that he was
testifying not only as a representative of the Nebraska Medical Association but also because he
has lost his father and an uncle to smoking.  “They represent the personal side to this ongoing
American tragedy,” Dr. Noble testified.  “You have even greater opportunity than my
colleagues and I do to save lives.”113  The testimony of Dr. Noble was also notable because the
Nebraska Medical Association was the only member of SmokeLess Nebraska/Citizens for a
Healthy Nebraska that testified in person at the hearing for LB 227.  The large voluntary health
associations again remained silent.
Also testifying was Rebecca Hasty of the National Organization of Women who said
that she supported LB 227 because it is often waitresses that are the victims of secondhand
smoke in restaurants.113  Jennifer Taute and her son, Jared, also testified in favor of the bill
because they are both asthmatics and cannot go to restaurants because of the danger to them
from secondhand smoke.112
Once again, Senator Thompson’s smokefree restaurant bill was advanced out of
committee, this time by a vote of 5-2.111  This vote took place on February 1, 2001. 
The next day, R.J. Reynolds began organizing a phone-banking campaign to defeat LB
227.  Phone-banking is a common tobacco industry tactic to make opposition from the tobacco
industry seem like spontaneous grassroots-level opposition.101  On February 2, a letter was sent
from Frank Lester, an executive in R.J. Reynolds State Government Relations, to Jim Moylan,
the lobbyist for R.J. Reynolds in Nebraska, which outlined R.J. Reynolds’ plan.114  Lester’s
letter describes how R.J. Reynolds was planning on mobilizing “grassroots” opposition to LB
227 in two phases using phone, mail and media outreach methods.
Phase 1 of the plan, which was to run from February 2 to 9, was to focus on a phone-
bank campaign.  The letter stated for Phase 1:  
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Immediately initiate consumer direct connect calls to all forty-nine members of the
legislature at a rate of three per day, per legislator.  Direct connect calls are when we
call a consumer (or restaurant), educate them on the issue and connect them directly to
the member’s office . . .114
For Phase 2, if necessary, phone calls were to continue but the mailing campaign and
media outreach portions were also to begin.  Regarding the ally outreach portion of the mailing
campaign, Lester stated:
The Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association (NLBA) is communicating with approx.
4000 restaurants/bars on their list.
Possible second stand alone mailer to 2500 restaurants directly affected by the
legislation . . .114
Another portion of the mailing campaign was to target legislators.  Lester wrote:
Narrow legislator target to 20 “key” members and initiate letterdesk operation to those
targets.  Letterdesk is when we call a restaurant or consumer, educate them on the issue,
write the letter for them over the phone, send them the letter with a stamped, self-
addressed envelope and ask them to mail to their legislator . . .
Identify any opportunities to participate in ally functions where we could send in a
team to conduct an on-ground letterdesk operation.  Specifically, we would send
team(s) to, for example, a NLBA function (e.g. trade show), engage participant, write
letter on the spot for them, get them to sign and we would mail to legislator.  These
would primarily be to twenty “leadership targets,” although we may expand the list to
areas with particularly vehement opposition and/or larger metro locations.
If there are no events scheduled, we have a couple of options:
• Have a meeting in major cities inviting restaurants to attend where we would
educate, hand out buttons, etc and initiate a letterdesk operation.
• Identify restaurants and bars.  Prearrange with management and send teams in
to conduct letterdesk operations with employees and customers . . . 114
Lester’s memo to Moylan goes on to describe how Phase 2 would also include a print
campaign:
Work with hospitality associations to identify 20 - 30 restaurant owners willing to
submit letters-to-the-editor.  Prepare letters and/or provide information to facilitate . .
.114
Finally, R.J. Reynolds was also considering conducting on radio campaign around the
time of a floor vote if it became necessary.  Lester wrote:
Possibly conduct a radio tour around the state with a third-party ally.  A radio tour is
when a service calls radio stations in a specific geographical location, books an
interview then, at a predetermined time, connects the spokesperson to the station. 
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Generally the tours are conducted from 6:30 am to around 10 am (drive-time).  The
spokesperson stays in one location (home if he/she wishes), and the service connects
them via telephone to the radio station where they conduct live and/or recorded
interviews.114
The script that the phone-bank operators were to use when contacting individuals about
LB 227 was located in R.J. Reynolds’ files.115  The script is notable because it represents the
caller as representing an apparent grass roots group of concerned citizens rather than a major
tobacco company.  It reads:
I’m calling on behalf of Nebraska Smokers’ Rights with an urgent message.
There is a bill, LB 227, before the state legislature that would severely restrict smoking
in all public places, including restaurants and restaurant bars.  The bill has passed out
of committee and may soon come up for a full Senate vote.  If this bill passes, you may
never again be allowed to enjoy a cigarette at your favorite restaurant.
Nebraskans don’t need big government dictating behaviors, especially concerning legal
products.  That’s why it’s important that citizens like you take action now and stop this
unreasonable smoking ban.
The best way to prevent this ban from passing is for you to contact Senator _________
right now and speak out against smoking bans.  If you’d like, I can connect you directly
to Senator ____________’s office so that you may call and protest the smoking ban. 
Can I do that for you?
(If yes, then continue, else terminate)
Now, the next voice you hear will be in the office of Senator ___________.  When the
phone is answered, ask to leave a message for Senator ___________.  Then in your
own words, tell him/her to vote against LB 227, the public smoking restrictions
proposal.  Let him/her know Nebraska citizens and businesses are smart enough to
make their own choices regarding smoking in public places.  Let him/her know how
important this issue is to citizens like you.
Thank you for your time (emphasis in original).115
Because of the negative public perception surrounding the tobacco industry, tobacco
companies often create front groups with legitimate sounding names (like Nebraskans for
Smokers Rights) to keep the tobacco industry’s involvement a secret.92  However the
spontaneous creation of such groups in opposition to efforts to advance tobacco control
measures does not constitute opposition from the public itself; rather this shows that the
tobacco industry can mobilize quickly to attempt to cloak their efforts.  The language utilized
in the script about government interference is also standard tobacco industry rhetoric.92
  
By the beginning of March, the Lincoln Journal Star and other state news sources
began reporting about all the calls received by state senators about LB 227.116, 117  When asked
whether she had received many calls about LB 227, State Senator Pam Brown of (D-Omaha)
responded, “Lots of them. They’re all, I think, telemarketers.  When I started getting them, I
asked my staff to find out if they’re constituents.  So far, none of them have known.”117 
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Senators reported that calls opposing LB 227 outnumber those for the bill by a ratio of 8 to 1 or
9 to 1.117
 Within a few days, Senator Thompson had some proof that these calls were part of a
phone bank campaign against her bill when her voicemail recorded a conversation between one
of her constituents and the telemarketer in which the telemarketer was coaching the constituent
in how the conversation with the senator’s office should proceed.118  Despite being able to
show that a phone bank operation was in place, it was still not possible to prove that it was the
tobacco industry that was involved.
Despite the fact that R.J. Reynolds was involving itself so heavily in opposing LB 227,
the bill continued to receive little support from the majority of tobacco control advocates. 
Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska was once again focused on increasing the state’s tobacco
excise tax so they provided little defense for LB 227 in the media or with legislators.
Despite the evidence that these calls were not spontaneous, the tobacco industry was
successful in defeating LB 227.  On March 7, the Legislature voted to reject LB 227.  The vote
count was 19 in favor and 29 opposed.119  During debate, senators from rural areas that
opposed the bill argued that small cafes in their districts would be hurt by LB 227.120.  Other
senators argued that the bill would create an unfair playing field between bars that serve food
and restaurants.  Another argument leveled against LB 227 was that it overextended the
government’s authority to regulate private businesses.  These arguments are all standard
tobacco industry rhetoric and have been used in almost every place that has attempted to pass a
smokefree law.92
On March 17, the Omaha World-Herald reported that R.J. Reynolds had been
responsible for the telemarketing campaign again LB 227.121.  Since LB 227 was already
defeated and they were required to disclose the money that had spend as part of their lobbying
effort to the Nebraska Accountability and Disclosure Commission in their April 15 filing, R. J.
Reynolds confirmed that it was behind the campaign.121  In fact, a spokesperson for R.J.
Reynolds defended the company’s actions to a reporter from the World-Herald.  Speaking
about the phone banking, the spokeswoman, Maura Payne, said, “We will do that upon
occasion to make it easy for people to call their senators.”121  Payne also stated, “We’re
educating people who might not be aware of the issue and then giving them an opportunity,
with some ease, to give their opinion to their legislator.”121  Payne also claimed that it did not
matter who was responsible for initiating the calls so long as individuals were able to express
their opinion to their legislator.  “That’s the beauty of our system.  People on both sides get to
speak out and say how they feel about any pending piece of legislation,” Payne said.121 
Tobacco Free Hall County’s Media Campaign
In August 2001, Tobacco Free Hall County, to further their goal of passing a local
smokefree workplace ordinance, rolled out six ads as part of their “Secondhand smoke kills”
campaign.122  Hall County, located in central Nebraska, approximately 100 miles west of
Lincoln,  includes Grand Island, and was still active as of 2004.  According to the 2000
Census, Grand Island was the fourth largest city in Nebraska after Omaha, Lincoln, and
Bellevue which borders Omaha.1  In 2001, Collette Shaughnessy and Susan Haeker, the leaders
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of Tobacco Free Hall County, the local tobacco control coalition, convinced Bailey Lauerman
and Associates, a Lincoln advertising agency (which had previous developed ads for Philip
Morris), to generously donate their time to develop a strong media campaign against
secondhand smoke.122  The ads developed by TFHC and Bailey Lauerman ran in several
national magazines and won numerous awards.123
Initially, the campaign was only supposed to be comprised of one ad, but it grew to six
because so many ideas were generated.  According to Rob Sacks of Bailey Lauerman, “We had
such a good time coming up with these images that we wanted to see if it could become a
campaign, and it was a good cause.  And Tobacco Free Hall County was a great group to work
with.  They’re taking a chance on these ads, just to get the word out there.”122  The purpose of
the advertisements was to catch people’s attention and to educate about the dangers of
secondhand smoke.  Haeker and Shaughnessy made it clear that were attacking the smoke and
not the smokers, which directly responds to one of the main arguments made by smokers.
According to Haeker, “This is really nonsmokers saying that this is no longer socially
acceptable ... The idea isn’t to bash the smokers.  That’s not what we want to do.  But we are
going to work hard to get these images distributed all around Hall County.”122
Not only was Tobacco Free Hall County able to spread their images around Hall
County, they were soon being seen throughout Nebraska and the rest of the country.  Tobacco
Free Nebraska, the statewide tobacco control program quickly announced plans to disseminate
300 copies of each advertisement to other local tobacco control coalitions around the state.124 
Jeff Soukup, Tobacco Free Nebraska’s community health educator, explained why they
decided to distribute the advertisements state-wide:
I think the edginess of it does a number of different things.  The ads can draw more
attention to themselves than is usually centered around public health issues.  I also
think, because of the number of media messages out there, something that catches the
eye is important.  We’re not just competing with the tobacco industry but with all other
images out there.124
Soon it was not just Nebraskans that were talking about Tobacco Free Hall County and
Bailey Lauerman’s smokefree images.  Reader’s Digest ran a feature on one of the
advertisements in its January 2002 issue.125  The national trade publications AdWeek and
Advertising Age also discussed the campaign in print.126123  In addition to the national press, the
campaign also won numerous awards including a gold ADDY for creative excellence in June
of 2002.127  The ADDY is the most prestigious award in advertising worldwide.
It is not surprising that the tobacco control advocates at Tobacco Free Hall County
were thrilled by their success.  Speaking about winning the ADDY, Haeker said, “This is the
world’s largest ad competition and the toughest category in that competition.  We’re very
pleased at the award this campaign has won, and we’re sure that Bailey Lauerman is as
well.”127  Shaughnessy added, “This has exceeded out wildest, wildest expectations.  It’s been
before so many people, and I think it’s recognizable to people.  But now it’s recognizable
throughout the country, and we think that’s pretty spectacular.”127
Following up on the success of “Secondhand Smoke Kills,” Tobacco Free Hall County
and Bailey Lauerman  unveiled a new campaign in 2003 , which featured three new
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advertisements specifically directed to the issue of smoking in the workplace.  After the more
general ads about the dangers of secondhand smoke, Tobacco Free Hall County wanted to
focus attention on the workplace to further the coalition's goal of passing a local smokefree
workplace ordinance.128
    
The media campaigns created by Tobacco Free Hall County and Bailey Lauerman
provide an excellent example of a collaboration between a local tobacco coalition and a private
for-profit company that benefitted both partners.       
Tri-Cities Implement Smokefree Parks
As of 2003, Tobacco Free Hall County has not succeeded in passing a comprehensive
local smokefree ordinance; however, they were successful in getting city facilities
smokefree.129  In 2002, Tobacco Free Hall County began pushing the City Council of Grand
Island to make all city property smokefree including city-owned parks.128  The impetus for the
decision to include city parks was complaints by youth working with Tobacco Free Hall
County that they were bothered by both the smoke and the example set by adults smoking at
ballgames and playgrounds.128
As part of their efforts, the youth were able to recruit their congressman, Tom Osborne
(R - District 3; $0 lifetime industry contributions) to support their cause.  Before being elected
to the House of Representatives, Osborne was the head coach of the University of Nebraska
football team from 1973 until 1999 and he was arguably the most beloved man in the state as a
result.  On March 29, 2002, Osborne sent a letter to Tobacco Free Hall County supporting their
efforts to make Grand Island’s city property smokefree.130  Two days later, Tobacco Free Hall
County went public with their goal.  They announced that later that week they would go before
the City Council with their goal of making city property smokefree.131  
At the city council hearing, the Council was generally supportive of making city
building and vehicles smokefree, but they had many more reservations about including city
parks.132  Their concerns mostly focused on the perceived difficulty in enforcement.  Testifying
in favor of including city parks were students from all three Grand Island high schools, the
boys' basketball coach for one of those high schools and Susan Haeker and Collette
Shaugnessy of Tobacco Free Hall County.  The letter from Congressman Osborne and also a
letter from State Senator Ray Aguilar (R- Grand Island; 8.2 policy score; $0 lifetime industry
total) were introduced in support of the proposed goal of smokefree city facilities including
city parks.133
Though the City Council left unconvinced that night, Grand Island youth and Tobacco
Free Hall County remained persistent on the issue, and in the end, they were successful.  In
May, the City Council again addressed the issue and voted 5 - 4 in favor of a resolution that
made city vehicles and facilities smokefree, which including fenced park areas, bleachers,
grandstands and athletics fields.133  The City Council split 4-4 but Mayor Ken Gnadt voted in
favor to decide the outcome.  The reason why the City Council passed this smokefree change
as a resolution instead of an ordinance was because if had been passed as an ordinance, the
City of Grand Island would have been responsible for enforcing the outdoor components,
which it was unwilling to do.  Because it was passed as a resolution, the “no smoking” signs
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that had to be posted were only advisory in nature; however, this did not mean that the whole
resolution was unenforceable.  Under the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act, smoking is not
permitted in any indoor public places that are not specifically designated as a smoking area;
therefore, since city-owned buildings in Grand Island could not contain smoking sections,
smoking within this buildings could be punished under state law.134  While the resolution was
not without its limitations, the high school students that were instrumental in securing its
passage believed strongly that just the posting of “no smoking” signs would have a positive
effect on the smoking habits and attitudes of Grand Island’s youth.134    
Within a year, the neighboring cities of Hastings and Kearney, which, combined with
Grand Island, are termed the Tri-Cities, passed similar resolutions that make city parks
smokefree. 135  As with Grand Island, these smokefree policies do not carry the force of local
law but represent a cultural shift regarding tobacco control in Nebraska. 
Improving the Implementing Regulations for the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act
In 2000, with the passage of two bills that changed the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act,
one that made state buildings and vehicles smokefree14 and one that made commercial daycare
centers smokefree,106 it became necessary for Health and Human Services to update the rules
and regulations for the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.  Part of this process included updating
the definitions for several terms such as common area, bar, and public place.  These terms had
been originally included in the  Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act, but they had  never been
specifically defined.  In addition, several terms, such as non-state building and child care
program, were now included in the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act as a  result of the changes
made to it by the laws passed in 1999 and 2000;136 therefore, Health and Human Services also
sought to define these new terms as well.  According to Molly Goedeker, the Health and
Human Services employee who was responsible for enforcing the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air
Act and who also drafted these new rules and regulations, the changes that were made were an
attempt to clarify Health and Human Services’ interpretation of the rules and regulations
associated with the Act.15      
Understanding that these rules and regulations might be challenged by the tobacco
industry or its allies, in drafting these regulations, Molly Goedeker had four different attorneys
review the language to ensure that Health and Human Services had the authority to make such
changes and two public hearings were held in December 2001.15  By covering these bases,
Goedeker helped to ensure that, though the process began two years earlier, little challenge
could be brought against the new rules and regulations.  As a result, they were approved by the
Attorney General and then signed by Governor Mike Johanns in January 2003.15 
One significant change to the rules and regulations was made based on public
comments received during the hearings.  Craig Lutz of the Nebraska Restaurant Association
requested that bars and restaurants not be categorized based on percentage of revenue from
food, because he said it created a slippery slope and was different from definitions used by
other state agencies, and instead suggested that the definitions from the Nebraska Food Code
be used, which defined a restaurant as a place that served food from a kitchen.137  Because
using the Nebraska Food Code definition was clearer and would define more establishments as
a restaurant instead of a bar (and because the fact that the recommendation was made by the
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Nebraska Restaurant Association provided political cover), the definitions in the Health and
Human Services rules and regulations were changed to correspond to the Nebraska Food
Code.137                 
Improving Enforcement of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act - LB 45 (2003)
In 2003, Senator Thompson introduced LB 45 which sought to revise the Nebraska
Clean Indoor Air Act to harmonize the Act with the new Health and Human Services (HHS)
rules and regulations and to make the Act more enforceable.138  The far more important aspect
was making the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act more enforceable.  Previously, Section 71-
5713 of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act stated “The Department of Health and Human
Services Regulation and Licensure, a local board of health, or any affected party may institute
an action in any court with jurisdiction to enjoin any violation of section 71-5707.”73  Since
section 71-5707 only dealt with individuals smoking in a nonsmoking area, a conservative
interpretation of this section meant that only an individual smoker could be penalized for
violating the Nebraska Clean Indoor Act.  LB 45 sought to make it clear that the entire Act was
enforceable; thus, business owners as well as individual smokers could be punished for failing
to comply with the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.
LB 45 also contained language that specifically included grocery stores, convenience
stores, and assisted-living facilities as public places,73 in addition to defining common areas to
include “hallways, stairwells, water fountain areas, restrooms, lobbies, waiting areas,
entrances, exits, and check-out counters.”  Language in LB 45 also eliminated some
exemptions in the Act such as smoking in private offices and the ability to designate an entire
room or hall a smoking section for a private social function.73 
The public hearing for LB 45 was conducted by the Health and Human Services
Committee.  The only individuals testifying in favor of LB 45 were Senator Thompson, as the
introducer of the bill, and Mark Welsch, the president of GASP of Nebraska.139  Throughout
the legislative process, LB 45 received only minimal support from the majority of tobacco
control advocates in Nebraska.118
There were four opponents to the bill.  Two individuals claimed to be testifying for
themselves, R.J. Brown and Walt Radcliffe.139  Radcliffe has been a longtime tobacco lobbyist,
and as of 2003,  represented United States Tobacco (See Lobbyist Expenditures).  Also
opposing LB 45 were Tim Keigher of the Nebraska Petroleum Marketers and Convenience
Store Association and Kathy Siefken, representing the Nebraska Grocery Industry Association. 
Both these organizations have received money from the tobacco industry and have been listed
on internal tobacco industry lists of allies within the state of Nebraska.4, 20
The objections of these two organizations seemed to focus on the revised definitions
and the removal of exemptions and not the enforcement section of LB 45.  They complained
that LB 45 would prevent convenience stores from creating smoking areas for their customers
and that it would prevent smoking in private offices.  As Keigher stated, “This is a total ban on
smoking in convenience stores.”140   
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Senator Thompson was aware of all the changes to the implementing regulations that
had recently been developed by Health and Human Services.  Except for the enforcement
clause, LB 45 was a clean-up bill that sought to harmonize the language of the Nebraska Clean
Indoor Air Act with the rules and regulations that would enforce it.  After the hearing she told
reporters, “They can’t now (have smoking areas), with or without LB45.  LB45 simply puts in
statute what is already in the new rules and regulations, so it is easier for people to read the law
and know exactly what it does.”140    
To reporters, Keigher and Siefken both seemed surprised to find out that the Health and
Human Services changes had very similar effects as LB 45.  “That’s news to me,” claimed
Keigher.  “It sounds to me like this is a total smoking ban.  And it is banned by the rules. 
Interesting.”140  Siefken responded by saying, “That is amazing.  They don’t have the authority
to do that.  They have to follow what the Legislature intended them to do.”140   According to
Goedeker, Keigher and Siefken’s surprise was feigned.  She said that Health and Human
Services had conducted meetings and exchanged correspondence with both the Nebraska
Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association and the Nebraska Grocery Industry
Association to explain the effect that the new rules and regulations would have for them so
both organizations were aware that LB 45 simply sought to clarify regulations that were
already in effect.  “I believe it was a good press opportunity for them,” Goedeker said.  “They
knew what was going on, they knew that it wasn’t effecting their businesses any differently
than it had before, but it was a good opportunity to confuse the media and confuse the
public.”15
The activities of the lobbyists seemed to have their desired effect on the language of LB
45.  Two senators on the Health and Human Services Committee, Philip Erdman (R-Bayard) 
and Doug Cunningham (R-Wausa), both stated publicly that they were willing to send LB 45
on to the full Legislature if everything but the enforcement section measure was stripped from
the bill, which was what happened.140  The Health and Human Services Committee drafted an
amended version of LB 45 that removed twelve sections so that only the enforcement section
remained, and then the bill was passed by a vote of 7-0.139  To Senator Thompson, this was an
acceptable compromise because she felt the enforcement measure was the important new piece
of the bill. 
The next hurdle for LB 45 was concern over the fact that the original language of the
Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act stated that “any affected party” could seek to bring an
injunction against an establishment that was not in compliance with the Nebraska Clean Indoor
Air Act.8  Some legislators were worried that this language would allow any individual to take
a business to court over its smoking policy.  During the second round of debate, an amendment
was passed that removed the ability of an individual or a local board of health to seek an
injunction requiring a business to comply with the law.141  Instead, the new language allowed
local public health departments to seek an injunction in court.  Individuals were to file their
complaints with these local health departments. 
Another change was that previously, proprietors were required to ask smokers to refrain
from smoking “upon request of a client or employee suffering discomfort from the smoke.”8 
Because LB 45 actually made such a provision enforceable against business owners, legislators
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decided to amend LB 45 so that proprietors of businesses were only required to ask smokers to
refrain from smoking if the smoker was smoking in the nonsmoking section.142  
After these changes were made, LB 45 was approved by the Legislature by a 43-0 vote
on March 14, 2003.  It was signed into law by the governor on March 20143.
Even with the compromises that were made to LB 45, the passage of the bill meant that
the State of Nebraska finally has the means to ensure that businesses, and not just smokers, are
in compliance with the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.   
Third Attempt at Smokefree Restaurants - LB 546 (2003; carried over to 2004)
In the 2003 legislative session, Senator Thompson once again introduced a smokefree
restaurant bill.144  In her new bill, LB 546, Senator Thompson decided to use the Health and
Human Services’ new definitions of a restaurant or a bar, which were part of the rules and
regulations approved by the governor in January 2003.15, 144  Rather than focusing on the
percentage of revenue that came from foods sales as LB 227 had done, a restaurant was
defined as a place where food is prepared in a kitchen; therefore, an establishment could not be
considered a bar if food was served from a kitchen.  Because this language defined more
businesses as a restaurant, the introduced version of LB 546 meant that if passed, more
establishments would have to be smokefree than would have been the case if either LB 750 or
LB 227 was passed.  This language also made deciding whether a business counts as a
restaurant or bar easier which facilitates enforcement.  
At the committee hearing, a greater number of people testified in favor of the bill than
in 1999 and 2001, including Mike Wadum from the American Lung Association, Mark Welsch
from GASP and Jack Cheloha on behalf of the City of Omaha.145  A representative from the
City of Omaha also testified in favor of the bill at the hearing because tobacco control
advocates in Omaha had pushed the City Council to adopt a resolution in support of LB 1436. 
The resolution which the Omaha City Council adopted stated:
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, by the City Council of the City of Omaha,
Nebraska that the City of Omaha supports such legislation to make restaurants smoke-
free if the bill does not take away local control of this issue, and that the bill would not
pre-empt any local government from establishing and enforcing policies at least as
stringent as or more stringent than, the proposed state legislation.146  [emphasis in
original]
Once again, Mark Lutz of the Nebraska Restaurant Association and Jim Moylan of the
Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association (and R. J. Reynolds) testified against the bill.145
During the 2003 session, LB 546 was advanced out of the Health and Human Services
Committee without amendments by a vote of 4-3.145  It did not come up for a vote on the floor
of the Legislature so it carried over until the 2004 legislative session. 
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Lincoln’s 2003 Attempt to Pass a Comprehensive Smokefree Workplace Ordinance
In 2003, the Lincoln-Lancaster County Health Department headed an effort to pass a
100% smokefree workplace ordinance for the city of Lincoln, the capital of Nebraska and its
second largest city.  The other groups who also fought for this ordinance were the Lincoln-
Lancaster County Board of Health, Tobacco Free Lincoln (the local tobacco control coalition),
the Lancaster County Medical Association and the Nebraska chapters of the American Heart
Association, American Lung Association and the American Cancer Society, attempted to pass
a 100% smokefree workplace ordinance for the city of Lincoln.  However, the Lincoln City
Council caved in to pressure from the tobacco industry and its ally, the hospitality industry, to
pass a confusing and weakened ordinance that allowed separated ventilated “smoking rooms”
and exempted bars.
In preparation for an attempt to pass a smokefree workplace ordinance in Lincoln, the
Lincoln-Lancaster County Health Department requested a study of the harm caused by
secondhand smoke to workers in the hospitality industry in Lincoln.  James Repace, a health
physicist who had conducted numerous similar studies, was contacted to measure the cotinine
levels present in the blood of workers in Lincoln.147  Cotinine is a biomarker for nicotine
exposure which is used to predict health risks.148 On May 5, 2003, Repace’s finding were
released, which found that the cotinine levels for nonsmoking bar employees in Lincoln were
18 times higher than the national median and based on these findings, he estimated that 17
hospitality industry workers in Lincoln die each year from the exposure to secondhand smoke
they receive in their workplace.148
In an effort to protect the health of workers and the general public, the Lincoln-
Lancaster County Health Department announced in August 2003  that it would put before the
city council an ordinance that would require all indoor places of employment and all indoor
public places in Lincoln, including bars and restaurants, to be 100% smokefree.149  In their
proposed draft of the ordinance, entitled the “Lincoln Smokefree Air Act,” which was released
on August 19, places of employment were defined as “an indoor area under the control of an
owner that employees access during the course of employment, including, but not limited to,
work areas, employee lounges, restrooms, conference rooms, meeting rooms, classrooms,
employee cafeterias, and hallways.150 The ordinance defined public places as “an indoor area to
which the public is invited or in which the public is permitted.”150  The only exceptions to this
smokefree ordinance were that hotel and motel rooms could be designated as smoking rooms
(but not more than 20% of all rooms) and smoking was permitted if it was being conducted as
part of medical research.  By requiring that all places of employment and public places be
completely smokefree, the Health Department sought to provide comprehensive protection
from secondhand smoke to the general public but also more specifically to employees.149
The Health Department’s draft of the ordinance also sought to avoid some of the
problems that had plagued the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act such as enforcing the law
against individual smokers.  The effectiveness of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act had been
weakened by the fact that it could only be enforced against individual smokers, until the
passage of LB 45 in 2003, so the proposed ordinance addressed this area by providing for
$100-$500 fines against the owners of businesses that failed to comply with the law as well as
against individual smokers.150  The draft ordinance also stated that failure to comply with its
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provisions was a sufficient cause to justify the revocation or suspension of an license granted
to that establishment by the City of Lincoln.  
Another section of the ordinance, as originally proposed, was its signage provisions,
which required the posting of at least one “no smoking” sign at all entrances used by the public
or employees.150  In the Health Department’s first draft, the only acceptable “no smoking”
signs were ones provided by the Health Department or the State of Nebraska, but this was
changed to any sign using the international “no-smoking” symbol of a cigarette with a red
circle and slash. 
Two other characteristics of the Health Department’s first ordinance proposal were
important.  First, the law was to apply not only to establishments within Lincoln but also to
establishments within three miles past the corporate limits of the city.150  The Lincoln City
Council has zoning jurisdiction over this three mile area in order to deal with city growth, so
by including this area the Health Department was attempting to expand the effect of the law as
far as possible.151  The first draft of the Lincoln Smokefree Air Act also stated that if a business
had a food establishment permit that included an outdoor area, then this outdoor area was also
required to be smokefree.150  This outdoor area provision, which mainly affected outdoor cafes
and beer gardens, was included at the recommendation of Tony Messineo, a restaurant owner
and member of the Lincoln-Lancaster County Board of Health.103.
Following the announcement by the Health Department that it would propose a
smokefree workplace ordinance, it became clear that the debate in Lincoln would be little
different from the debate over the passage of the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act  in 1979. At
that time the tobacco industry and its allies in the hospitality industry had argued that the
Legislature should not establish separate smoking and nonsmoking areas because they said
there was little evidence that secondhand smoke was harmful, that it would have a harmful
economic impact and that it was unreasonable government interference into private
businesses.47  The tobacco industry used these arguments in 1979, because, as Ray Oliverio,
the Director of Public Affairs for the Tobacco Institute, said, “All of these arguments play well
in Nebraska.”47  In 2003, over twenty years later, the tobacco industry and its ally, the
hospitality industry, would use these same arguments to successfully oppose the passage of
Lincoln smokefree workplace ordinance.
The subtitle for the Lincoln Journal Star’s article the day after the announcement of the
Health Department’s proposed ordinance for Lincoln accurately captured the nature of the
debate that would continue for months in Lincoln.  It read, “The Health Department and
supporters call it an issue of employee health; to opponents, it’s a matter of free choice.”149  In
the article, Brian Kitten, co-owner of a Lincoln bar named Brewsky’s, echoed tobacco industry
rhetoric saying, “My belief: There will always be a market for an environment where a smoker
can go in and have a meal and have a drink.  Why make that illegal?”149  Kitten also said that
he was skeptical about the harm caused by secondhand smoke.  He asked, “Who do you
believe?” and stated that different studies came to different conclusions.149  In the coming
months, Kitten would serve as the primary spokesperson for the opponents of the local
smokefree ordinance.
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In an effort to allay fears about the proposed ordinance, Bruce Dart, the Director of the
Health Department, met with the Nebraska Restaurant Association, the Downtown Lincoln
Association, the Lincoln Independent Business Association and the Chamber of Commerce
following the release of the ordinance.152  The Health Department also sent out 3,100 letters to
business owners to invite them to attend hearings conducted by Dart and Ed Schneider,
President of the Lincoln-Lancaster County Board of Health, where they would explain the
effect of the proposed law; however, less than two dozen businesspeople attended the
hearings.103, 152  One of the few that did attend however was Walt Radcliffe, a longtime tobacco
industry lobbyist who was working for United States Tobacco at the time (See Lobbyist
Expenditures).  While Radcliffe claimed to be only representing himself and not the tobacco
industry, he stated in his parting comments that he would see everyone at the meetings before
the City Council.152 While continuing to maintain that he was only representing himself,
Radcliffe would continue to play a leading role in opposing the passage of the smokefree
workplace ordinance.103     
While the Health Department’s hearings were not well-attended by business leaders, it
was not because the hospitality industry, especially bar owners, were not mobilizing in
opposition.  In explaining why very few people came to the meetings, Brian Kitten told the
Lincoln Journal Star, “We felt it was just a dog-and-pony show.  They [health officials] want to
ram it through any way they can.  The real battle is with the City Council members.”153
In the months following the Health Department’s announcement that it would pursue a
comprehensive smokefree workplace ordinance, the editorial pages of local newspapers were
filled with numerous op-eds on both sides.  The issue was also covered extensively in
newspapers and television stations throughout the state.  Shortly after the Health Department’s
decision, the two main newspapers in Lincoln printed conflicting editorials.  The city’s major
newspaper, the Journal Star, came out in favor of smokefree workplaces.  The Journal Star’s
editorial stated:
There is one certainty in the sure-to-come debate over going smoke-free.  Research,
both anecdotal and statistical, disproves those who would complain that the proposed
ban will egregiously damage their businesses . . . In fact in Boulder, Colo., and
Corvallis, Ore., restaurant sales increased after smoking bans went into effect.  And
University of California researchers found no adverse revenue impact from that state’s
ban on smoking in restaurants and bars . . . The smoking ban also would be in keeping
with the image Lincoln wants to project as a very livable, family-friendly city.  Put
simply, the time for a smoking ban has come, and there’s no reason it shouldn’t be
implemented as soon as possible.154
On the other hand, the Daily Nebraskan, the student newspaper for the University of
Nebraska-Lincoln, came out against smokefree workplaces.  Its editorial said:
The proposed smoking ban would eliminate smoking in any establishment housing
employees, as well as public places within three miles of Lincoln city limits [sic].  And,
the way we see it, the ban also would eliminate choice . . . We here at the Daily
Nebraskan oppose the ban on smoking for that reason – bar and restaurant owners,
acting under consideration of their employees, should be able to determine whether
smoking should be barred in an establishment . . . Lincoln offers plenty of places to
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avoid secondhand smoke.  Let the business owners and smokers choose for themselves
just how much personal harm they’re willing to risk.155
Throughout the debate over the proposed 100% smokefree workplace ordinance, these
two papers would maintain these positions with the Journal Star supporting smokefree
environments while the Daily Nebraskan sided with the tobacco industry’s position that
smokefree workplace laws violated the rights of business owners.
Following hearings with business owners that were sparsely attending and after
receiving comments from other city officials, the Health Department decided to make some
changes to the draft of the ordinance.  At the request of Lancaster County Board of
Commissioners, the three mile area outside the city limits was removed so that only businesses
within Lincoln would be effected.153  According to County Commissioner Larry Hudkins, this
request was made not because the board disagreed with the intent of the proposed law but
because they felt extending the smokefree changes further into Lancaster County only
complicated the issue. 153  Another change was the elimination of outdoor areas at restaurants
and bars from the smokefree requirements, which was taken out after health advocates were
unable to find research that specifically addressed the effect of secondhand smoke in an
outdoor setting.153  Businesses that were located in private residences, which included daycare
centers, were exempted from the smokefree requirement to avoid legal concerns about
inspecting private homes without a warrant.  
After the Health Department finalized its draft in early October, a hearing before the
Lincoln City Council was set for November 3, 2003.  On October 14, the Lincoln-Lancaster
County Board of Health held a meeting to recommend that the City Council approve the
proposed law.  The board’s president, Ed Schneider, said “It’s time we try to protect these
innocent people who are not smokers . . . 80 percent of the public who have been adversely
affected by secondhand smoke.”156  
Despite the elimination of workplaces located in private residences from the
requirements of being smokefree, Walt Radcliffe, the lobbyist for United States Tobacco,
released a memo on October 23 that said that the enforcement provisions of the Health
Department’s proposed ordinance would violate the Fourth Amendment of the United States
Constitution.157  Specifically, Radcliffe felt that the language in the Lincoln Smokefree Air
Act, which said, “The Health Director and law enforcement agencies are hereby authorized to
inspect a place of employment or public place at any reasonable time to determine compliance
with this Chapter,” would allow warrentless inspections that violated the Fourth
Amendment.157  (Despite several attempts, the tobacco industry has never succeed in
challenging a local tobacco control ordinance on Constitutional grounds.60)
The following day, October 24, Cindy Wostrel, Chairperson of Tobacco Free Lincoln
Coalition, and David Holmquist, Governmental Relations Manager for the Nebraska chapter of
the American Cancer Society, held a press conference to release the results of a poll conducted
by Harstad Strategic Research that surveyed 402 likely voters from October 9-14, 2003, that
showed strong support for making all workplaces smokefree:
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•  Would you favor or oppose a local ordinance in Lincoln that would ban smoking in all
indoor public places and workplaces, including restaurants and bars?” 
• 61% said that they strongly favored a smokefree ordinance
• 12% said that they somewhat favored a local smokefree ordinance.
• 9% somewhat opposed a smokefree ordinance.
• 17% strongly opposed a local smokefree ordinance.158 
• “If restaurants and bars in Lincoln were smoke-free, would you honestly say you would
visit restaurants and bars in Lincoln more often, less often, or about the same amount as
you do now?”]
•  33% of respondents said they would visit restaurants and bars more often.
•  56% said about the same.
•  8% said less often.158
Despite this evidence of popular support, Brian Kitten and Mark Lutz, administrator for
the Nebraska Restaurant Association, continued to tell reporters that they thought a smokefree
workplaces would hurt businesses in Lincoln.159  (The Nebraska Restaurant Association has a
history of financial ties with the tobacco industry.4, 92)  Mirroring standard tobacco industry
arguments, Kitten said that he had been calling bar owners in other cities with smokefree
ordinances.  “Everything I found out was that it does negatively impact the bar, bar-and-
restaurant, nightclub-type business,” he said.  “You see really negative impact on communities
that institute a ban when surrounding communities don’t.”159 (In fact, every objective scientific
study of the impact of such legislation on the hospitality industry has shown either no effect or
a positive effect.93)  Lutz also stated this position to reporters, saying that he expected
establishments within the city limits to lose business while the ones outside the city would
gain.159  Another argument that Lutz used in opposing the Lincoln local ordinance was to argue
that any smokefree legislation should be passed by the Nebraska Legislature and not by local
communities. He said, “There has to be one set of rules for the Lincoln, Omaha and Scottsbuff
areas.”160  Despite articulating this position, Lutz’s organization, as discussed earlier in this
report, the Nebraska Restaurant Association, actively opposed attempts to pass statewide
legislation to make restaurants smokefree.
At the hearing before the Lincoln City Council on November 3, almost 40 people
testified concerning the proposed ordinance.161  The testimony heard by the City Council
differed little from the positions that had been publicly expressed by both sides prior to the
hearing.  A formal vote on the issue was tentatively set for November 24.
    Three days after the hearing, on November 6, the Lincoln City Council met with
members of the Omaha City Council to discuss common issues.  At that meeting, at least one
member of the Lincoln City Council told his Omaha counterparts that the Lincoln City Council
was almost certain to pass the ordinance but not without making some changes first.162  “My
guess is we will pass an ordinance of some kind,” said Council member Glenn Friendt.  “I
think we’ll have some amendments.”162    
Within a few days, council members had introduced numerous amendments to weaken
the proposed ordinance.163  Three members, Glenn Friendt, Annette McRoy and Jon Camp
introduced amendments to allow smoking in bars with their amendments differing in how a bar
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was defined.  Council member Patte Newman introduced an amendment to exempt truck stops
and coffeehouses.  At the time, Council member Terry Werner told reporters that he was
considering introducing an amendment to allow separately ventilated areas where smoking was
permitted, a position promoted by the tobacco industry.164  Ignoring the fact that such
ventilation systems do not address the health problems associated with secondhand smoke for
employees, he stated, “There has to be a little room for compromise.  Maybe there’s a way to
do it without compromising people’s health.”163  The reason why Werner felt ventilation was a
possible compromise was because health advocates had not presented a united front in
opposing ventilation.  The American Cancer Society and a environmental health representative
from the Health Department stated that the ordinance would better protect the health of the
public in the form proposed by the Health Department but that ventilation would be an
acceptable compromise.103  Other health advocates continued to reiterate their position that the
ordinance should not be weakened in any way including ventilation.  Werner would go on to
introduce an amendment to allow separately ventilated “smoking rooms” in businesses,165 but
he and Ken Svoboda were the two council members that were most supportive of passing a
strong smokefree ordinance.
Health advocates responded by publicly criticizing the actions of the City Council. 
Concerning the amendments, Ed Schneider, President of the Board of Health, said, “I think that
[the adoption of the proposed amendments] will not give the protection to the public or
employees we need.  We have some empathetic, intelligent, caring council people.  What we
have to do is remain focused on the health issue.”163
With the Lincoln City Council already contemplating weakening the proposed
ordinance, Jerry Irwin, the owner of a Lincoln strip bar called the Foxy Lady, began circulating
petitions in 30 to 40 bars for patrons and employees to sign opposing the ordinance.166 Irwin
stated that he was hoping to gather thousands of signatures to present to at the next City
Council meeting.  He said, “There will be a ton of people.  The first hearing, that was just the
first wave.  There will be a lot of bar employees saying (smoking) in not a problem.”166
By the second hearing on November 17, no changes had been made to the Health
Department’s proposed ordinance but more than 15 amendments had been introduced by
council members, almost all seeking to weaken the smokefree provisions within the ordinance. 
During the hearing, health advocates continued to focus on the health benefits to workers and
the general public and testified against the tobacco industry positions raised by bar owners that
their business would be harmed and that smokefree ordinances represented improper
government inference.165  The health advocates also argued that separately ventilated rooms
were ineffective in protecting employees and the public from secondhand smoke.
Following the second hearing, Lincoln Journal Star printed an editorial calling on the
City Council to not weaken the proposed ordinance.  It concluded, “Creating exceptions to the
ban will only create problems and weaken its effect.  Banning smoking in all workplaces is
healthier, fairer and simpler.  The City Council should approve the ban in its current form.”167
With the City Council still undecided, the original date for a final vote, set for
November 24, came and went with no changes being made to the ordinance but no vote being
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taken either.  Individuals from both sides of the debate continued to mobilize in support of
their position by contacting the members of the City Council and the media.
It was at the next meeting on December 1, that the City Council finally decided take
action on the Lincoln Smokefree Air Act.  Due to pressure exerted through the hospitality
industry, Council Members Patte Newman and Annette McRoy, had introduced an amendment
which sought to exempt bars.  This amendment required that to receive an exemption the bar
had to file an affidavit annually with City Clerk’s office stating that less than 60% of its gross
revenue came from the sale of food.  At this meeting, health advocates were able to convince
the City Council to reject this bar exemption by a vote of 3 - 4 with Newman, McRoy and
Friendt voting in favor.168  
The turning point in the Lincoln Smokefree Air Act came after the City Council’s
decision to not exempt bars.  Instead of voting on the Health Department’s proposed
ordinance, the City Council continued to seek a compromise position and then sets its sights on
the amendment introduced by Terry Werner that sought to allow any workplace to have
separately ventilated breakrooms and  “smoking rooms.”169  The language of the amendment
did not make it clear whether these “smoking rooms” would be simply a room where people
could go to smoke or whether it would serve as a smoking section for a restaurant or bar where
employees would have to work.  The amendment did limit the size of the “smoking room” by
saying that it could comprise no more than 35% of the square footage of the place.170  Despite
the fact that the language of the amendment did not make its intent clear, the City Council
decided to adopted it by a vote of 4 - 3 with Werner, Svoboda, Cook and Camp voting in favor
and the three council members who wanted to exempt bars entirely voting against it.169 
Because the City Council had adopted this amendment, the vote on passing the ordinance was
delayed for another week for to allow for further examination of the modified ordinance.168 
The City Council’s decision to weaken the law by allowing ventilation and the subsequent
delay that it caused would have further ramifications for the outcome of the ordinance.  
Neither side was happy with this compromise and since the vote was delayed, both
health advocates and members of the hospitality industry continued to press the City Council. 
At the next meeting, on December 8, Patte Newman reintroduced her amendment to allow
smoking in bars that took in less than 60% of their revenue from food sales.  Having already
rejected that amendment the previous week, some council members were surprised at
Newman’s action.  Council member Werner stated, “This certainly wasn’t typed up in the last
five minutes.  Why didn’t we have it? . . . It certainly gives the appearance of trying to hide
something.”168  During the meeting, Newman placed a stack of petitions gathered by bar
owners about 1 ½ feet high in front of her and, ignoring the polling data released by health
advocates, said, “I believe the community has spoken.  The exemption for bars is an exemption
the community wants to see.”168
Despite its failure the week before, the Lincoln City Council decided to adopt the
amendment to exempt bars by a 4 - 2 vote with Jon Camp switching his vote in favor.168 
Jonathan Cook was absent from the meeting due to illness.  Camp said that he decided to
change his vote after he sequestered himself from the public for several days to read a book
about personal freedom and responsibility written by his late father.168  During this meeting,
the City Council also decided to remove the language limiting smoking in motel and hotels
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rooms to no more than 20% of the total number of rooms and 35% of total square footage for
the separately ventilated “smoking room.”  They replaced these hard limits with language
similar to the Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act so that the area were smoking was allowed was
to be “reasonably proportionate to the preference of the users.”171    Because of Council
member Cook’s illness, the City Council decide to delay its vote until the next week’s meeting
on December 15.
With the ordinance now exempting bars and allowing separately ventilated “smoking
rooms” in other places, health advocates were angered by the actions of the City Council. 
Following the City Council meeting, Cindy Wostrel, chairperson of Tobacco Free Lincoln, told
the press, “This defeats the intent of the legislation and the will of city voters.” 168  With these
changes, the health advocates stated that it would be better for the ordinance to be defeated
than to pass in its current form.  Ed Schneider, the President of the Lincoln-Lancaster County
Board of Health, said, “We’d rather not have any ordinance at all.  This does not protect the
health in this form.”170
The City Law Department was also critical of Newman’s amendment.  They stated,
“This amendment lacks consistency between exempted places of employment and public
places.  This amendment is also inconsistent with the intent of the proposed ordinance and the
Nebraska Clean Indoor Air Act.  In addition, this amendment raises many legal concerns.”168 
The legal concerns that the Law Department were referring to were that the City could be open
to lawsuits from businesses claiming that the ordinance created unequal treatment.168  
Another problem with the amended ordinance was that the City Council still had not
clarified whether or not employees would have to work in the separately ventilated “smoking
rooms.”  Regarding smoking breakrooms, the ordinance stated, “The smoking breakroom shall
not serve as a work area and no employee shall be required to enter the smoking breakroom in
order to reach the employee’s work area.  The prohibition shall not apply to employees
providing janitorial and maintenance within the smoking breakroom,”171 but the only
protection provided to in employees regarding the “smoking rooms” was a section which
stated, “No member of the public nor any employee shall be required to enter the smoking
room in order to access common areas of the place of employment or public place, including
but not limited to, hallways, restrooms, lobbies, and waiting rooms.”171
At the next meeting on December 15, health advocates attempted to get the City
Council to vote up or down on the original draft that was submitted by the Health Department. 
Council member Werner made a motion to adopt the original form of the ordinance but it was
rejected 3 - 4 with Werner, Svoboda and Cook voting in favor.172  Following this setback, the
health advocates tried at the meeting to get the weakened version of the ordinance defeated,
but once again, they were unsuccessful.  The Lincoln City Council voted 5 - 2 in favor of
adopted the ordinance that allowed separately ventilated rooms and exempted bars.172  The two
opposing votes were from Werner and Svoboda.
The members of the hospitality industry were thrilled by their victory.  “I’m excited.  I
think it was a good compromise.  I think the democratic process was followed,” said Brian
Kitten.172    
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Meanwhile, health advocates turned their attention to Lincoln’s mayor, Coleen Seng,
calling on her to veto the weak ordinance.  They were joined in this call by the Lincoln Journal
Star, which stated in an editorial on December 18: 
Tobacco smoke is a known killer.  Secondhand smoke is listed as a Class A
carcinogen.  Government has a right to put limits on the use of dangerous and addictive
products.  Ken Svoboda and Terry Werner were the only council members with the
conviction to stand firm for a smoking ban that deserves the name.  The final version of
the ban is ineffective, complicated and unfair.  Mayor Seng would be wise to veto it.173
That same day, Mayor Seng vetoed the ordinance passed by the City Council writing:
The original Smokefree Air Act as introduced contained the key features of being fair
and equitable, simple to enforce and easy to understand.  The respect the City Council’s
rightful role in hearing public testimony and following the legislative process.  But in
reviewing what the council approved, I have concluded this ordinance is unfair,
unenforceable and legally questionable.174    
Following Mayor Seng’s veto, health advocates began working to convince one of the
five council members who had voted in favor of the ordinance to change his/her position
because five votes was the number needed to override a veto; however, they were
unsuccessful.  Despite the efforts of health advocates, warnings from the Law Department and
the Police Department that the ordinance was on shaky legal and enforcement grounds and the
veto of the mayor, the Lincoln City Council once again voted 5 - 2 on December 22, 2003, to
override the veto;175 thus enacting, at best, an extremely confusing smokefree ordinance and
setting a bad precedent for the rest of Nebraska.
Peter Hanauer, a lawyer at Americans for Nonsmokers’ Right and expert on local
smokefree ordinance language, described the problem with the ordinance wording:
The exception allowing smoking in enclosed, separately ventilated employee
breakrooms is quite typical of laws that provide for 100% smokefree work areas at
places of employment, but still allow for an indoor smoking room for employees away
from their work stations during their breaks. This portion of the ordinance is clear and
should not provide any difficulties with implementation or enforcement. 
However, the exception for enclosed, separately ventilated smoking rooms is confusing
for two reasons: 1) Given the exception for employee breakrooms, it does not seem
reasonable to also provide for such smoking rooms in the office workplace. 2)
Although the exception applies to both public places and places of employment, the
language of the exception is more typical of provisions governing only public places,
such as restaurants.
Although it is conceivable that the provisions for separately ventilated breakrooms and
smoking rooms could co-exist (i.e., there could be separate rooms for smoking while
performing work, as well as separate rooms for smoking while on break), in my
analysis of several hundred laws relating to smoking in the workplace, I do not recall
seeing both provisions in the same law. Work areas for smoking employees are almost
never enclosed, separately ventilated, rooms, because they would be too costly and
impractical. For these reasons, it seems unlikely that it was the intent of the Council to
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allow smoking in work areas of office workplaces.
One possible interpretation for the smoking rooms would be that such rooms in public
places are exempt from the smokefree requirements but that these rooms could not
serve as a work area (e.g., a room in a restaurant where smokers could carry their own
food to smoke while eating, but in which there was no table service). Another
interpretation would be that these smoking rooms are exempt from the smokefree
requirements and that these rooms can serve as a work area (e.g., a smoking room in a
restaurant where waitstaff would have to work and would therefore be exposed to
secondhand smoke).
In any event, these exceptions are confusing and overlapping. Although the smoking
room exception purports to apply to both public places and workplaces, taken as a
whole and in light of the breakroom exception, it more reasonably would only apply to
public places, such as restaurants. (Bars may obtain an exemption from the ordinance.) 
In order to be certain about whether smoking rooms in public places can also be part of
the work area, I believe there must either be a clear statement of legislative intent with
respect to the smoking room exception or an amendment of the ordinance that clearly
sets forth the applicability of that exception.176
As of March 2004, the City Council of Lincoln still has not specified whether their
intent was to allow these “smoking rooms” to function work areas or not.  The actual effect of
the ordinanc e will depend on how the Lincoln City Council (and possibly the courts) chooses
to interpret the confusing language about the “smoking rooms.”  If the provisions for smoking
rooms are interpreted in a way similar to the provision about smoking breakrooms, so that the
“smoking rooms” cannot serve as a work area, then the practical effect will be to make most
workplaces and public places (except bars) smokefree.  If, on the other hand, they interpret the
“smoking room” provision as allowing these rooms to function as work area, then employees
would continue to be subjected to secondhand smoke and the ordinance would be so weak that
it would represent a major victory for the tobacco industry.
ADVERTISING AND SAMPLING
While the issues of tobacco advertising and the distribution of tobacco samples have
not been as hotly contested in Nebraska compared to clean indoor air (and excise taxes),
several tobacco control attempts in these areas have been made with only limited success.
 
Nebraska Attempts Warning Labels - LB 368 (1963)
The  clean indoor air laws proposed in Nebraska beginning in the 1970s were not the
first tobacco control efforts in Nebraska.  The very first attempt at tobacco control occurred in
1963 when state Senator T. C. Reeves of Central City sponsored a bill in the Legislature that
would have made it illegal to sell cigarettes in the state unless the pack of cigarettes were
labeled with the phrase, “Used excessively, this product will endanger human health,”in such a
manner that this wording was distinguishable from the other printed material on the
package.177.  Later the wording was changed to read, “Use of this product will endanger human
health.”178  This effort to include warning labels on cigarettes occurred before the first Surgeon
General’s Report (released in 1964)179 which concluded that smoking caused lung cancer and
was two years before the US Congress enacted the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
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Act in 1965, which  preempted state and local action and required the weaker warning label:
“Caution: Cigarette smoking may be hazardous to your health.”
 This bill was supported by Dr. Henry Lemon, the director of the Eppley Institute for
Research in Cancer and Allied Diseases at the University of Nebraska Medical Center, and
Nebraska football star Bill (Thunder) Thornton, both of whom cited health concerns regarding
smoking as their reason for supporting LB 368.180  Dr. Lemon made the case for the bill by
saying, “This is not a matter of morals.  It is a matter of the science of health.  If we label
dangerous drugs, then we should so label cigarets.”180  Senator Reeves attacked the tobacco
industry itself when he charged that they “have no moral conscience,” and said, “They never
concern themselves with the suffering and misery which is the aftermath of the cigaret
habit.”180  
Even though four Nebraska wholesale companies opposed the bill at hearing, LB 368
was passed in the Public Health Committee by a vote of 5 to 2.180  While the bill was later
killed by the full Legislature by a vote of 26 against and 9 in favor, the effort did receive
widespread attention and was covered in the press at least as far away as Milwaukee and
Dallas.178, 181-183
Free Samples of Spit Tobacco Prohibited - LB 48 (1989)
In 1989, the Nebraska Legislature passed LB 48, which was sponsored by state Senator
M. L. “Cap” Dierks.  LB 48 sought to prohibit the distribution of free samples of spit
tobacco.184  This bill was significant for two reasons: 1) very few states prohibited distribution
of free samples of any form of tobacco product, and 2) LB 48 was primarily pushed by
dentists, specifically the Nebraska Dental Association.  
The motivation for the Nebraska Dental Association’s involvement in tobacco control
was that witnessing many cases of mouth cancer caused by spit tobacco prompted them to
question whether such a substance should be distributed for free and in a manner that lent itself
more easily to access by youth.185  The first year that they attempted to pass this type of
legislation was in 1987.  Though it failed that year and again in the 1988 legislative session,
the third time proved to be the charm.
 As would be expected, the primary opposition to LB 48 came from the spit tobacco
companies and not cigarette manufacturers.  The Smokeless Tobacco Council (STC) was a
group founded to represent the interests of companies that manufactured spit tobacco, just as
the Tobacco Institute represented the cigarette companies.  A memo dated January 31, 1989
from Kurt Malmgren, Senior Vice President of State Activities for the Tobacco Institute to
Samuel Chilcote, Jr., President of the Tobacco Institute, describes a meeting of key individuals
involved in the plan to defeat LB 48.186  Lobbyists for the Smokeless Tobacco Council and
U.S. Smokeless Tobacco, which manufactures Skoal and Copenhagen, met with the Tobacco
Institute’s Nebraska lobbyists at the time, Walt Radcliffe and Bill Peters, in order to “discuss
the coordination of plans to defeat LB48."186  It was noted that a telephone bank was in place if
calls were needed for certain “targeted districts.”  One option that was also discussed if it
appeared that LB 48 could not be defeated was to offer an alternative bill which would only
prohibit free samples of spit tobacco to individuals under the age of 18.186
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Despite the efforts of the tobacco industry, the Nebraska Legislature passed LB 48 on
March 2, 1989 and the bill was signed into law by Republican Governor Kay Orr ($3,000
lifetime industry total) four days later.187  With the passage of LB 48, free samples of spit
tobacco could not be distributed in the state of Nebraska.  Furthermore, the Nebraska Dental
Association has remained involved in tobacco control efforts, including being a member of the
SmokeLess Nebraska coalition, and its Executive Director, Tom Bassett, has been active in
writing op-ed pieces against pro-tobacco industry legislative efforts such as a preemption bill
in 1996.188     
Efforts to Prohibit Tobacco Advertising at the Local Level
In December, 1994, Mark Welsch of the Group to Alleviate Smoking Pollution (GASP)
began pushing the Bellevue City Council to prohibit cigarette advertising on billboards within
city limits.189  According to the 2000 Census, Bellevue was the third largest city in Nebraska.1
It is located just south of Omaha but it generally falls within the Omaha metropolitan area.  
In 1994, the City Council was considering prohibiting any new billboards from being
established.190  The original purpose of the ordinance was to prevent an expansion of billboards
along the Kennedy Expressway, which runs through Bellevue.190  Because the city council was
already debating billboards restrictions, Welsch and GASP saw this ordinance as an
opportunity to initiate efforts to stop cigarette advertising through billboards.189  
GASP’s argument was that the tobacco industry used billboards to promote smoking to
children, particularly because billboards were more likely to be seen by them than advertising
in newspapers or magazines.  This argument was supported by the American Council on
Science and Health which conducted a review of relevant studies and concluded that
advertising by the tobacco industry, including billboards, was often targeting minors.189   
GASP’s attempt stalled before the Bellevue City Council and no action was taken.
Cigarette advertising throughout the state was not addressed until the passage of the Master
Settlement Agreement (MSA) in 1998.  One of the conditions of the settlement was that the
tobacco industry could not advertise using billboards.
YOUTH ACCESS RESTRICTIONS
Laws which seek to reduce the availability of tobacco products to children, generally
known as youth access laws, have also been a focus of tobacco control efforts in Nebraska,
especially at the local level.  Even though youth access laws are not effective at reducing youth
tobacco use,191 the tobacco industry still opposes them and works to weaken proposed youth
access laws and attempts to undermine the enforcement of the laws that have been passed.  
Cigarette Vending Machine Restrictions - LB 130 (1991)
In 1991, Senator DiAnna Schimek (D-Lincoln) sought to protect Nebraska’s youth
from tobacco by introducing a bill related to cigarette vending machines.  Part of Senator
Schimek’s decision to introduce this bill was the result of lobbying done by the American
Lung Association of Nebraska, which wrote the original version of the bill that was
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introduced.192  In its original form, LB 130 would have made it illegal to sell tobacco products
from a vending machine in Nebraska.  The last half of Section 1 of LB 130 stated, “To ensure
that the use of tobacco products among minors is discouraged to the maximum extent possible,
it is the intent of the Legislature to ban the use of vending machines and similar devices to
dispense tobacco products within Nebraska.”193
LB 130 was assigned to the Judiciary Committee, which decided that it did not want to
completely prohibit sales from a vending machine so by a vote of 5-2, the members of the
Judiciary Committee voted to sent LB 130 to the floor of the Legislature with an amendment
that changed the language of the bill so that vending machines would only be prohibited “in
facilities, buildings, or areas which are open to the general public.”194 
Due to large number of bills introduced during the legislative session, LB 130 was not
voted on by the full Legislature during the 1991 legislative session so it carried over to the
1992 session.  At this time, Senator Schimek decided to declare LB 130 her priority bill to
guarantee that it would be heard before the Legislature.195  
LB 130 came up for debate at the end of January 1992.  At this stage, Senator Scott
Moore of Seward ($2,750 lifetime industry total) successfully proposed an amendment that
exempted any business that owned a liquor license from the vending machine restrictions.196 
The amendment also moved the date in which the new regulations would go into effective from
January 1, 1993 to January 1, 1994.196, 197  When interviewed by the Omaha World-Herald,
Moore said that he felt that the bill was well-intentioned but that it would not actually keep
cigarettes out of the hands of minors and he claimed, “What you’ll do is provide a lot of
inconvenience for people who smoke.”196
Senator Ernie Chambers (I - Omaha; 7.7 policy score; $0 lifetime industry total)
attacked Moore’s actions and said that the amendment showed that legislators were just talk
when it came to preventing minors from smoking.  “There will be places available for minors
to get cigarettes, thanks to Senator Moore and the others that voted with him.  The tobacco
industry and those making money from vending machines are calling the shots,” Chambers
commented.196  
Senator Schimek conceded that her bill had been watered down, but still felt that it
would do some good.  Machines would have to be removed in restaurants without liquor
licenses, grocery stores, and laundromats, which vending companies claimed contained half of
all the cigarette vending machines in the state.196
Despite the weakening of the bill by still allowing vending machines in some public
places, the final version of LB 130 still provided relatively strong penalties for violators.  LB
130 stated:
Any person violating this section shall be guilty of a Class III misdemeanor.  In
addition, upon conviction for a second offense, the court shall order a six-month
suspension of the offender’s license to sell tobacco in any and, upon conviction for a
third or subsequent offense, the court shall order the permanent revocation of the
offender’s license to sell tobacco if any.197  
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With the passage of LB 130 during the 1992 legislative session, cigarette vending
machines in Nebraska could no longer be located in public places such as laundromats or
arcades but they were still permitted in bars, bowling alleys, and many restaurants.197  
Omaha's Controversial Youth Access Law - Ordinance #32972 (1993)
While Senator Schimek’s effort to restrict vending machines was proceeding in the
Legislature, work was underway in Omaha to pass an even stronger youth access ordinance. 
For over two years, numerous individuals and organizations such as members of the City
Council, Mayor P.J. Morgan, the Omaha Police, GASP of Nebraska, the American Lung
Association of Nebraska and PRIDE-Omaha and other members of the Omaha Community
Partnership had worked to craft a city ordinance that dealt with the issue of access to tobacco
by minors.198, 199  PRIDE-Omaha was Omaha’s leading drug prevention group and the Omaha
Community Partnership was a group of community leaders who were involved in preventing
drug use by minors.199   
On April 27, 1993, the Omaha City Council passed Ordinance #32972, which placed
specific restrictions on the location of vending machines, prohibited the distribution of free
samples of tobacco products, and established stronger penalties for selling tobacco products to
minors.199  Because so many groups had been involved in developing this ordinance, the
Omaha City passed it unanimously.200
The ordinance provided for a fine of no less than $50 to no more than $100 for a first
violation.  For getting caught selling to minors a second time, the establishment would be fined
at least $100 but not more than $300 and would have their license to sell tobacco suspended for
at least one day but not more than ten days.  For all subsequent violations, the ordinance
required increasing fines and increasing lengths of suspension after a hearing.201  The license
that could be suspended after a hearing was granted by the state, which would have serious
repercussions for the future of the ordinance as discussed below. 
Another key aspect of the new ordinance was that it would be enforced by using teens
to attempt to make illegal purchases.  The ordinance stated:
Such procedures may provide for using individuals who are less than 18 years of age to
test compliance with this ordinance.  It is appropriate to utilize individuals under the
statutory age for the purposes of law enforcement or monitoring compliance with this
ordinance if such endeavors are supervised by sworn law enforcement personnel.201       
The Omaha Police Department quickly set about enforcing this ordinance.  It went into
effect in June and by early August, the Omaha Police had conducted compliance checks for
tobacco and found that 77 out of 113 license holders sold to minors.199  No citations were
issued to the 68% of merchants that violated the youth access ordinance; instead letters were
sent to them that offered free education but also informed them that citations would be issued
in the future to merchants that were not in compliance.  
In September, the Omaha Police Department established the STOPP Unit (Strategy To
Overcome Peer Pressure).  The formation of the unit was the result of a $202,000 grant that the
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Omaha Community Partnership received from the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation to fund
Project STOPP,199 most of which went to the STOPP Unit of the Police Department.  The grant
stipulated that at least three compliance checks had to be conducted in order to determine the
effectiveness of the program.  The check in August of the previous month was to function as
the baseline.  On March 9, 1994, compliance checks for both tobacco and alcohol were again
conducted by the police.  For this time, 39 businesses out of 116 were not in compliance (34%)
for either tobacco and alcohol.199.
By March 1994, retailers began to oppose enforcement of the ordinance.  They
consisted primarily of individuals who had been cited for selling tobacco to minors.  On April
29, 1994, an article appeared in the Omaha World-Herald in which James Martin Davis, an
attorney representing a number of merchants who had been cited for violating the youth access
ordinance regarding tobacco, commented on his clients’ views of the ordinance.  Davis said
that the police practice of using minors as part of the undercover compliance checks was
unfair; he said  “It’s preposterous that the police are creating offenses that, except for the
police activity, would have never occurred.”202.  He also stated his belief that the city ordinance
was “unconstitutional.”  This was the opening salvo by Omaha retailers in an attempt to
overturn Ordinance #32972.
On September 21, the STOPP unit conducted 88 compliance checks for businesses that
sold tobacco.  Out of these 88, 27 sold tobacco to a minor (31%).199  
On September 29, 25 restaurant and bar owners picketed Police Headquarters in protest
of the compliance checks.203 The individuals represented restaurants, bars, services stations and
other stores that sell tobacco. 
Supporters of Ordinance #32972 and the efforts of the police were quick to mobilize to
counteract the pressure from the retailers.  By September 30, child advocacy, drug use
prevention, and health groups met and formed a coalition named the Prevention Coalition for
Children.199 This coalition would play a major role in the coming months in combating
attempts to weaken Omaha’s tobacco control ordinance and its enforcement. 
In response, Police Chief James Skinner held a press conference on October 7 to
respond to the pressure from retailers by saying that the Omaha Police Department would
continue to make random compliance checks to ensure that businesses which sold tobacco
products were not illegally selling to minors.203  Skinner defended the focus to preventing
minors from getting access to tobacco and alcohol by commenting on the relationship between
criminal behavior and the use of tobacco and alcohol and stated, “We’re concentrating on
prevention, so we don’t continue to have young kids killing each other.  We’re sticking our
head in the sand if we don’t realize that.”203  At the press conference, representatives from the
Prevention Coalition for Children and several others groups expressed their support of the
police’s efforts to enforce youth access laws including the superintendents or spokesperson for
four school districts in and around Omaha and a representative from the mayor’s office.203 
Vending Companies’ Lawsuit
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After Police Chief Skinner and the Omaha Police Department refused to give in to the
demands of retailers, on October 21, 1994, four vending companies sought to get an injunction
against the Omaha ordinance by filing a lawsuit in the Douglas County Circuit Court.204, 205 
The four vending companies were D.J.M. Amusements, Variety Vending, Dahl Vendors and
Host Coffee.  Named in the suit were the City of Omaha, Police Chief Skinner, and the Omaha
Police Department.204
The vending companies argued that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it was
vague, failed to provided adequate notice and hearing procedures to individuals affected by the
ordinance and conflicted with state law.206  They also argued that the manner in which police
were enforcing the law was unconstitutional because the police were conducting undercover
operations against businesses for which they no indication that the ordinance was being
violated and because the people who were ticketed (the owners) were not present at the time of
the sale of tobacco to underage youth.  
The retailers also began to pressure the Omaha City Council and mayoral candidates,
three of whom were city council members.  The retailers' lawyer, Davis, stated, “If the mayoral
candidates don’t publicly disapprove of these tactics, then they’ll find pickets, by registered
voters, in front of their campaign headquarters.”207
During this time, the Prevention Coalition for Children remained active.  In October,
they gathered almost 2,000 petition signatures in support of strong youth access laws and their
enforcement, got several op-ed pieces published in the World-Herald, and met with the City
Council and mayoral candidates.199  During the course of the lawsuit, members attended the
court proceeding and contacted the media to maintain coverage on the fact that retailers were
suing so that they did not have to comply with the city’s youth access ordinance regarding
tobacco.
In July, 1995, a Douglas County Circuit Court judge ruled that the ordinance was
constitutional and provided adequate due process to individuals who are accused of violating
the ordinance.208  Judge Richard Spethman said that the ordinance was clear and that guidelines
for enforcement were adequate.  Spethman said, “The ordinance provides definitions that are
not confusing to the average citizen.”208  
Predictably, the owners of the vending companies and their attorney spoke out against
the decision, and city officials, the police, and tobacco control advocates applauded it. 
Representatives from PRIDE-Omaha, had attended the court hearings regarding the lawsuit
were thrilled by the outcome.  Cathy Shipp, the Youth Project Director of PRIDE-Omaha’s
Teen Advisory Panel, was quoted as saying, “We have received many, many phone calls of
support from parents who want to see laws upheld regarding tobacco sales to teens.”208  Mark
Welsch, President of Nebraska’s Group to Alleviate Smoking Pollution (GASP) also
commented on the decision by saying, “I think retailers that break our law are selling an
addictive, poisonous drug to our kids, and they should be stopped.”208
Following the dismissal of the lawsuit by the vending companies, the Prevention
Coalition for Children was disbanded;199 however, the legal troubles of Ordinance #32972 were
not yet over. 
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The Baker’s Supermarkets Lawsuit
On August 18, 1995, the Omaha Police Department again conducted tobacco
compliance checks on 84 businesses; 24 of these merchants (29%) sold to minors.199  During
this set of checks, several Baker’s Supermarket stores sold to minors, a second offense at four
locations; therefore, they were required by the city ordinance to suspend selling tobacco for at
least one day.209  Angered by this requirement to suspend sales, Fleming Supermarkets, the
parent company of Baker’s, filed a lawsuit in the District Court of Douglas County against the
City of Omaha and the Administrative Board of Appeals of the City of Omaha on the grounds
that Omaha’s ordinance conflicted with state law.209 
While Omaha’s youth access ordinance was able to survive the lawsuit brought by the
vending companies, the lawsuit brought by Baker’s Supermarkets was more successful.  One
significant reason for this success was that Baker’s had learned from the example set by the
vending companies and the other retailers opposed to Omaha’s ordinance that a battle in public
over youth access would not be to the advantage of retailers who sought to weaken the law and
its enforcement.  As a result, Baker’s did not take their appeal to the media or to public
officials.  Instead the company quietly took their case to court. No evidence could be found
that the proceedings of the lawsuit or its eventual result were ever written about in the media.  
On August 14, 1996, the lawsuit filed by Baker’s parent company challenging the
ordinance was heard by Douglas County District Judge Stephen A. Davis.  The members of the
Prevention Coalition for Children were unaware that this lawsuit was proceeding.199
On September 19, Judge Davis ruled that the portions pertaining to hearing procedures
and punishments of the Omaha ordinance were in conflict with state laws and thus, were void. 
Specifically, Judge Davis ruled that it was not permissible for the City of Omaha to suspend a
license granted by the State of Nebraska because state law did not provide for suspensions.209. 
Davis’ ruling eliminated the ability of the Omaha Police Department and its STOPP
Unit to aggressively enforce the city’s youth access ordinance by removing the penalties
against retailers that were provided in Ordinance #32972.199  While the remaining portions of
the ordinance (such as the tobacco sample restrictions) are still written into law, the ordinance
as a whole can no longer be enforced strongly by the Omaha Police Department as they were
before the lawsuit by Baker’s Supermarkets because penalties provided by the ordinance were
removed.  
Cooperation from State Officials 
Under a federal law known as the Synar Amendment, states must demonstrate that
tobacco retailers are complying with youth access laws and that illegal sales to youth are below
20%.210  Failure to maintain compliance rates can result in the loss of federal funding from the
Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Administration (ADAMHA) to be used for substance
abuse treatment.211   As of 2004, if Nebraska fails to meet the requirements of the Synar
Amendment, the state stands to lose $2.9 million.210
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On the initiative of the tobacco industry,212, 213 Governor Benjamin Nelson (D-$43,261
lifetime industry total (as Governor)), the Nebraska Department of Public Institutions, the State
Patrol and the Nebraska Department of Health collaborated with traditional tobacco industry
allies such as the Nebraska Retail Grocers Association, the Nebraska Petroleum Marketers and
the Nebraska Retail Federation to create the “Stop the Sale” retailer education campaign with
the nominal purpose of meeting the requirements of the Synar Amendment. Such tobacco
industry inspired programs are designed to provide the appearance of addressing the problem
of youth smoking while not engaging in any meaningful activities that will actually reduce
youth smoking.214   Not surprisingly, later, Philip Morris attempted to use this collaboration to
pass youth access legislation that was favorable to the tobacco industry by introducing a weak
youth access bill that included state preemption of stronger local laws as will be discussed
below.  Because the tobacco industry has historically been more effective at the state level, the
tobacco industry uses state preemption to keep local communities from passing strong tobacco
control ordinance including 100% smokefree workplace ordinances.110   
As was done elsewhere, including Missouri,211214 the tobacco industry sought to utilize
the Synar Amendment for their own benefit.  In a December 13, 1993,  Hurst Marshall, a Vice
President for the Tobacco Institute, wrote Roger Mozingo, a former Vice President at the
Tobacco Institute and later, R.J. Reynolds’ Vice President of State Government Relations,
summarizing the industry’s ADAMHA legislative plans for Nebraska.  He wrote:
After a meeting between industry personnel and Governor Nelson, the governor
informed the Department of Health that an ad hoc committee is to be established
between the two groups to develop language which meets ADAMHA [Synar]
regulations.  We expect legislation or an executive order to be reasonable [from the
tobacco industry’s point of view] and hopefully, include preemption.212
In another summary from Marshall to Mozingo on February 1, 1994, Marshall updated
developments in Nebraska.  He stated:
Governor Nelson has authorized the Liquor Enforcement division to develop rules
dealing with ADAMHA with input from tobacco retail trade.  TI lobbyist is part of
working group dealing with the administration to ensure industry concerns are
implemented.213
In May, 1995, the collaboration between the tobacco industry, tobacco retailers and the
State of Nebraska took another step forward when the Department of Health decided to use
part of a video produced by R.J. Reynolds in their own video to educate Nebraska retailers on
not selling tobacco to minors.215  The request was detailed in a letter from Bill Lindquist, a
sales executive for R.J. Reynolds, to Tom Griscom, the Executive Vice President of External
Relations for R.J. Reynolds.  In the letter, Lindquist wrote:
We were contacted by the Nebraska Department of Health who want to put part of our
Support The Law video in a video they are producing specifically for NE retailers. 
They are working together with the NE Retailers Assoc., and Tobacco Lobbyists (Only
one name given - Walt Radcliffe, who Hurst Marshall says is with the smokeless
tobacco group).  They felt that of all the videos available on this issue, our video was
one of the best in dealing with the issue of educating and training retailers on not
selling cigarettes to youth.  They want to include the section that shows various
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attempts by minors to purchase cigarettes and the steps the retailer goes through in
refusing to sell.215
This request by the Nebraska Department of Health – wanting to implement part of a
tobacco industry program – was so unusual that Lindquist was suspicious of their motive at
first.  He continued in the letter, “I spoke with the person at the NE Dept. of Health and she
seems on the level.  Plus, given who else is involved with this project I don’t see any
concerns.”  Handwritten on the bottom of the letter is the words, “We gave our permission.”215
During October, 1995, “Stop the Sale” free workshops were held in nine locations
across Nebraska.  As Dwayne Richard, President of the Nebraska Retail Federation (NRF),
told “Select NRF Members,” these workshops were “the result of eight months of work by the
Nebraska Retail Federation, Nebraska Retail Grocers Association, Nebraska Petroleum
Marketers, Nebraska Department of Health, Department of Public Institutions and the
Nebraska Highway Patrol.”216  These workshops consisted of education about Nebraska’s
youth access laws, training about the prevention of sales to minors which included a video
presentation (though it is not known if this video contained scenes from R.J. Reynolds’
“Support the Law” video) and the distribution of signage and other materials. 216
On November 22, 1995, Governor Nelson publicly stated his support for the efforts
made by the state agencies and tobacco retailers.  In a press release and press conference that
took place at a Q4Quik convenience store in Lincoln, Nelson applauded the results of the
collaboration.  At the press conference, he stood between one sign saying “We Check IDs” and
another sign of Joe Camel.217  In the press release Nelson stated, “Together, they have found a
common ground and have come up with a non-regulatory, common-sense strategy designed to
decrease tobacco use by our young people.”218  
This collaboration between the governor, three state agencies and tobacco retailers
publically seemed to show that youth access was an area where the government and the
tobacco industry could work together to improve the welfare of the public; however, the next
legislative session, Philip Morris tried to use this legitimacy to try to pass preemption in
Nebraska, but the Nebraska Department of Health helped to dispel this legitimacy by actively
opposing the preemption attempt.     
Philip Morris’ Attempt to Pass Preemption - LB 1350 (1996) 
During the middle of the 1990 session, Philip Morris was actively promoting its
“Action Against Access” (AAA) program which focused on using retailer education as a
means to comply with the Synar Amendment.  In addition, the “Action Against Access”plan
also called for introducing weak youth access laws that often included preemption.219  After
collaborating with state agencies the previous year on retailer education, Philip Morris
attempted to pass preemption in Nebraska in 1996.    
During the 1996 legislative session, Senators Dan Fisher of Grand Island ($3,000
lifetime industry total), John Hilgert of Omaha ($4,500 lifetime industry total), Carol Hudkins
of Malcolm (R-4.2 policy score; $6,000 lifetime industry total), Dan Lynch of Omaha ($6,800
lifetime industry total), Dwite Pedersen of Elkhorn (R-3.5 policy score; $7,600 lifetime
industry total), Carol Pirsch of Omaha ($4,450 lifetime industry total) and Jennie Roback of
77
Columbus ($7,800 lifetime industry total) sponsored a youth access bill that contained
preemption, reduced tobacco licensing fees, and made it a crime for anyone to conduct
compliance checks without involvement from law enforcement officers.220  (This later
provision would have made it impossible, for all practical purposes, for local health
departments to enforce youth access laws.)  This bill was pushed by Nebraska’s retail
community and interestingly, the tobacco industry did not try to hide their support of the bill.
Fisher, Hilgert, Hudkins, Lynch and Pedersen were running for office in 1996 and
everyone received money from Philip Morris except Hilgert who received money from R.J.
Reynolds (See Appendix).  Hilgert later dropped himself from the bill.  Pirsch and Robak both
received money from Philip Morris during their last election in 1994 (See Appendix).  As of
2003, Hudkins and Pedersen remained state senators. 
The preemption clause of LB 1350 stated:
Such sections shall be applicable and uniform throughout the state, and unless
specifically allowed by state law, no political subdivision, including an home rule
charter city, or department, board, or agency thereof and no other department, or
agency of the state, shall enact new or enforce existing laws, ordinances, or rules
regulating the sale, distribution, marketing, display, or promotion of tobacco
products.220
Nebraska’s health advocates did not remain silent on LB 1350.  On February 12, their
position appeared in the Omaha World-Herald’s Public Pulse section.  Written by Daniel
Wherry of the American Cancer Society, it noted that the sponsors of the bill had “put their
names on the line as advocates for the tobacco industry.”221   Wherry added, “This bill, under
the guise of raising penalties, tries to make it a crime for anyone to conduct compliance checks
of vendors without law enforcement involvement.”221  He also made sure to discuss preemption
by concluding, “Most importantly, this bill proposes a preemption clause that prohibits any
community from passing any tobacco law or ordinances that are tougher than the watered-
down rules proposed by the bill or ones already on the books, which are not being enforced.”221 
The retail community, on behalf of the tobacco industry, also tried to utilize the
editorial pages.  In a guest column entitled “Uniform Cigarette Law Needed”, Fred Stone,
Executive Director of the Nebraska Petroleum Marketers and Convenience Store Association,
Kathy Siefken, Executive Director of the Nebraska Retail Grocers Association, and Dwayne
Richard, President of the Nebraska Retail Federation, wrote of the Nebraska retail
community’s support for LB 1350.222  The authors cited their cooperation with the State Patrol
and the Department of Health Services as proof of their good intentions concerning underage
tobacco use.  “Last year, Nebraska’s retail trade associations joined state law enforcement and
health officials to launch a program aimed at preventing tobacco sales to minors,” they wrote,
adding later:
This year, retailers are building on their commitment by supporting legislation to
toughen Nebraska’s minimum age laws.  LB 1350 is a comprehensive measure which
provides for licensing of retailers who sell cigarettes, requires unannounced compliance
testing by law enforcement officers and slaps fines on repeat offenders.  In addition,
retailers convicted of a third offense could have their license suspended.222 
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The op-ed also makes clear the retailers’ position on preemption:
Particularly important from our point of view is that the measure establishes uniform
statewide standards that would apply to all businesses regardless of where they operate. 
Uniform regulation is good public policy and good business policy.  It is preferable to a
patchwork quilt of local laws that is confusing to consumers and inconvenient to
businesses that operate in more than one locality.  Worst of all, in the absence of
uniform regulations, businesses can be placed at a competitive disadvantage when they
are located in a town that has more restrictive laws than its neighbors.  Uniform
legislation provides a level playing field on which all business can compete.222
They conclude, “State Sens. Dan Fisher, Carol Hudkins, Dan Lynch, Dwite Pedersen, Carol
Pirsch and Jennie Robak should be commended for introducing LB 1350 as a solution to a
problem confronting the state of Nebraska.”222
Within a few days, health advocates had responded with an op-ed of their own in the
World-Herald.  On March 2, a piece written by Tom Bassett,  Executive Director of the
Nebraska Dental Association, was published that countered the retailers’ position.188  Bassett
attacked tobacco retailers and tobacco lobbyists for trying to misinform legislators, the
governor and the public about the intent of LB 1350 in their efforts to get it passed and called it
“a con job of major proportions.”  He noted that the bill was opposed by the Nebraska Dental
Association, the American Lung Association, the American Cancer Society, the Nebraska
Network of Drug Free Youth, PRIDE-Omaha, the PTA and other health groups.  Bassett also
stated that LB 1350 was a “tobacco lobbyist’s dream come true” because it contained
preemption.  As he wrote, “It would take all authority away from towns and counties to enact
ordinances that would be tougher on tobacco issues than state law provides.  It’s called a pre-
emption clause, and it’s part of the tobacco industry’s national plan to keep all the power in
state capitals where its lobbyists have the most influence.” Bassett concluded by saying, “LB
1350 should be so soundly defeated that in the future senators will ask lots of questions before
they sign a bill presented to them by the tobacco lobbyists and their cohorts.”188
The efforts of tobacco control advocates were successful and the bill did not even make
it out of committee.  Not only did the bill die in committee, but both Hudkins and Pirsch
withdrew their names from the bill.223 
The Rudman Report
In 1997, Warren Rudman, former U.S. Senator from New Hampshire, and the New
York City-based law firm of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison prepared a document
entitled “Report to the Management of Philip Morris U.S.A Regarding Implementation of the
Action Against Access Program.”219  The report was prepared to coincide with June 27, 1996,
the one year anniversary of the start of the Philip Morris’ Action Against Access Program.
In June, 1996, Philip Morris prepared a document which detailed the purpose of the
Rudman Report.  The Philip Morris document stated:
Media and ally awareness of the success of this program [Action Against Access] needs
to be enhanced.  There is a distinct need for a two pronged, continuing education
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strategy to clearly communicate the achievements of the program to reach government
leaders and the general public.
Members of Congress . . . need both cover for their actions on behalf of PM and the
rest of the industry, and a better understanding of the positive actions being undertaken
by PM.
Secondly, the constant battle to get the traditional media to provide both substantial and
fair coverage of PM’s efforts has become more difficult in light of recent events.  The
following proposed actions have been developed to stress the significance and positive
(but as yet unheralded) actions by Philip Morris to keep kids away from cigarettes.224
The Rudman Report, though presented as an independent evaluation, was crafted by Philip
Morris to accomplish these two tasks.  The Philip Morris document stated it this way, “The
release of this audit/report on June 26th, will be the news hook around which this proposal is
based.”224
The findings detailed in the Rudman Report concerning Nebraska provide an analysis
of the tobacco industry’s failure to pass “Action Against Access” legislation from Philip
Morris’ point of view.  Indeed, Philip Morris representatives and allies provided much of the
information for this report.  The following were some of the findings from the Rudman Report
for Nebraska:
The legislation [LB 1350] was supported by a coalition of retail interests and tobacco
manufacturers.  This coalition had previously worked with the state Department of
Health to develop tobacco sales training programs for retail employees.  However,
despite retail and tobacco industry support for legislation in 1996, the Nebraska
Department of Health did not support legislative action in 1996 and specifically
opposed local preemption and the requirement that law enforcement officers participate
in retail compliance testing. Anti-tobacco organizations opposed the legislation,
objecting in particular to local preemption and the prohibition on using private citizens
in retail compliance testing.
According to PMUSA representatives, the “short session” in 1996 (60 days, versus 90
days in 1997), worked to frustrate consideration of the legislation in 1996.  The
legislation’s sponsor 110 informed PMUSA that there was inadequate time to complete
action on the bill in 1996, and thus there would be committee hearings but no
committee vote on the matter.  PMUSA requested that the Governor’s office intercede
and encourage consideration of the bill, but it was reportedly told that no time existed
to consider the bill in 1996.  A representative of the Nebraska Retail Federation with
whom we spoke did not disagree with this assessment, but did note that the presence of
tobacco industry support for the legislation did cause some concern among some state
legislators.  PMUSA representatives disagreed with this observation, observing that
while the political climate in some states required PMUSA to play a secondary role in
AAA legislation, Nebraska was not such a case.  Newspaper articles tend to support
PMUSA’s interpretation.  PMUSA’s representatives are optimistic that the legislation
will pass in the longer 1997 session, and predict that the local preemption provision
might not be included in next year’s bill.219  
While Philip Morris’ attempt to utilize the cooperation between tobacco retailers and
the State of Nebraska  in order to pass preemption in a youth access bill was not successful, it
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does represent a cautionary tale about how the tobacco industry and its allies are willing to
utilize previous cooperation, in this case on employee education, to pass legislation that is
harmful to the health of the public.                                                                                                  
                                     
Youth Possession Ordinances
During the summer of 1997, three cities that lie along Interstate 80 passed ordinances
that outlawed the possession of tobacco by a minor.225 Spearheading these ordinances were the
police chiefs of North Platte, Gothenburg and Cozad.225  Their reason for pushing for the
possession ordinances was that they said it was frustrating for officers to attempt to enforce
Nebraska’s tobacco laws which made it a crime for minors to use tobacco or purchase it but
not to possess it.  Much of this difficulty came from police efforts to crack down on minors
smoking during their lunch break.  Groups of high school students would often smoke across
the street from their school during that break.  The penalty for violating these new youth
possession ordinances was a fine of up to $100.225
The response of health advocates was to praise the intent of the ordinances in seeking
to address the problem of underage smoking, but they also cautioned that youth possession
ordinances would not solve the problem.  As Jeff Soukup of Tobacco Free Nebraska stated, “It
wasn’t too long ago that people would just shrug their shoulders over teen-age smoking.  It’s
commendable that communities are recognizing it as the number one preventable health
problem.”225  Despite the praise seeking to address the issue, both Soukup and Corrie Kielty of
the Smokeless Nebraska Coalition stated their position that other steps, such as effective
education efforts and enforcement of laws that penalized the sale of tobacco to minors, needed
to be taken to address underage smoking.  Kielty said, “Our concern is that we hold kids
accountable and we hold adults accountable, too.  It’s not the kids that are profiting from the
sale of tobacco.  It’s the adults.”225  Because youth possession laws focus responsibility on
children instead of businesses and have not been shown to be effective in reducing tobacco
use, the tobacco industry is supportive of youth possession ordinances.226, 227
The cautioning of advocates did not prevent the Omaha World-Herald’s editorial staff
from downplaying the need for an educational component to reduce youth smoking.  In a
September 3 editorial entitled “Sensible Approach to Tobacco Problem” they presented an
argument that making tobacco possession by a minor illegal would work better than an
educational campaign.  They argued:
If hearts and minds can be converted by a clever slogan, wonderful.  But the first
priority is to keep tobacco out of the mouths - and smoke out of the lungs - of children. 
Fines of up to $100 in Cozad, Gothenburg and North Platte may do more than
television commercials to stop a teen-ager from smoking or chewing.  Certainly the
fines should help increase the vigilance of parents.228  
Later the editors add:
The city councils of three Nebraska cities have come up with a better way to deal with
smoking.  Prohibiting possession of tobacco as well as its purchase and use by minors
plugs a gap in the law.  It makes minors accountable.  These council members have
shown a caring attitude toward the young people of their communities.228
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Ainsworth
Alliance
Cozad
Curtis
Eustis
Fremont
Gibbon
Gothenburg
Grand Island
Hastings
Holdredge
Kearney
Maywood
North Platte
Plattsmouth
Shelton
Sidney
Wayne
Yutan
Table 18: Cities in Nebraska that passed youth tobacco possession ordinances as of 2003
By early October, Kearney, another city along I-80, had passed a tobacco possession
ordinance similar to the others.229  By February, 1998, the World-Herald reported that at least
11 communities had passed ordinances that made possession of tobacco by a minor illegal.230
As of 2003, a total of 19 cities had passed youth possession ordinances in Nebraska (Table
18).231
Plattsmouth & Omaha Pass Youth Access Ordinances
In 2002, two neighboring cities, Plattsmouth and Omaha, were both successful in
passing youth access bills that required vendor assistance in order to access any tobacco
products.  Plattsmouth is much smaller than Omaha with a population of only about 7,000 but
it is the largest city within Cass County, which had a total population of approximately 25,000
in 2000.1  Omaha, which is the largest city in Nebraska, has a metropolitan area that
encompasses Douglas and much of Sarpy Counties which have a combined population of
approximately 587,000 in 2000.1  
An initial step toward passing both of these ordinances was “Operation Storefront.”  In
1999, the local tobacco control coalitions for both cities participated in this nationwide project
which sought to “document the presence, locations and types of retail tobacco advertising,
promotion and product placement in their communities.”232  Teams of high school youth and
adult sponsors visited local retail outlets in an effort to answer four general questions:
1. Are tobacco products placed near products which attract children (candy, toys, soda
pop, snacks, etc.)?  Or are they near adult products (laundry, home repair or automobile
products)?
2. Are tobacco products placed behind the counter so they require face-to-face
transactions with clerks or are they located near doors, at child’s-eye level, or away
from the clerk’s view and easily shoplifted?
3. Are there more tobacco ads or promotions in inner-city or lower income neighborhoods
than in middle or high-income neighborhoods?
4. Are tobacco products or advertising placed below 3 feet?  Since it is illegal for children
to purchase or use tobacco products, and it is fairly difficult for adults to bend down to
the 3-foot level, any placement or advertising below 3 feet would be cause for question.232
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In Omaha, these efforts were conducted by the Metropolitan Omaha Tobacco
Awareness Coalition (MOTAC) and Our Healthy Community Partnership.  MOTAC was
Omaha’s local tobacco control coalition and was still operating as of 2003.  Our Healthy
Community Partnership was a consortium of various health-related groups in Omaha such as
health care providers, social service agencies and health insurers.  On October 30, 1999
“Operation Storefront” teams visited over 150 businesses in metropolitan Omaha to survey
their product and advertising placement.232
The following week, on November 6, 1999, a smaller but similar “Operation
Storefront” was carried out in neighboring Cass County, including Plattsmouth.232  This effort
was conducted by Cass County Tobacco is A Drug (TAD).  Cass County TAD was the local
tobacco control coalition within that county and was still active as of 2003. 
These “Operation Storefront” activities found that stores within these communities had
cigarettes and other tobacco products at a level that could be reached by children and that these
tobacco products were in open displays that could be accessed by anyone.  Examples such as
cigarettes being placed close to the door of the store, which allowed them to be easily
shoplifted, were also found. The youth access ordinances that were eventually passed by
Omaha and Plattsmouth were designed to eliminate the abilities of minors to access tobacco
products with the ease that was seen in “Operation Storefront;” however, it would take several
more years for local tobacco control advocates to be successful in getting their respective city
councils to pass stronger youth access legislation.
In 2001, Cass County TAD hired Sandy Thomas as its Tobacco Prevention
Coordinator, which was its first paid staff position.233  One of the first actions that Thomas
undertook was an educational campaign to increase the community’s awareness about the need
for tobacco control.  In October, 2001, she organized at a meeting to discuss the Communities
of Excellence manual developed by American Cancer Society, which focused on the steps that
local communities could take to reduce the harm done by tobacco.233
Three Plattsmouth city council members, John Porter, Doug Derby and Paul Lambert,
attended this meeting.234  One of the topics discussed in the manual was the need to prevent
minors from shoplifting tobacco products by requiring that all such products could only be
accessed by a store employee.  In practice, this requirement meant that tobacco products had to
be behind a counter or locked in a cabinet.  The three council members left convinced that such
an ordinance was an important step for preventing tobacco use by minors and that it would be
possible to pass.233  They began collaborating with Cass County TAD to educate the rest of the
city council on this issue.
As a result of this effort, on March 18, 2002, the Plattsmouth City Council passed a
youth access ordinance unanimously which stated:
No person may (a) sell, permit to be sold, or offer for sale tobacco or tobacco products
by means other than Vendor-Assisted Access, or (b) display tobacco or tobacco
products in a manner allowing customers access to tobacco or tobacco products without
vendor assistance.235    
This ordinance passed through the city council with little resistance.  While some local
merchants were opposed, many store owners in Plattsmouth had already placed tobacco behind
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a counter to avoid shoplifting.233  As a result, the opposition from local retailers was not strong
enough to defeat a bill that was being pushed by three council members.
Almost seven months later, Omaha passed a similar youth access ordinance on October
8, 2002.236  MOTAC had not been as fortunate as Cass County TAD with regard to council
members willing to push for youth access legislation, but they were able to secure one
legislative champion. In 2001, Councilman Garry Gernandt decided to help after meeting with
MOTAC’s youth groups, Get Involved Fight Tobacco (GIFT).237  The youth presented
Gernandt with the results from Operation Storefront and later surveys that were conducted by
GIFT of local stores that sold tobacco products.  These presentations convinced him to propose
a youth access ordinance that required vendor assistance for an access to tobacco products.237
With the support of a legislative champion and continued pressure from MOTAC and
its affiliated youth group, the ordinance passed the city council of Omaha unanimously.238 
While the language between the Plattsmouth and Omaha ordinances were very similar, the
Omaha ordinance also provided for a punishment of a $200 fine for the first offense and a $500
fine for any subsequent offense.236
One of reasons why the Omaha ordinance passed unanimously was because, as in
Plattsmouth, the opposition from retailers was weak because many retailers in Omaha already
had moved their tobacco products behind the counter or placed them under lock and key.238 
One local supermarket chain, No Frills, spoke out against the ordinance at the public hearing
claiming that it should be left to the businesses to make product placement decisions. Overall,
the retail community, including Baker’s Supermarkets, who had filed a lawsuit to weaken a
previous youth access ordinance in Omaha, was silent.238.
It did not escape the attention of Councilman Gernandt and members of MOTAC that
this ordinance was putting into law what many retailers had already done. Therefore, they
recognized that the ordinance was only a part of efforts needed to reduce the number of minors
that use tobacco products.  As Kathy Burson, President of MOTAC and Tobacco Prevention
Coordinator of PRIDE-Omaha, stated, “There’s not one magic bullet that will completely
eliminate the problem.  But the youth-access issue is a very important component of a
comprehensive approach.”237  Speaking about the effect of the ordinance on youth smoking,
Councilman Gernandt told the Omaha World-Herald, “This is just a small baby step.”237
In Nebraska, the tobacco industry and is allies have worked to ensure the passage of
weak youth access laws and have actively opposed the effective enforcement of these laws. 
Furthermore, in 1996, Philip Morris unsuccessfully attempted to use the issue of youth access
to pass preemption in Nebraska. 
EARLY CIGARETTE EXCISE TAX INCREASES
Historically, the Nebraska Legislature has increased the cigarette excise tax rarely and
in small increments.  For example, it was increased from $0.14 to $0.18 in 1982, from $0.18 to
$0.23 in 1986 and from $0.23 to $0.27 in 1987. (More recent excise tax increase efforts are
shown in Table 19).  Often these smaller tax increases are the result of hard economic times
that forced the Legislature to increase the excise tax to balance the budget.  The tobacco
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industry has shown little concern over these small tax hikes. When health advocates have
pushed for excise tax increases, they have tried for more substantial increments to reduce
cigarette consumption (and, in one case, finance environmental programs), generally without
success.  Health advocates have also attempted to secure a portion of an excise tax increase to
be dedicated to funding tobacco control efforts, again with little success.
Nebraska Clean Environment Act
By early 1992, a group of environmentalists in Nebraska had been working for over a
year preparing for an initiative drive to increase the excise tax on a pack of cigarettes by 25
cents.239  This money would have gone to fund a tree planting program, a statewide recycling
effort, cancer research and smoking cessation programs.  This group called themselves the
Nebraska Clean Environment Committee and they were led by Francis Moul, an avid
environmentalist and the husband of the lieutenant governor.  While health advocates in the
state were in favor of the Nebraska Clean Environment Committee’s campaign to raise the
state’s cigarette excise tax, the tobacco control community in Nebraska was not well-organized
at the time and could not provide a high level of support.     
The actions of the Clean Environment Committee did not go unnoticed by the tobacco
industry.  A news summary prepared by the State Activities Division of the Tobacco Institute
on October 10, 1991 indicates that the tobacco industry was monitoring the progress of the
Clean Environment Committee before the petition drive was announced; however, the industry
did not seemed concerned about the possibility of an initiative until advocates began their
petition drive.240  
The tobacco industry was aware of the launch of the petition drive almost as soon as
the membership of the committee itself.  Within a week of when he sent it to his donors,
Moul's letter  announcing the start of the petition campaign was in the hands of the R.J.
Reynolds’ Government Relations Department which forwarded it on to Philip Morris.239  The
letter that R.J. Reynolds and Philip Morris had in their possession was addressed to Rita
Sanders.  Sanders worked for the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association, which has long
been allied with R. J. Reynolds and both organizations have shared the same lobbyist in
Nebraska, Jim Moylan.5, 241
Table 19: Summary of Efforts to Increase Tobacco Excise Tax in Nebraska (Key Events)
Year Sponsor Bill Number  
  (if
applicable)
Proposed Increase Status
1992 Nebraska Clean
Environment
Committee 
Initiative that attempted to
increase the tobacco excise
tax by $0.25 to fund
environmental efforts and
smoking cessation.
Failed due to
insufficient
number of
signatures
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1993 Sen. Jerome Warner
(Waverly) 
LB 22 Increased the excise tax by
$0.05 to help balance the
state budget
Passed
1993 Sen. John Lindsay
(Omaha)
LB 595 Increased the excise tax by
$0.02 to pay for cancer
research at the University of
Nebraska Medical Center
and Creighton University
Passed
1999 Sen. David Landis
(Lincoln)
LB 505 Attempted to increase the
excise tax by $0.66.
Approximately $0.14
earmark for tobacco control.
Failed
2001 Sen. Jim Jensen
(Omaha)
LB 792 Attempted to increase the
excise tax by $0.30.  $0.05
earmark for tobacco control. 
Failed
2002 Sen. Jensen LB 1149 Attempted to increase the
excise tax by $0.50. $7
million per year was
designated for tobacco
control.
Failed
2002 Revenue Committee LB 1085 Tax increase bill that
increased the excise tax by
$0.30  to help meet budget
constraints.  No earmark for
tobacco control. 
Passed
The initial strategy taken by the tobacco industry was discussed by Matt Paluszek,
Government Affairs Regional Director for Philip Morris, in a memo to other senior Philip
Morris executives.242  He stated, “Our short-term strategy is to make it known that there is
broad-based opposition to this initiative, so as to undermine efforts to raise money for the
campaign and to get the 42,000 valid signatures needed.”242  Paluszek also wrote that all press
inquires would be handled by Bill Peters, the Tobacco Institute’s lobbyist for Nebraska, and he
named possible allies in their fight against the initiative, namely, “NE Retailer Federation,
Farm Bureau, NE Consumer Packaging Council, Higher Education representatives (and
possibly smoker’s rights).”242
Another list which appears to include possible allies was found in tobacco industry
documents that was handwritten on a copy of the Clean Environment Committee’s donation
information sheet, but it is not known who wrote this list.  This list included the “NE Tax
Research Council, Chamber [of Commerce], Farm Bureau, Solid Waste (NE Consumer
Packaging Council) - Retail Merchants, Smokers, Retail Grocers, University [of Nebraska],
Cancer Research, Every Group That Is Currently Recieving (sic) Funding.”243 
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While the Clean Environment Committee was just getting their petition off the ground,
the tobacco industry had their hands full with several other initiatives.  Similar tax initiatives
were further along in Massachusetts, Colorado and Oregon, and new ones were beginning in
Arkansas and Oklahoma as well.244  The tobacco industry was already focused on these other
initiatives and they did not take the threat posed by the Francis Moul and his group very
seriously.  As a result, the initial response by the tobacco industry was to simply monitor the
progress of the Nebraska Clean Environment Committee.  As Robert McAdam, Tobacco
Institute Vice President of State Affairs for Initiatives, Referendums, and Special Projects, and
Daniel Wahby, Director of Special Projects for the Tobacco Institute, stated in a memo to the
Tobacco Institute Coordinating Committee, “It has been consistently believed that the
proponents of this issue were not politically sophisticated enough to qualify this issue for the
ballot.  Now that they have filed this issue for circulation, we will be monitoring their activity
closely to determine their progress.”244  Both McAdam and Wahby would lead the tobacco
industry’s opposition to the Nebraska Clean Environment Act.   
Through the middle of May, the tobacco industry mainly focused on monitoring the
progress of signature-gathering.  A memo from McAdam to the Tobacco Institute Coordinating
Committee on May 19, 1992 stated, “There is still little evidence that the proponents of this
initiative have organized sufficiently to qualify this issue for the ballot.  While they did have
some petition gatherers located at polling places during this state’s primary election, they did
not have the coverage necessary to obtain sufficient signatures.”245  
At the same time, however, the tobacco industry started to spend money to fight the
petition.  On May 20, McAdam wrote to the Tobacco Institute Management Committee saying,
“In an attempt to pay for some preparatory legal work and for a possible survey should the
petition gatherers appear to be reaching their goal, I believe we need to allocate $40,000 for
this campaign at this time.”246  By the middle of June, McAdam was beginning to take the
initiative campaign in Nebraska more seriously.  His memo to the Tobacco Institute
Coordinating Committee on June 15 stated, “While the proponents of the tax increase initiative
in this state continue to appear somewhat disorganized, they have recently hired a professional
consulting firm to help them gather signatures throughout the state.  They have indicated to
reporters that they plan to pay signature gatherers on an hourly basis.  While it is still too early
to determine if they will be successful, we have organized our legal approach to challenging
certain aspects of the initiative, as well as the individual signatures that the proponents may
submit.”247 
By June 17, the first assessment for funds to combat the Nebraska initiative was
prepared and sent to senior executives within Philip Morris, R.J. Reynolds, Lorillard and
American Tobacco with the total amount being the $40,000 requested by McAdam, divided
between the companies on the basis of market share.248
 
This money was to be sent to the Nebraska Executive Committee c/o Bill Peters, who
was the Tobacco Institute’s lobbyist for Nebraska.4, 249, 250  These “Executive Committees” and
other front groups with neutral to positive-sounding names,  were led by the Tobacco Institute
lobbyist in states where an initiative was underway.251  For example, money from the tobacco
industry to defeat the initiative in Arizona was sent to the Arizona Executive Committee and in
New Jersey, the checks were mailed to John O’Conner in the Tobacco Institute’s office in
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Albany, New York, but the checks were to be made payable to Citizens for Representative
Democracy in West Trenton, New Jersey.248     
In July, the Nebraska Clean Environment Committee submitted an estimated 48,000
signatures to the Secretary of State for certification.250  The total number of signatures that was
needed to be placed on the ballot was 41,058.252  By then, the tobacco industry was actively
attempting to recruit new allies to help in its fight against this environmental initiative.   In
addition to the “traditional” tobacco industry allies, which included  business and tax groups,4,
20 the Tobacco Institute was attempting to enlist the aid of WIFE, which stands for Women
Involved in Farm Economics.  WIFE is a national organization whose president in 1992 was
Elaine Stuhr, who was elected a Nebraska state senator from Bradshaw in 1994 and remained
in the Legislature as of 2003 (R - 4.3 policy score; $1,250 lifetime industry total).  In a letter to
Stuhr, Daniel Wahby, the Director of Special Projects for the Tobacco Institute, wrote, “First
of all, I would like to take this opportunity to thank you and your organization for your interest
in assisting our efforts in defeating the proposed 25 cents per pack excise tax on tobacco
products.”253  Wahby tells Stuhr that he has asked Bill Peters to get in touch with her to give
her more information.  He states, “I apologize for not having specific information in writing as
it relates to the farm community in Nebraska but I trust your conversation with Mr. Peters will
give you some information to go on.”253
The tobacco industry also began threatening a lawsuit if the issue was placed on the
ballot.  Bill Peters, the Tobacco Institute’s lobbyist, told reporters that the true number of
signatures that needed to be obtained was more than 61,000 and not the 41,058 that the
secretary of state said was necessary.254  The conflict came over whether language in the
Nebraska Constitution required the number of signatures to exceed a percentage of the citizens
that were registered to vote in the last election for governor or a percentage of citizens that
actually voted in the last election for governor. 
While the tobacco industry was threatening a lawsuit, their first tactic was trying to
disqualify the signatures that had been submitted.  Another memo from McAdam to the
Tobacco Institute Management Committee, dated July 21, 1992 detailed the tobacco industry
plan for dealing with the initiative at this stage.  McAdam wrote:
The narrow margin of signature submitted by the proponents of this initiative leads us
to believe that through diligent efforts to disqualify signatures, we may be able to avoid
facing this issue on the ballot this year.  To that end, our legal team continues to focus
on issues that can be raised in court that would result in this issue being stricken from
the ballot.  In the interim, we are working with Pancho Hays to use the computer
program established for the Colorado effort to compare petition signatures with voter
registration records with the hope that we will find enough incorrectly validated
signatures to disqualify the petition.255  
The memo goes on to state that the tobacco industry was planning on challenging the
verification findings made by the county clerks if they were not favorable to the industry. 
McAdam also says in case the disqualification efforts are unsuccessful, a budget and campaign
plan are being organized to fight the initiative on the ballot.255
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The tobacco industry carried out their plans to disqualify signatures by taking a copy
machine to the Secretary of State’s office to make photocopies of all the petitions that were
submitted so that they could be reviewed for any mistakes.256  McAdam indicated that this
review process included hiring handwriting experts to compare signatures.255 
The budget that McAdam spoke about was sent to high level executives for the
participating companies on the next day.  Now the Tobacco Institute was asked for an
additional $145,000 to combat the Nebraska Clean Environment Committee, again based on
market share, bringing the total to date to $185,000.257
By the middle of August, McAdam was reporting that the Secretary of State, Allen
Beermann, was on vacation but would finish determining if there were a sufficient number of
signatures for the issue to be placed on the ballot for the November election when he returned. 
As of August 13, McAdam was reporting that there seemed to be only 12 more signatures than
the minimum needed.258  By August 18, McAdam was reporting that the last count done by the
office of the Secretary of State showed that the petition was now short just 4 signatures.259 
Both memos also discussed the strategy of the tobacco industry.  As McAdam stated:
In anticipation of the possibility of having to run a campaign, we are launching a
survey to determine the arguments that would be necessary to win.  We are also putting
together the elements of a campaign plan and an appropriate budget.  Once we receive
an indication of the direction the Secretary of State intends to take, we will have a
better idea how much of an effort we will need to wage in this situation.258259
Such a campaign was not necessary.  The tobacco industry’s efforts to challenge the
signatures were successful and on September 2, 1992, Secretary of State Beerman issued his
finding that the Nebraska Clean Environment Committee had failed to gather enough
signatures.  The final count was 40,803 signatures, 255 short of certification.  While it cannot
be known for certain whether or not the Secretary of State would have certified enough
signatures for the Nebraska Clean Environment Act to get on the ballot if not for the tobacco
industry’s campaign to defeat the initiative, it seems clear that the petitions submitted by the
Nebraska Clean Environment Committee were subjected to a much higher level of scrutiny
than was normally the case.  This was also the case in other states, such as Colorado, where the
tobacco industry was successful in fighting against an initiative to raise the cigarette excise
tax.251
Following the secretary of state’s ruling, Francis Moul and the organizers of the
petition drive challenged the decision in court.  In the Lancaster County District Court, they
argued that 550 signatures that had been rejected by Beermann because the petition gatherers
were not registered voters should have been deemed valid under a Nebraska Supreme Court
ruling earlier that year.260  On September 22, Judge William Blue deemed that the Nebraska
Supreme Court’s previous ruling only permitted individuals to gather signatures outside of the
county in which they were registered not that individuals did not have to be registered voters to
gather signatures.261  With this ruling, the drive to get the Clean Environment Act on the ballot
in 1992 was over.
The tobacco industry appears to have spent over $400,000 in its successful effort to
stop the tax initiative.  Just prior to the ruling by Judge Blue, on September 18, 1992, James
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Cherry, the Senior Associate General Counsel for Lorillard, sent a check in the amount of
$53,469 to the Nebraska Executive Committee in order to pay for Lorillard’s portion of
Assessment 3.262  While a copy of Assessment 3 could not be found in the industry documents,
it is possible to determine the total amount for Assessment 3 by dividing the amount Lorillard
paid by its market share as reported in Assessment 1 and Assessment 2.
The fact that Assessment 3 was equal to the amount determined by using this formula is
confirmed by a later document dated October 20 from McAdam to Kurt Malmgren, Senior
Vice President of State Activities for the Tobacco Institute, in which McAdam wrote, “We
have spent approximately $225,134 of the original $619,495 assessment.”263  Table 20 shows
the amounts requested by the Tobacco Institute to defeat the initiative, but it should be noted
that because of the failure of the petition to get on the ballot, the tobacco industry did have to
spend all of the money they allocated.  The October 20 memo from McAdam to Malgren stated
that RJR and American [Tobacco] had not paid their portions of Assessment 3 at that time, but
Philip Morris’ and Lorillard’s portions were sufficient to cover the expenses.263  A memo dated
November 20 from a vice president of American Tobacco to Donald Johnston, the President
and CEO, showed that the American Tobacco Company did contribute to Assessment 3 in the
amount of $14,961.39.264  It could not be determined whether R.J. Reynolds paid their portion
of Assessment 3 or skipped out on the bill.  By adding together the full amounts for 
Table 20: Summary of Tobacco Industry Contributions Assessed to Defeat the 1992 Attempt
to Increase the Tobacco Tax
Tobacco Company Assessment 1 Assessment 2 Assessment 3
Philip Morris $20,262 $73,450 $313,805
R.J. Reynolds $12,974 $47,029 $200,927
Lorillard $3,452 $12,515 $53,469
American Tobacco $3,312 $12,006 $51,294
TOTAL $40,000 $145,000 $619,495
Assessment 1 and Assessment 2 and the $225,134 from Assessment 3 that was actually spend
indicates that the tobacco industry spend a total of $410,134 on the defeat of the Nebraska
Clean Environment Act petition drive. 
1993 Excise Tax Increases 
The year following the defeat of the Clean Environment Act was another year in which
the Legislature proposed small increases in the cigarette excise tax to meet budget needs.  A
national recession was being felt in Nebraska so one bill, LB 22, was passed which raised the
excise tax by $0.05 to help balance the state’s budget, while another bill, LB 595, raised the
excise tax by $0.02 to pay for cancer research at the University of Nebraska Medical Center
and Creighton University.265  These bills increased Nebraska’s excise tax from $0.27 to $0.34. 
Nebraska’s excise tax would not be increased again until 2002.
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THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT
 
Early Conflict Concerning a Lawsuit Against the Tobacco Industry
In August, 1996, Nebraska began publically showing interest in initiating a lawsuit
against the tobacco industry.  At the time, 14 other states had filed lawsuits including
neighboring Kansas.266  The Liggett Group, the smallest of the tobacco companies that was
being sued by the states, had broken ranks with the large tobacco companies and had agreed to
a settlement to avoid bankruptcy.267  This settlement by Liggett represented the first time that a
tobacco company had agreed to settle a lawsuit over the harm caused by cigarettes and
represented a major turning point in efforts to sue the tobacco industry. 
Due to these circumstances, Governor Ben Nelson (D) and Don Leuenberger, the
Director of the Nebraska Department of Social Services, began approaching the Attorney
General Don Stenberg (R-$4,000 lifetime industry total) about the feasibility of Nebraska
filing suit.  As detailed in an Omaha World-Herald article on September 4, Leuenberger sent a
letter to Attorney General Stenberg the previous week asking him, “What action will you take
on behalf of the State of Nebraska to curb smoking by children and to recover Nebraska
Medicaid funds?”266  According to an aide for Nelson, the letter from Leuenberger was sent
with the backing of the governor.  Trent Nowka, Governor Nelson’s chief lobbyist, said, “If it
can be done, he [Nelson] wants to do it.  If there’s an opportunity for the state to recover these
costs, we should explore the options.”266  Members of Nebraska’s Smokeless States coalition,
Smokeless Nebraska, which was funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, GASP of
Nebraska, local tobacco control advocates and some state senators, most notably, Senator Don
Preister of Omaha (D - 8.8 policy score), had also been calling on Stenberg to initiate a
lawsuit.266  A spokesperson for the Attorney General’s office said that Stenberg would take at
least a week to review the request by Leuenberger.266
On September 6, the World-Herald applauded the fact that Stenberg had not initiated
litigation to that point in an editorial entitled “Individual Rights, Responsibilities Are Caution
Signs in Tobacco Suit.”268   The editorial also cautioned against the idea of using government
regulations to prevent the tobacco industry from marketing to children because of the
possibility that such actions would be struck down by the courts.  The paper’s reason for not
supporting a lawsuit was that it said the way to get people to not smoke was through:
education, social pressure and tough enforcement of the laws against the purchase,
possession or use of tobacco products by minors.  Nebraska should try to improve the
effectiveness of these methods.  It shouldn’t place its faith in the curbing of speech or
in the hope of receiving a financial windfall from an industry that has attracted
powerful enemies.268
On September 9, 1996, Attorney General Stenberg issued a confrontational reply to
Leuenberger’s letter, which was later quoted in the press.269  (The full letter was located in R. J.
Reynolds’ files.270)  Before he addressed either of Leuenberger’s concerns, Stenberg
questioned his motives for sending the letter by writing, 
However, I first must confess that the timing of your letter raises political questions. 
The Nelson Administration has been in office for more than 5-1/2 years and never
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before have you or any member of the Nelson Administration sought my advice
concerning these tobacco issues.  In those 5-1/2 years, I am not aware of any major
Nelson Administration initiatives to educate Nebraskans concerning the dangers of
smoking, nor has the Nelson Administration proposed legislation to curb smoking by
children.  As you note in your letter, Mississippi filed suit concerning this issue on May
23, 1994, more than two years ago, and for more than two years, you did not seek my
advice concerning this legal question.  It was only after the Democrats, at their National
Convention, highlighted tobacco issues, and only a day or two after Governor Nelson
returned from that Democratic convention, that this letter was sent to me. According to
news accounts, the letter was sent to me with the Governor’s express approval.  This
raises serious questions as to whether your letter is a good faith request for my advice,
or simply political posturing for the benefit of Ben Nelsons U.S. Senate campaign.270  
Stenberg’s reply continued, stating that despite his belief that Leuenberger’s letter was
politically motivated, he was willing to answer his questions.270  Regarding efforts to reduce
smoking by minors, Stenberg avoided saying how the office of the Attorney General could
help the problem.  Instead, he listed various actions that he felt Governor Nelson and Director
Leuenberger could take to address the issue of smoking by minors.  Stenberg encouraged them
to support legislation that would establish tougher laws and enforce current laws regarding
underage smoking.  For example, he noted that currently it was not illegal for minors to
purchase or possess cigarettes and suggested legislation that would deny welfare benefits to
individuals who allow their children to smoke.  Stenberg also stated that Nelson could appoint
judges who view underage smoking as a serious problem and would therefore revoke the
licenses of any business caught selling tobacco products to minors.  Stenberg informed
Leuenberger that he would be willing to participate in a television or radio campaign to
educate young people not to smoke.  Attorney General Stenberg’s use of pro-tobacco industry
positions, such as punishing the children that purchased cigarettes and not the adults that sold
them illegally, seems to represent an effort by Stenberg to deflect all responsibility for
lowering the amount of smoking by children from himself (and the tobacco industry) to
Governor Nelson.
As for the possibility of litigation against the tobacco industry – something within
Stenberg’s authority – Stenberg informed Leuenberger that he had contacted the Attorney
General of Mississippi about that state’s settlement with Liggett and the Attorney General of
Texas concerning its lawsuit and that his office had reviewed both cases.270 He also stated that
he was aware of actions taken by other states against the tobacco industry. 
Stenberg further stated, “It is my position that if Nebraska is legally entitled to recoup
Medicaid costs from tobacco companies, then such action should be pursued.  The bottom line
at this time is that Nebraska should neither rush into litigation, nor rule out the possibility. 
Many important legal and policy questions must first be assessed. [emphasis in original]”270  In
the letter, Stenberg proceeded to lay out the questions that he wanted to be evaluated and then
he provided preliminary answers to them.  Every one of Stenberg’s answers were in opposition
to a lawsuit against the tobacco companies.  
Stenberg continued by stating, “In order to further access the above factors, I would
invite the Department of Social Services to identify any legal theory which the courts have
upheld that would enable the State to recover from tobacco companies.  How would you deal
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with the problem created by the legal doctrine of assumption of risk? [emphasis in original]”270 
Mirroring the tobacco industry’s arguments in other cases to recover Medicaid costs incurred
by the state because of smoking-induced illnesses, Stenberg requested that Leuenberger have
his staff examine every Medicaid file from the last 12 months in order to demonstrate the
impact of tobacco use in the Medicaid population in Nebraska and asked Leuenberger for his
estimate of the amount of money Nebraska would receive from the Liggett settlement and how
much of this money the State would have to pay to the federal government.270
Stenberg summed up his position in his concluding paragraph:
My personal opinion is that smoking is bad for a person’s health and that the Nelson
Administration should be doing more to prevent children from smoking.  In the spirit of
bi-partisan cooperation, I have made a number of suggestions which you and the
Governor may pursue to accomplish that goal. So far as a lawsuit against tobacco
companies is concerned, I will review the matter further after you have responded to
my request for information and after litigation in other states has progressed to the
extent that we can better evaluate whether any viable legal theory exists on which the
State might be able to make some recovery.270
Stenberg’s reply was not without political ramifications.  The World Herald quickly
picked up on the story that Stenberg was accusing the governor of using a possible lawsuit
against the tobacco companies as a ploy for his U.S. Senate campaign.  In a September 11,
1996 article entitled, “Stenberg: Suit Smells Of Politics, Timing Questioned On Tobacco
Issue,” the newspaper quoted from Stenberg’s letter and presented the reasons why he was
opposed to a lawsuit.269 (Stenberg and Nelson ran against each other in the U.S. Senate race 4
years later, in 2000; Nelson won.)
In the same article, the Department of Social Services responded by saying that it was
Stenberg who was using this issue for political gain.  Deb Thomas, the Deputy Director of the
Department of Social Services, said, “I thought it was a very political response to a
nonpolitical request for a legal opinion.”269  Thomas also stated that the issue of a lawsuit
against the tobacco industry had been discussed within the Department of Social Services for
the past two months and she said her department’s interest stemmed from the recent settlement
between Liggett and the State of Mississippi.  Thomas also questioned why Stenberg, the
state’s chief legal officer, had posed legal questions directly to Leuenberger, a doctor.  “I don’t
think it’s appropriate for a client to tell his attorney what legal theories exist,” she remarked. 
“That’s what we were asking him.”269  Thomas said that her department wanted to work
together with the office of the Attorney General to discuss the possibility of a lawsuit.  She
said, “What we want to do is have a conversation, not politically tinged, with the attorney
general’s staff on the legal merits and whether they want to pursue this legally.”269
Governor Nelson’s response was delivered by his Press Aide, Dara Troutman.  She
defended the governor’s record on tobacco control by saying that Nelson had worked to
prevent youth smoking by signing a law which placed restrictions on vending machine sales,
had backed compliance checks on tobacco merchants by the State Patrol and had also
supported grants by the Health Department which went to local tobacco control advocates to
be used to prevent smoking by minors.269  Troutman also accused Stenberg of playing politics
when she said “It’s unfortunate the attorney general turned this into a political issue.”269 
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Once again, the World-Herald sided with Stenberg.  In an editorial on September 12,
the newspaper supported Stenberg’s position on the possibility of filing a lawsuit by writing,
“Nebraska Attorney General Don Stenberg has made a logical case for using caution on the
question of whether the State of Nebraska should join in a suit against the tobacco industry.”271 
Regarding the second part of Leuenberger’s question to Stenberg about preventing smoking by
children, the editorial expressed concern about a “potential abridgement of commercial
speech.”  The editorial concluded by saying, “The question of what Nebraska should do is
more important than the politics that may have caused it to be raised.  Stenberg’s view is
reasonable.  If the state’s best legal minds see a good chance that the benefits would outweigh
the costs, Nebraska should join.  But if the most that can be achieved is standing in line with
other states and bashing the villain of the month, it’s hardly worth the trouble.”271 
Stenberg prevailed.  Nebraska did not initiate a lawsuit against the tobacco industry.  In
Nebraska, there was little more public debate about the issue during the end of 1996 and the
beginning of 1997.  Meanwhile, more and more states filed lawsuits.  On March 20, 1997, the
details of Liggett’s settlement with 22 states was disclosed.  In exchange for legal immunity,
Liggett Group agreed to hand over internal documents, put warning labels on its cigarettes
packs which stated that cigarettes are addictive and pay one-quarter of its pretax profit to aid
other lawsuits against other tobacco companies.272  With this announcement, the larger tobacco
companies began talking seriously with the states about also settling the lawsuits against them.
The Global Settlement Agreement 
Once the possibility of a settlement of tobacco litigation that could generate substantial
money for the state developed, Nelson and Stenberg appeared to put aside their political
differences to work together to possibly recoup Medicaid costs due to smoking.  On April 23,
1997, they jointly sent a letter to Geoffrey Bible, Chairman of Philip Morris Companies, and
Steve Goldstone, Chairman of RJR Nabisco, Inc,273 which attempted to take advantage of the
fact that Nebraska had not joined the litigation against the tobacco industry.  Nelson and
Stenberg wrote:
To date, the State of Nebraska has not joined in the tobacco litigation now being carried
on by 23 of the 50 states.  Among the reasons Nebraska has not joined in this litigation
at this point are the great expense involved in pursuing a lawsuit and because of the
traditional legal defenses which may be available to the tobacco companies.
On the other hand, there is no question that tobacco is a contributing cause to a number
of illnesses including lung cancer, lung disease, heart disease and other medical
problems.
It has now been reported by the Wall Street Journal that both of you personally met
with attorneys general from several suing states and discussed the possibility of a
settlement of tobacco litigation for a possible payment of $300 billion over the next 25
years.  To say the least, this suggests more than a little concern on the part of the
tobacco companies that they face possible substantial legal liability.
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We do not wish to clog the courts with additional litigation or incur substantial legal
expenses unnecessarily.  However, we have an obligation to Nebraska’s taxpayers to
recover Medicaid expenses when possible.
As Nebraska continues to evaluate its position concerning tobacco litigation, it would
be very helpful to have a direct answer to the following question:
Will you at this time give us your written assurance that in the event of a settlement of
the current tobacco litigation with one or more of the now litigating states, that the
State of Nebraska will be given the opportunity, without filing suit, to participate in
that settlement on terms no less favorable than that given to any of the now litigating
states? 
The answers from each of you concerning this question will be a significant factor in
Nebraska’s consideration of how to proceed on this issue.  The failure to make a timely
response to our letter would also weigh significantly in our deliberations.274
The World-Herald reported that Nelson and Stenberg had sent a letter to the two
tobacco companies concerning Nebraska’s status in the event of a settlement.  The article
stated, “Stenberg said that Nebraska is in a position to ride the coattails of the lawsuit filed by
others, should a settlement be reached.”275  Stenberg also told reporters that the possibility of a
lawsuit had not been ruled out.  Commenting on other states that had not filed a lawsuit,
Stenberg told reporters that Colorado had sent a similar letter to tobacco companies and that
others states were still weighing their options.  Nelson and Stenberg also informed the press
that in the letter they had requested a written assurance that Nebraska would be included in any
settlement.  When asked what would happen if they did not receive a favorable response from
the tobacco companies, Nelson responded that “it would be pretty hard for us not to file
suit.”275
Most of the remaining states filed lawsuits and two months later, on June 20, 1997, it
was announced that the tobacco companies had agreed to a $368 billion settlement with the 40
states that had sued as well as with the attorneys who had brought private lawsuits on behalf of
private individuals or groups.276  This settlement between the states and the tobacco industry
was dubbed the Global Settlement Agreement.277  Broadly speaking, the Global Settlement
involved trading the tobacco industry effective immunity from further private and public legal
action in exchange for payments to the states, establishing a fund to pay injured smokers, and
for the tobacco industry to accept some limitations on its marketing practices as well as limited
regulation by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration.278 
Nebraska was one of only ten states that had not initiated litigation.  They had also not
received a reply from Philip Morris or R.J. Reynolds.276  When the settlement was announced,
no information was presented concerning what would happen to the states that had not filed
suit, so it was unclear whether Nebraska would participate in the settlement.
With Nebraska’s status in “legal limbo,” as the World-Herald dubbed it, tobacco
control advocates criticized the inaction of Nelson and Stenberg in pursuing a lawsuit.276  “I
wish our attorney general was a party to this so we could ask him what’s going on,” declared
Mark Welsch of GASP. “I don’t feel right calling the attorney general of Mississippi to ask
him these questions.”276  The Director of PRIDE-Omaha, Susie Dugan, said, “Tobacco is the
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No. 1 cause of death in Nebraska.  The state could have been a lot more aggressive in
protecting the health of Nebraskans.”276  
Both Nelson and Stenberg stated they were confident that Nebraska would receive its
share in the settlement even it that meant filing a lawsuit.  Karl Bieber, a spokesperson for
Nelson, said, “The governor feels that if the State of Nebraska is left out of this process, we
will pursue litigation to make sure we get our fair share.”276  Despite such statements and an
Associated Press article that stated it was likely that the ten states that had not filed suit would
still be included,279 Nelson was still uncertain enough to send another letter to Geoffrey Bible,
Chairman of Phillip Morris Companies.273  Dated June 23, 1997, Nelson wrote:
As you may recall, on April 23, 1997, I, together with Nebraska Attorney General Don
Stenberg, wrote you regarding the tobacco litigation being pursued by a number of the
states (copy enclosed).  To date, I have not received a response.
In light of the pending settlement to this litigation, I would appreciate your immediate
response.273
Fortunately for Nebraska, within a couple of days, it was announced that the states that
had not sued would still share in the settlement.  On July 2, a press conference was held by
Nelson and Stenberg to discuss the nature of the settlement agreement.280  Stenberg told
reporters that the settlement was separate from the costs of litigation; therefore, the states that
bore those costs were to be reimbursed by the tobacco companies through separate agreements
from the Global Settlement Agreement.280  
On August 12, Bible of Philip Morris Companies and Goldstone of RJR Nabisco finally
drafted a letter in response to the one sent by Nelson and Stenberg,281 but it is unknown if the
letter was actually sent.  The letter claimed that the settlement discussions were underway
which precluded them from responding at the time.  The letter stated that it was the tobacco
companies’ position during deliberations that the states be treated on an equal basis and that
because the Attorneys General agreed to that position, it would not be necessary for Nebraska
to initiate legal action. The letter concluded by making the point that the settlement would only
take effect if ratified by Congress; therefore, Nelson and Stenberg were urged to support the
settlement and encourage Nebraska’s senators and representatives to do likewise.281  With these
further assurances, it seemed that the state of Nebraska was guaranteed  a share of the tobacco
settlement without having to initiate a lawsuit against the tobacco industry.
Collapse of the Global Settlement Agreement
Because of the Global Settlement’s immunity and regulatory provisions, it was not a
“settlement” in the strict legal sense, but rather a proposal for legislation.  As a result, it had to
be enacted by Congress before any of the states were to receive any money.  By February,
1998, U.S. Senator Bob Kerrey (D- NE) was already warning members of the Legislature not
to spend the money to be received from the settlement because it was “bogged down in
Washington.”282  This warning was particularly apt because the Global Settlement –
particularly the immunity provisions – was extremely controversial within the public health
community nationwide.278
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While the Global Settlement Agreement was being debated in Washington, the benefits
that Nebraska was to receive from the settlement dwindled in scope.  In the initial version of
this settlement, Nebraska was to receive $32 million a year, but after calculating how much
would go to the federal government and taking into consideration the drop in revenue from
smokers quitting due to higher prices, the Legislature estimated that Nebraska’s share would
only be around $10 million per year.283   
By March, David E. Corbin, President of the Nebraska Public Health Association, was
publicly calling for Nebraska to file a lawsuit against the tobacco industry in order to ensure
that the cigarette makers were forced to pay for the harm that they had caused.284  As Corbin
said, “The evidence is overwhelming against the tobacco industry.  Mississippi, Florida and
Texas have already negotiated large state settlements.  In the meantime, we in Nebraska sit
back and pray to win a lottery for which we didn’t even buy a ticket.”284  In addition, a number
of state senators were criticizing Attorney General Stenberg for not filing a lawsuit as 40 other
states had already done.285
Ultimately, opponents of the immunity sections were successful in removing these
provisions from the legislation to implement the Global Settlement Agreement (authored by
Arizona Senator John McCain) as well as strengthening other public health provisions.  The
tobacco industry then turned against the deal and the bill died in Congress.278
On June 30, Governor Nelson announced that Nebraska would have to file its own
lawsuit and he told reporters, “If Congress is not going to permit that settlement to go through,
we cannot be left on the outside looking in.”286  Soon after this announcement, Attorney
General Stenberg began making preparations for the lawsuit.  
On August 18, 1998, the members of SmokeLess Nebraska told Stenberg what aspects
of a possible settlement between the State of Nebraska and the tobacco industry should be
included.287  SmokeLess Nebraska was a coalition of tobacco control groups which was headed
by Health Education Inc., a Lincoln-based advocacy group, and also included the American
Cancer Society, the American Lung Association, the American Heart Association, the
Nebraska Medical Association, the Nebraska Dental Association,  as well some local groups
such as PRIDE-Omaha.  David Holmquist of the Heartland Division of the American Cancer
Society said that the primary issues were that the settlement force the tobacco industry to stop
advertising to youth, prevent sales of tobacco to minors and provide money for tobacco control
and smoking cessation programs.287  
Four days later, on August 22, 1998, Nebraska finally became the 41st state to sue the
tobacco industry when Attorney General Stenberg filed a lawsuit in the Lancaster County
District Court on behalf of the state against Phillip Morris Inc., R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co.,
B.A.T. Industries, American Tobacco Corp., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., Lorillard
Tobacco Co., the Council for Tobacco Research U.S.A. Inc., and the Tobacco Institute.288 
Signing the Master Settlement Agreement
While Nebraska was filing suit, a team of attorneys general were negotiating with the
tobacco industry to create a new settlement to replace the Global Settlement Agreement. 
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Having learned from the failure of the Global Settlement, the attorneys general decided to limit
their settlement negotiations with the tobacco industry to issues that they had the full authority
to settle directly, rather than including legislative proposals.  The deal that they brokered
became the Master Settlement Agreement.289  
In exchange for payments to the states determined by a complex formula related to
cigarette consumption and inflation that extended indefinitely (estimated to total $206 billion
over the first 25 years for the 46 settling states), public access to tobacco industry documents,
limitations on advertising and promotions and disbanding the Council for Tobacco Research,
the Council for Indoor Air Research and the Tobacco Institute, the states agreed to drop their
lawsuits.278, 290   In addition, the tobacco industry, having learned that a lengthy debate on the
merits did not serve its interests, insisted that the individual states had to decide whether they
would participate within seven days following announcement of the Settlement.290
This last component of the Master Settlement Agreement raised some concern with
tobacco control advocates in Nebraska.  Before the deal had been finalized between the
attorneys general and the tobacco industry, the members of SmokeLess Nebraska and Mark
Welsch of GASP were publicly worrying that seven days would not permit the State of
Nebraska, particularly Attorney General Stenberg, to closely examine the details of the
settlement before deciding whether or not to sign the agreement.290  Dave Holmquist of the
American Cancer Society stated, “We just think seven days is an awfully short time to make a
decision on something that will affect the American people for a long time to come.”290
When the Master Settlement Agreement was formally announced on Saturday
November 14, 1998, it seemed highly likely that Nebraska would participate.  By Monday
Attorney General Stenberg and Governor Nelson came out in favor the settlement.291 Stenberg,
who had final say on whether to sign the Master Settlement Agreement, said that he wanted to
consult State Senator Roger Wehrbein (R-Plattsmouth; 7.5 policy score; $0 lifetime industry
total), Chairperson of the Appropriations Committee, and State Senator Don Wesely (Lincoln;
$1,550 lifetime industry total), Chairperson of the Health and Human Services Committee,
before making his final decision.291  Stenberg explained his rationale for favoring the
settlement, saying, “It is unlikely that Nebraska would obtain a judgement of more than $1
billion [the estimated value of the MSA to the state over the first 25 years] if we refuse this
settlement and continue our own lawsuit.”291
Early Tuesday November 17, 1998, Attorney General Stenberg announced that he had
decided to accept the Master Settlement Agreement.292  Once again, Stenberg reiterated his
position that he felt Nebraska would not receive as much in its own lawsuit as it would receive
by participating in the Master Settlement Agreement.  Governor Nelson stated that he felt that
the settlement was not perfect but that it was acceptable; he said  “I’ve never been one to let
my desire for the perfect get in the way of the good.”291  
By signing the Master Settlement Agreement, Nebraska’s share of the settlement over
the first 25 years was estimated to be $1.17 billion.292  Annual MSA payments for Nebraska are
between $38.1 and $49.9 million.293 
USE OF THE TOBACCO SETTLEMENT FUNDS 
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The Establishment of Trust Funds for the Tobacco Settlement Money - LB 1070 (1998)
In 1998, Nebraska established trust funds for the tobacco settlement money that the
state was expecting to receive from the Global Settlement Agreement and which it eventually
received under the Master Settlement Agreement.  While the Legislature, responding to
pressure from Governor Nelson, decided early on that the settlement money would be used for
improvements to the state’s health infrastructure, the Legislature was less committed using the
money received as a result of the state’s Medicaid expenditures due to smoking to actually
reduce the harm done by smoking through tobacco prevention and control efforts.  
 
During the 1998 legislative session, when Nebraska was anticipating receiving money
from the Global Settlement Agreement, Governor Nelson and state legislators, such as Don
Wesely of Lincoln, the Chairperson of the Health and Human Services Committee, and Jim
Jensen of Omaha (R - 7.5 policy score) stated their desire to ensure that the settlement money
be applied to improving the healthcare system of the state.  To safeguard this goal, Wesely
introduced LB 1070 at the request of Governor Nelson.294  
LB 1070 required that the money that Nebraska was to receive from any settlement
with the tobacco industry was to be deposited in the Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund to be
invested so that it would generate interest that could be spent.294  While this fund was
originally created with the Global Settlement Agreement in mind, the death of that agreement
and Nebraska subsequent decision to participate in the Master Settlement Agreement meant
that the money the state received from the Master Settlement Agreement was deposited in the
Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund.   
LB 1070 specified not only where the settlement money would be deposited but also
how it would be disbursed.  The interest that accrued from the investment of the settlement
money was to be deposited in another trust fund, entitled the Excellence in Health Care Trust
Fund.  A six-member council appointed by the governor, entitled the Excellence in Health
Care Trust Fund Council, was to review applications and then, subject to the approval of the
Director of Health and Human Services Finance and Support, award the interest income in the
Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund through grants and loan guarantees.294  
LB 1070 stipulated who was eligible to receive tobacco settlement dollars by stating
that the Excellence In Health Care Trust Fund Council was only authorized to provide grants
and loan guarantees to eight specific areas; tobacco prevention and control was not one of
them.293, 294
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1) conversion of nursing homes to assisted-living facilities or other alternatives to nursing homes
2) public health services
3) trauma and emergency medical services
4) conversion of rural hospitals to “limited-service” rural hospitals
5) recruitment, retention and education of health professionals for underserved populations
6) development of the health infrastructure to support a “telemedicine” capability
7) expansion and development of community-based services for senior citizens
8) state’s matching share for the Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
Source: (National Governor's Association Center for Best Practices, 2000)
Table 21: Approved Areas for Spending the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund
• Community programs to reduce tobacco use
• Chronic disease programs
• School programs
• Statewide programs
• Enforcement
• Counter marketing
• Cessation programs
• Surveillance and evaluation
• Administration
• Teen Tobacco Education & Prevention Project
Source: Bohlke, A. Legislative Bill 1436 - Final Reading. Legislature of Nebraska: January 20, 2000.
Table 22: Public Health Activities Deemed Eligible for Use of Excellence in Health Care Trust
Fund
It was only under the public health services funding section (Area #2 in Table 21) that tobacco
prevention and control was mentioned as a possible use of tobacco settlement dollars and then
it was only mentioned as one of ten public health activities that were specifically deemed to be
eligible for funding (Table 22). 
While the Global Settlement Agreement was dying in Congress, the Legislature passed
LB 1070 with strong support of Governor Nelson.295  Nebraska had now dedicated the funds
that the state would eventually receive as part of the Master Settlement Agreement to health
improvements, but it had failed to establish tobacco prevention and control measures as a
funding priority.
Even with funding for tobacco control so weakly prioritized in law, at the time, health
officials expressed confidence that tobacco settlement money would be used to reduce the
harm done by smoking.  Soon after it was announced that Nebraska would participate in the
settlement, Deb Thomas, Policy Secretary of Health and Human Services, told the press that 
one of the primary purposes of the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund would be to support
education and research on smoking in addition to smoking prevention efforts, but at this time
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there was little to support her belief.295        
Developments Regarding the Tobacco Settlement During 1999
In April, 1999, the newly-elected governor, Republican Mike Johanns, made his 
appointments to the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund Council – David Corbin, President
of the Nebraska Public Health Association, Joel Gajardo, President of the Nebraska Minority
Health Association, Sandra Massey, a consumer, Cordelia Okoye, a Director of a public health
program and registered nurse, John Klosterman, a farmer, and Dr. Dale Michels, a physician
and chairperson of the council.296  Johanns had been elected governor in a landside victory over
his Democratic challenger in the 1998 election.  (The former governor, Democrat Ben Nelson,
won the U.S. Senate contest in 2000 against Attorney General Don Stenberg.)  One reason why
Johanns won so easily was that he ran on an anti-tax platform which appealed to the
traditionally conservative voters in Nebraska.  Johanns’ stance toward tax increases would play
a major role in the future of Nebraska’s tobacco control efforts.  
In October, 1999, Harold W. Andersen, a contributing editor for the World-Herald,
lamented the low priority that the Nebraska Health Care Trust Fund Act (LB 1070) seemed to
place on ensuring that the settlement money would be used for tobacco control in an op-ed
piece entitled, “Too Little of Bonanza Goes to Stop Smoking.”297  As he stated, “But while the
1998 Nebraska law acknowledges that the money comes from ‘tobacco-related litigation for
compensation for the costs of treating smoking-related illnesses,’ there’s no emphasis at all on
efforts to discourage smoking.”297  Andersen also added, “Would it be appropriate that the
2000 Legislature take another look at the Nebraska Health Care Trust Fund Act and insist that
a significant portion of the funds be directed to discouraging cigarette smoking?  That, after all,
is the national health problem which is the primary reason ... why state governments have all
those billions to spend.”297 
At the time of Andersen’s op-ed piece, Nebraska still had not received its first
payments from the settlement so neither the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund Council nor
the Legislature had actually established whether or not tobacco control would be a funded from
the settlement money, but when the Council announced its top five funding priorities prior to
the 2000 legislative session, tobacco control was not included.298  While not surprising given
the language of LB 1070, this failure on the part of the Council to include programs to combat
smoking as a primary focus prompted health advocates to push the Legislature to become
involved in determining the use of the settlement dollars during the 2000 legislative session.  
On December 14, 1999, Nebraska received its first payment under the Master
Settlement Agreement which totaled $14.7 million, and by the end of December, the state also
received another $12.6 million.299
Funding for Tobacco Free Nebraska - LB 1436 (2000)
Saying that she was distressed by the fact that the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund
Council had not included efforts to reduce smoking among youth in its top five funding
priorities, State Senator Ardyce Bohlke of Hastings, who was the Chairperson of the Education
Committee, decided to bypass the council’s grant process by introducing a bill in the
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Legislature to annually allocate the first $560,000 in interest generated by the investment of the
tobacco settlement to fund a tobacco control media campaign that was to be developed by
youth.298  Thirty-six other state senators co-sponsored this bill, designated LB 1436.300  Bohlke
felt that a media campaign designed by teenagers would be the most effective means of
lowering the number of teenage smokers and she cited Florida’s Truth campaign, which
included aggressive media spots designed to expose the tobacco industry’s lies,301, 302 as an
example.  Her program, named the Teen Tobacco Education and Prevention Project, was to
allow a 12 member committee to review proposals from high school students and then select
four each year to fund for up to $100,000 each.298
The health advocates in Nebraska were not supportive of Senator Bohlke’s proposal
because they felt it would be largely ineffectual on its own and that more substantial funding
was needed to reduce the level of tobacco use in the state.  At the hearing before the Education
Committee, Brian Krannawitter, who was representing the American Heart Association, and
Mark Welsch, the President of GASP, testified against the bill because of those reasons.303 
Testifying in favor of the LB 1436 were individuals from the Nebraska Board of Education, the
Nebraska State Education Association, the Independent Colleges and Universities Association,
Omaha Public Schools and  some students.  No health advocates testified in support of
Bohlke’s original proposal.  Despite the opposition from two tobacco control organizations,
LB 1436 was voted out of committee by a vote of 8-0 with the annual funding reduced to
$500,000.303
 LB 1436 had a total of 37 sponsors –  12 more than was necessary to advance the bill
on the floor of the Legislature.300  While the Legislature as a whole was highly supportive of
Senator Bohlke’s proposal, there was still disagreement over her methods for funding the
program.  While some also agreed with health advocates that Senator Bohlke’s proposal did
not go far enough in funding tobacco control, the primary objection stated by these few
legislators was that by avoiding the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund Council’s grant-
awarding process, the settlement’s trust fund was being “raided.”298  
Typical of the senators that opposed the bill was Senator Jim Jensen of Omaha (R- 8.5
policy score) who stated his support for the goal of the bill (reducing smoking among
teenagers) but said that Bohlke’s idea should compete for a grant from the Trust Fund Council
just like any other public health measure. “It has destroyed that whole grant process,” he
stated.  “The grant process doesn’t mean anything - you can go to the Legislature and get it
funded out of there.”298  Senator Thompson of Papillion (D - 8.7 policy score) was another
state senator that was opposed to the original version of LB 1436.  She said, “This is too early
in the process [for the Legislature] to begin opening up the trust fund - no matter how worthy
the cause.”298  While these few legislators protested loudly, the bill seemed destined to be
passed by the Legislature.
While on the floor of the Legislature, health advocates began pressuring state senators
to increase the amount of funding for tobacco control to a level which would be more effective
at reducing the amount of tobacco use.  Prior to this refocusing on LB 1436, Citizens for a
Healthy Nebraska had been fighting to secure increased funding for the pre-existing statewide
tobacco control program, Tobacco Free Nebraska, through an earmark in an cigarette excise
tax increase (See Citizens’ Excise Tax section).  When that proposal died on the floor of the
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Legislature in January 2000 due to opposition from the tobacco industry and its allies, Citizens
for a Healthy Nebraska began focusing their lobbying and grassroots efforts on increasing the
budget for Tobacco Free Nebraska using LB 1436 instead of an excise tax increase as a way of
increasing funding to tobacco control.  To accomplish this goal, they proposed that the
Legislature fund Tobacco Free Nebraska at a level of $7 million per year.  While this level of
funding was only roughly half of the CDC’s minimum recommended level of $13.31 million
per year,304 increasing the funding for tobacco control to this level would rank Nebraska 16th
out of the states that had already made decision about how to use their settlement money and
was similar to the amount of funding adopted by the neighboring states of Iowa and
Colorado.305
On February 20, 2000, the Omaha World-Herald also spoke out against the original
form of LB 1436 in an editorial entitled “Good Goal, Questionable Tactic.”306  It stated:
This newspaper bows to no one in its desire to curb teen smoking.  But Bohlke’s bill
elbows ahead of other health-care projects that are supposed to be funded by the
Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund.  That fund in backed by Nebraska’s $1.17
billion share of a national settlement with tobacco companies.
The trust fund is supposed to be administered by a six-member council that evaluates
proposals and issues grants outside the pressures of the political process.  It is expected
to issue its first grant this summer.  But Bohlke’s bill scoops up the first $500,000,
leaving the remaining $6.5 million to all the rest.
This bill may be unstoppable, but if it passes it sets a troubling precedent.306
With pressure being applied on one side by health advocates that wanted to see the
amount of money being spent on tobacco control increased and from the other side by
legislators that were opposed to “raiding” the trust fund, Senator Bohlke decided to offer an
amendment to her bill.  Her teen media campaign remained in the bill but the amendment
added $7 million per year for the next three years which was devoted to Tobacco Free
Nebraska.307  On the day that Bohlke proposed her amendment, March 16, 2000, the
Legislature adopted it by a vote of 31-2.308
The amendment that was adopted called for the creation of the Tobacco Prevention and
Control Cash Fund, which was to be credited with $7 million dollars annually for fiscal year
1999-00, 2000-01 and 2001-2002.307  This fund was to be used for a comprehensive statewide
tobacco control program (preexisting in the form of Tobacco Free Nebraska) that was to
include, but was not limited to:
(1) Community programs to reduce tobacco use, (2) chronic disease programs,
(3)school programs, (4) statewide programs, (5) enforcement, (6) counter marketing,
(7) cessation programs, (8) surveillance and evaluation, (9) administration, and (10) the
Teen Tobacco Education and Prevention Project.307
The amendment stipulated that the money that was to be credited to the Tobacco Prevention
and Control Cash Fund was to come from the Tobacco Settlement Trust Fund.  This meant that
Tobacco Free Nebraska was to be funded out of the principal of the tobacco settlement and not
the interest generated by the investment of the principal. 
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Another change made by this amendment to LB 1436 was that it eliminated the former
repository for the interest generated by the settlement payments, the Excellence in Health Care
Trust Fund, and instead placed the interest in a preexisting fund, Nebraska Health Care Cash
Fund.106  To accommodate this change, the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund Council was
renamed the Nebraska Health Care Cash Fund Council and their membership was increased
from six to nine.106  The Nebraska Health Care Cash Fund was already receiving money from
Medicaid transfers from the federal government so the Legislature was consolidating two
different funds into one294, 307.  It was the Nebraska Health Care Cash Fund, which now
contained Medicaid transfers from the federal government and interest from tobacco
settlement, that would be used to provide $50 million per year for health-related expenditures
as part of LB 692, which was passed the following year in 2001 (See Below).307
The health advocates that had fought against the original version of LB 1436 as
insufficient applauded the change to LB 1436.  “This will save lives,” said Rich Lombardi, a
lobbyist for Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska, who added, “It’s a significant step and something
I think everyone will be proud of.”308
Many of the senators that had originally opposed LB 1436 also spoke out in favor of
this change.  Senators Jim Jensen, Nancy Thompson and Dennis Byars of Beatrice (R - 7.7
policy score) had disagreed with Bohlke’s method of getting the money for her program by
raiding the settlement trust fund, but these three legislators were also strong tobacco control
proponents so they supported the new version of LB 1436 as being an appropriate reason to
modify the trust fund.  “I think I can convince myself, rationalize to myself, that we are
appropriately using this fund and that it is important to public health in this state,” stated
Byars.308
The World-Herald was also supportive of the change to LB 1436.  An editorial entitled
“Worthy Anti-Smoking Push” stated: 
When a World-Herald editorial last month criticized Nebraska State Sen. Ardyce
Bohlke’s effort to put $500,000 into an anti-smoking for teen-agers, it wasn’t because
of any quarrel with the goal.  Our concern was that it circumvented the Legislature’s
previously developed plan for the Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund, under which a
six-member council was to evaluate proposals and issue grants.
But a surprise amendment by Bohlke, overwhelmingly endorsed by the lawmakers on
Thursday, abandoned the multi-grant approach and advanced a new plan - one that is
easier to support.  By devoting $21 million over three years to anti-smoking education,
stop-smoking clinics and public relations campaigns to discourage teens from taking up
the habit, the amendment would put all the monetary eggs . . .  into one basket.
It’s the right basket.  After all, the trust fund exists because Nebraska participated in a
national settlement with tobacco companies, an agreement that grew out of the harm
tobacco inflicts on the nation’s collective health.  What, then, could be more fitting
than using the money to throw a counterpunch?
...
Rich Lombardi, lobbyist for a coalition of seven public health-care groups, points to
this: While Nebraska has been spending only about $200,000 a year on smoking-
cessation programs, tobacco companies have spent $32 million in the state for
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marketing.  With this new plan, the industry’s expenditures will still outstrip the state’s
almost 5-to-1, but at least now there’s an opportunity to play catch-up. . . .309
Bohlke’s amended bill is now just one round of debate away from passage, and the
lopsided vote on Thursday leaves little room for doubt that it will get it.  We urge the
Legislature to provide that final OK and urge Gov. Mike Johanns to sign it.  It’s bound
to be a lifesaver.309     
 
The Legislature proceeded to vote unanimously, 45-0, to approve LB 1436 and
Governor Johanns signed it into law on March 29, 2000.307, 310  With the passage of LB 1436,
the State of Nebraska was funding tobacco control at $7 million per for each of three years (per
capita expenditure of $4.22).  At the time, the Centers for Disease Control recommended that
Nebraska fund tobacco control between $13.3 million and $31 million (per capita expenditure
of $8.03 to $18.73)305; while Nebraska was only spending roughly half the minimum amount
that CDC recommended, this ranked Nebraska at 16th out of the 46 states that had decided how
their settlement money would be spent.305  This level of tobacco control spending placed
Nebraska just ahead of its neighbors, Colorado and Iowa, which were ranked 17th and 18th
respectively, and far ahead of South Dakota and Kansas, ranked 35th and 44th.305  The
Legislature’s decision to pass LB 1436 represented a significant achievement for tobacco
control advocates in Nebraska, but the Legislature’s decision to provide funds for only three
years would have serious repercussions in 2003 when tobacco control advocates attempted to
get Tobacco Free Nebraska refunded in the middle of budgetary crisis.   
Settlement Funding for Health Improvements - LB 692 (2001)
One consequence of the funding increase that Tobacco Free Nebraska was able to
receive during the 2000 legislative session was that medical groups began clamoring for a
portion of the settlement dollars.  The two loudest voices were those of the University of
Nebraska Medical Center, the state’s medical school, and Creighton University, a private
university in Omaha that also has a medical school.311  By June, 2000, these two institutions
were calling for a large portion of the settlement money to be used biomedical research. 
“Tobacco use has resulted in significant health problems in Nebraska and for citizens in
general and that leads to enormous health-care costs,” stated Dr. Roderick Nairn, the
Chairperson of Creighton Medical School’s Department of Medical Microbiology and
Immunology.  I think the research we would do would be to develop a much better
understanding of smoking-related diseases and its underlying causes and cures.”311  Ron
Withem, a spokesperson for the University of Nebraska, told reporters that Michigan has set
aside $1 billion of its settlement dollars for research and said, “There needs to be more of a
legacy for the state, and we think medical research, particularly with the outstanding medical
research centers we have in the state, would really provide a cutting-edge difference in the
state.”311  Withem had also served as a state senator from Papillion from 1983 until 1997,
receiving lifetime tobacco industry contributions of $3,300 and an additional $7,964 from
tobacco industry allies (See Appendix).
Dr. Dale Michels, Chairperson of the Nebraska Health Care Cash Fund Council,
responded to this lobbying in June by saying that the grant process should be given time to
work.  The Council was planning on awarding its first grants that fall.  The council had
received 174 application – 24 from the University of Nebraska Medical Center and one from
Creighton Medical School –  requesting a total of $34 million for the $3 million that the would
105
be awarding at that time.311  Michels said, “Lawmakers have set up a plan to finance public
health care across the state, and some people are already set to change it before we get the plan
off the ground.”311  Responding specifically to the desire to use the settlement money for
biomedical research, Michels stated, “My concern is that what we have set up is going to
benefit all the people in the State of Nebraska as opposed to a research project that may or may
not benefit all of the state’s citizens.”311   
Lawmakers also were talking about the desire of the Legislature to have a greater say in
how the settlement money would be spent.  In particular, concern was expressed regarding the
fact that such a large amount of money was to be disbursed by only nine people.  “Some of my
colleagues definitely feel that with the magnitude of dollars there, the Legislature should have
more control,” said Senator Jensen, the chairperson of the Health and Human Services
Committee.312   
For the next few months, the University of Nebraska Medical Center and Creighton
University continued to lead efforts calling on the Legislature to dispense the tobacco
settlement instead of relying on the grant process.311  In September, Governor Johanns weighed
in on the issue.  He said that he supported splitting the settlement in three ways: one-third to
remain for Nebraska Health Care Cash Fund grants, one-third to be distributed by the
Legislature and one-third to go toward medical research at Creighton University and the
University of Nebraska.311  Regarding the research opportunities, Johanns said, “I think it is a
great opportunity to literally lift Nebraska and put it on the map,” but he added that he thought
one-third of the money should remain in the grant process because, “These grants have great
potential to improve access and delivery of health-care services to medically underserved
areas, improve the quality of health-care services and strengthen public health in Nebraska.”311 
 With all this prior discussion on how best to spend the tobacco settlement money, it
was not surprising that when the 2001 legislative session began in January numerous bills
dealing with using settlement money for health improvements were introduced.  By combining
the interest generated from the investment of the tobacco settlement dollars and money
received from federal Medicaid transfers, the Health Care Fund was estimated at $50 million
per year.294, 307, 313  This $50 million was separate from the $7 million that Tobacco Free
Nebraska was receiving directly from the settlement payments for three years.  The Speaker of
the Legislature, Doug Kristensen of Minden, introduced a bill on behalf of Governor Johanns
that included one-third of the $50 million to be going to biomedical research.313.  Senators
Jensen, Jennie Robak of Columbus and Thompson all separately introduced bills that focused
largely on improvements to Nebraska mental health services, Senator Lowen Kruse of Omaha
(D - 7.6 policy score; $500 lifetime industry total) introduced a bill that would have raised
state Medicaid payment rates for mental health services, and Senator Byars introduced three
bills that sought to increase the amount spent on respite care and developmental disabilities.
The focus on public health and specifically on mental health was not surprising. 
Historically, Nebraska’s funding per capita for public health had been either 49th or 50th out of
all states,311 and as Susan Boust, a community mental health service provider from Omaha
testified at the Appropriations Committee and Health and Human Services Committee’s  public
hearing for all these bills, Nebraska was spending $8.36 per person on community-based
mental health efforts while the national average was $32.313    
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Rather than pass a hodgepodge of different bills, the members of the Appropriations
and Health and Human Services Committees set out to draft a single compromise bill.  “It is
our goal to blend all of the bills into one of them and to use it as a vehicle to bring it to the
Legislature,” said Senator Jensen.313
By February 22, the two committees involved had hammered out a bill regarding how
the $50 million from the settlement investment income in the Nebraska Health Care Cash Fund
would be spent annually.  The disbursement was as follows:
• $19 million for mental health services
• $10 million for biomedical research
• $8.5 million for improvements to the state’s public health infrastructure ($6 million to
establish public health offices in 69 counties and improve the offices in 24 counties and $2.5
million to improve in minority health in counties that had a minority population of at least 5%)
• $5 million in public health grants to be awarded by the Nebraska Health Care Cash
Fund Council
• $3 million for services for developmental disabilities
• $3 million in unallocated dollars 
• $1 million for respite care
• $500,000 for a one-time mental health study 314
The language for this distribution was incorporated into LB 692, which was originally one of
the bills introduced by Senator Byars.  Because of the importance of this bill, Senator Byars
chose to designate LB 692 as his priority bill.  In the Nebraska Legislature, each senator is
permitted to designate one bill as their priority bill, which virtually guarantees that it will be
addressed by the Legislature before the session ends.
The $10 million that was included for medical research was to be given to Nebraska’s
four leading research institutions: the University of Nebraska Medical Center, Creighton
University Medical Center, the University of Nebraska-Lincoln and the Boys Town National
Research Hospital.315  While most of the other areas listed in LB 692 were only funded for two
years (FY2002 and FY2003), the heavy lobbying by the state’s two medical schools and the
support of the governor resulting in language in LB 692 in which biomedical research had no
sunset date included and the amount of funding was to increase from $10 million to $12
million after two years and then from $12 million to $14 million after another 2 years and then
was to continue at the $14 million level316.  
Of the $8.5 million to go directly for public health, $6 million was to be used to
establish public health offices in the 69 counties that didn’t have one and to improve the
capabilities of the offices in the other 24 counties while the remaining $2.5 million was to go
to improvements in minority health in counties that had a minority population of at least 5%.315 
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Originally, the number of counties that met that criteria was calculated to be 24 but this
number was revised to 30 when more accurate Census data were examined.317.
The vast majority of the Legislature was content with this bill.  By a vote of 39-1, they
advanced LB 692 out of the first round of debate.315  The lone dissenting vote was from
Senator Ernie Chambers of Omaha (I - 7.7 policy score), the only African-American senator in
the Legislature.  In the Nebraska Legislature, one dissenting vote can be easily shrugged off
unless that vote is from Senator Chambers.  He has been serving as a state senator since 1970
so he is an expert on Nebraska’s legislative procedures and has brought numerous bills down
singlehandedly.1  Chambers’ argued in general the amount designated to public health
improvements was too low and specifically, the $2.5 million allocated in LB 692 for minority
health was too low in a state where the infant mortality rate for African-Americans is one of
the worst in the nation – roughly three times higher than that for whites.315, 317  Chambers also
asserted that the benefit of biomedical research was much less apparent than that produced by
public health measures.317  He argued, “I don’t want a situation where we give it to individuals
and groups, and after the money has been spent, there is nothing to show for it except that we
spent some money.”317 
In the end, Senator Chambers was successful in getting more money for minority health
concerns included in LB 692.  The total amount directed specifically to minority health was
raised from the $2.5 million to over $4.2 million.318  This increase came when legislators
decided to dedicate $700,000 of the $10 million in research money for minority health, another
$700,000 from the public health grants to minority programs and finally $220,000 was to be
used for the creation of three minority health satellite offices located in Omaha, Lincoln and
rural Nebraska.318
While the passage of LB 692 was an important step toward improving public health in
Nebraska, the immense support for this bill would become a serious hurdle for tobacco control
advocates in 2003, when they sought to secure funding for Tobacco Free Nebraska because
legislators were unwilling to jeopardize the funding of these programs to fund tobacco
prevention and control efforts out of the tobacco settlement money.
2001 and 2002 Budget Shortages
After the 2001 session, it became apparent that the weakening economy affecting the
entire country would not leave Nebraska untouched.  With tax receipts lower than expected,
the state was faced with approximately a $220 million shortfall in the two-year $5.5 billion
budget approved during the 2001 session.319  (This amount represented a 4% shortfall.)  In
response, Governor Johanns called for a special session of the Legislature in October and he
proposed a $173 million cut to the state budget and called on the Legislature to not pass any
tax increases.319  During the special session, the Legislature followed fairly closely the budget
proposed by Johanns.  Most notably, no new taxes were passed, state aid to K-12 education,
which was approximately one-quarter of the budget, was untouched and the University of
Nebraska system bore the deepest cuts.320  The cuts passed during the special session solved
$171 million of the shortfall with the remaining $50 million shortfall to be addressed during
the regular session in 2002.
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Unfortunately for the state, the biennium budget numbers continued to worsen. When
new revenue figures came in early during the 2002 legislative session the anticipated $50
million shortfall rose to $186 million and then to $222 million in March, another 5%.321
Once again, Governor Johanns reiterated his position that the budget deficit should be
remedied through spending cuts and not tax increases.321  Having already cut $171 million
from the budget during the 2001 special session, legislators viewed the governor’s position
toward tax increases as unreasonable.  Over the governor's veto, the Legislature passed
temporary increases in the state income tax, sales tax and cigarette excise tax (See Citizens’
Excise Tax section) as well as made spending cuts including the state’s K-12 school system.322 
Previously, Governor Johanns said that the only tax increase he would support was on the
cigarette excise tax.322  Governor Johanns was willing to support an excise tax increase because
an excise tax increase was less likely to have political repercussions for him with Nebraska
voters than a sales or income tax increase.323 Despite the fact that during the 2001 special
session and the 2002 legislative session the Legislature had made $295 million in spending
cuts and transfers and raised taxes by $142 million – $25 million from the cigarette excise tax
increase – a shortfall of $130 million still remained by the end of the 2002 legislative
session.324 
One major consequence of the budget crisis facing the Legislature in 2002 was that
Tobacco Free Nebraska lost $5 million from its $21 million total.325  In 2000, Tobacco Free
Nebraska had been allocated $7 million for FY2000 but it was not possible for the program to
scale up fast enough to spend this money during the first year.  Because of the need to
following standard government procurement rules (writing and advertising requests for
proposals and soliciting competitive bids), only about $2 million of the $7 million appropriated
was spent.325  With this money not being spent by the end of biennium in FY2001, the
Legislature considered this $5 million “unobligated.”  Rather than treating these funds as
encumbered for contracts being in the process of awarded, during the 2002 session, the
Legislature decided, as part of LB1310, to reallocate this money to cover a shortfall for the
Children’s Health Insurance Program.326  Tobacco Free Nebraska was not alone in this respect.
Dozens of programs lost money that had been allocated to them during the previous biennium
budget which had not been spent and thus had become unobligated.325
Unfortunately for the state, the biennium budget numbers continued to worsen. When
new revenue figures came in early during the 2002 legislative session the anticipated $50
million shortfall rose to $186 million and then to $222 million in March, another 5%.321
Once again, Governor Johanns reiterated his position that the budget deficit should be
remedied through spending cuts and not tax increases.321  Having already cut $171 million
from the budget during the 2001 special session, legislators viewed the governor’s position
toward tax increases as unreasonable.  Over the governor's veto, the Legislature passed
temporary increases in the state income tax, sales tax and cigarette excise tax (See Citizens’
Excise Tax section) as well as made spending cuts including the state’s K-12 school system.322 
Previously, Governor Johanns said that the only tax increase he would support was on the
cigarette excise tax.322  Governor Johanns was willing to support an excise tax increase because
an excise tax increase was less likely to have political repercussions for him with Nebraska
voters than a sales or income tax increase.323 Despite the fact that during the 2001 special
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session and the 2002 legislative session the Legislature had made $295 million in spending
cuts and transfers and raised taxes by $142 million – $25 million from the cigarette excise tax
increase – a shortfall of $130 million still remained by the end of the 2002 legislative
session.324 
One major consequence of the budget crisis facing the Legislature in 2002 was that
Tobacco Free Nebraska lost $5 million from its $21 million total.325  In 2000, Tobacco Free
Nebraska had been allocated $7 million for FY2000 but it was not possible for the program to
scale up fast enough to spend this money during the first year.  Because of the need to
following standard government procurement rules (writing and advertising requests for
proposals and soliciting competitive bids), only about $2 million of the $7 million appropriated
was spent.325  With this money not being spent by the end of biennium in FY2001, the
Legislature considered this $5 million “unobligated.”  Rather than treating these funds as
encumbered for contracts being in the process of awarded, during the 2002 session, the
Legislature decided, as part of LB1310, to reallocate this money to cover a shortfall for the
Children’s Health Insurance Program.326  Tobacco Free Nebraska was not alone in this respect.
Dozens of programs lost money that had been allocated to them during the previous biennium
budget which had not been spent and thus had become unobligated.325
While Tobacco Free Nebraska lost $5 million from its FY2000 allocation, the
Legislature did not touch the program’s budget for FY2001 and FY2002; therefore, Tobacco
Free Nebraska was able to obligate $7 million a year for both of these years.325  Because of the
reallocation that occurred during the 2002 legislative session, Tobacco Free Nebraska only
received $16 million over three years and not the $21 million over three years that had been
originally budgeted for the program as part of LB 1436 in 2000.307
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Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) Revenues
Excellence in Health Care Trust Fund
(dissolved into 2 separate accounts in 2000)
Tobacco Prevention and 
Control Cash Fund
$7 million annually from MSA principal
for 1999/00 - 2001/02
Nebraska Health Care Cash Fund
(includes MSA interest and Medicaid 
transfers from federal government)
$50 million annually for health-related expenditures,
including:
• $19 million for mental health services
• $10 million for biomedical research
• $8.5 million for improvements to the state’s public
health infrastructure 
• $5 million in public health grants to be awarded by the
Nebraska Health Care Cash Fund Council
• $3 million for services for developmental disabilities
• $3 million in unallocated dollars 
• $1 million for respite care
• $500,000 for a one-time mental health study
Table 22: Summary of Allocation of Master Settlement Agreement Funds, 2001
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With a shortfall of $130 million remaining after the 2002 legislative session, the
governor once again called a special session in July, 2002322 and froze spending for all state
agencies.  With tax receipts for the preceding eleven months falling short of projections, the
estimated budget deficit that state senators were faced with rose from $130 million to $233
million.324  Later it was determined that the actual deficit number for the biennium was much
higher that $233 million figure that was estimated by the Governor’s budget office.  The $233
million figure was calculated by assuming that many expenditures would not increase, but
when projected increases to Medicare, state aid to school, employee salaries and health
insurance were factored in, the deficit figure rose to $778 million.327  
Similar to the special session in 2001, the special session of 2002 cut over $15 million 
from the University of Nebraska system – half of which was taking from the largest campus,
the University of Nebraska-Lincoln.328  In addition, approximately 19,000 people were
removed from Medicaid enrollment by changing eligibility requirements which was supposed
to save approximately $20 million.329  While tobacco control was unaffected by the special
session of 2002, the Legislature was unable to solve the budgetary crisis facing the state. This
massive deficit remained for the 2003 legislative session came at a very unfortunate time for
Tobacco Free Nebraska.  
CITIZENS FOR A HEALTHY NEBRASKA’S EXCISE TAX INCREASE ATTEMPTS
First Attempt for a Tax Increase - LB 505 (1999 - 2000) 
Believing that the Master Settlement Agreement earlier that year did not do enough to
prevent underage smoking, the members of SmokeLess Nebraska decided to create a new
coalition in November, 1998, with the specific goal of reducing smoking by minors by making
cigarettes more costly through an excise tax.330  Named Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska, the
new coalition was comprised of the Nebraska divisions of the American Cancer Society, the
American Heart Association, the American Lung Association, Health Education Inc., the
Nebraska Association of Hospitals and Health Systems, the Nebraska Dental Association and
the Nebraska Medical Association.331 
 While no specific amount for an tax increase was announced, Rich Lombardi, the
coalition’s lobbyist, stated that $1.00 would be a good goal.331  Only Alaska and Hawaii had
excise taxes that high at the time.  Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska’s announcement that it
would pursue an excise tax increase came right on the heels of a nationwide announcement the
day before by Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds that they had raised the wholesale price of a
pack of cigarettes by $0.45331  to recoup the money they had to pay as part of the Master
Settlement Agreement.
The coalition’s reason for pushing for a large excise tax increase was that it viewed it
as the most effective means of getting smokers, especially teenage smokers, to quit.  “Our
group understands that the real solution is to keep kids out of the market by increasing the cost
of a pack of cigarettes so that kids won’t smoke,” according to Sherry Miller at the coalition’s
first press conference.331  Miller was the former President of the Nebraska Parent Teachers
Association.  It was Miller and Dr. Chris Caudill, a Lincoln cardiologist, that announced the
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formation of Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska.  Speaking about the plans to increase the excise
tax, Caudill said, “It is the number one way we can get kids to stop smoking.”330 
Following standard tobacco industry rhotoric,332 the day after the Citizens for a Healthy
Nebraska’s announcement, cigarette smuggling was already being proposed as a reason to
forgo an excise tax increase.  State Senator Bob Wickersham of Harrison, who later voted
against LB 505 in committee, stated, “You do have to examine whether it will work or, in fact,
whether it would be an incentive for bootlegging and other activities.”330 Wickersham was
repeating one of the tobacco industry’s primary arguments to combat excise taxes is to argue
that large excise tax increases lead to increased levels of cigarette smuggling.332  Cigarette
smuggling typically means purchasing cigarettes in a state with a lower excise tax and then
selling them for a profit in a neighboring state which has a higher excise tax.  The tobacco
industry argues that cigarette smuggling leads to increased levels of organized crime.  They
also claim that excise tax increases lead to economic hardship for retailers due to revenue lost
to neighboring states.  The tobacco industry and its allies usually base their claims on studies
paid for by the tobacco industry, while independent studies show that smuggled cigarettes only
account for 2% to 6% of total consumption.332  
These claims would all be employed in Nebraska by the tobacco industry and its allies
in 1999 to defeat a $0.66 excise tax increase that Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska got
introduced by Senator David Landis of Lincoln.     
 Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska was successful in getting their proposed excise tax
considered by the Legislature.  In the 1999 session, Senator David Landis (D - Lincoln)
introduced LB 505, which sought to raise the excise tax on a pack of cigarettes from $0.34 to
$1.00.102  In addition to raising the tax, LB 505 sought to establish the Tobacco Prevention,
Control, and Enforcement Fund with approximately $0.14 of the $0.66 increase going to this
fund. This would generate an estimated $14 million annually to fund tobacco control efforts in
Nebraska, which was the CDC’s minimum recommended level of funding for tobacco control
in Nebraska.305  The Tobacco Prevention, Control, and Enforcement Fund was to be
administered by the Health and Human Services’ Health Promotion and Education Division,
which was part of the Office of Preventive Health and Public Wellness.305  This effort was
prior to the passage of LB 1436, the bill that designated $21 million over three years to a
statewide tobacco control program, so if LB 505 would have been successful, it would have
been responsible for funding a statewide tobacco control program.  The purpose of this fund as
defined in LB 505 was for “enforcement, counter-marketing, education, and outreach programs
that specifically address the cause and prevention of smoking-related diseases and smoking
prevention and cessation.”102  
The intent of the large increase in the excise tax, as explained by Senator Landis in his
Statement of Intent was “to create an economic impediment to the purchase of cigarettes by
adolescents in Nebraska.  National Cancer Institute studies show that a 20% increase in the
price of a pack of cigarettes should result in a 30% decrease in teenage smoking.”333 
The tobacco industry’s response was to disseminate their typical smuggling arguments. 
For example, Brown and Williamson produced a report entitled “LB 505's Effect on Nebraska
Retailers” which detailed the tobacco industry’s key points for opposing LB 505,334 which
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seemed targeted to retailers.  It even used language that makes it seem that the reasons are
coming from another retailer and not Brown and Williamson.  For example, the first sentence
of the document was “This tax will only punish our stores and our legal consumers” and the
last line was “Most of these sales and profits will simply be shifted to our neighbors who are
not burdened by this tax.”334  In between these two lines were a litany of figures for lost sales,
lost profits and lost workers that Brown and Williamson indicated would result from smokers
purchasing their cigarettes from places other than Nebraska retail outlets.  Nowhere in the
document was the source of these figures cited.334
The testimony of Dennis Rasmussen, lobbyist for Philip Morris, at the Revenue
Committee’s hearing on LB 505 focused on the same themes.  Citing studies conducted by the
industry-funded American Economics Group and Incontext, Inc.,335 Rasmussen’s handout to
legislators contained sections entitled “Sales and Jobs Lost to Surrounding States,” “Lost
Retail Sales,” “Unfair Burden,” and “An Unregulated Black Market in Cigarettes.”336  William
Peters, the lobbyist for both Brown & Williamson and Lorillard, David Schulte for the
Nebraska Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors and Bob Skochdopole for the
Smokeless Tobacco Council337 also testified against the tax increase.
Testifying in favor of LB 505 were numerous representatives from the members of
Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska, the American Association of Retired Persons (AARP), nine
individuals from Loup County Public School and representatives from Creighton University
and the University of Nebraska Medical Center.337
LB 505 was advanced out of by a vote of 5-3 but the committee added an amendment
so that the tax increase would sunset after three years on December 31, 2002.337
After LB 505 advanced out of committee, the Americans For Tax Reform, (listed in a
Philip Morris document as one of the company's “core allies”338) sided with the tobacco
industry.  In a letter to State Senator Jim Jensen, Grover Norquist, President of the American
For Tax Reform, reminded Jensen that he had signed the Americans for Tax Reform’s
Taxpayer Protection Pledge.  Norquist stated, “As you know, there is a proposal in the
Nebraska legislature which would raise taxes on tobacco products.  Unless this tax increase is
matched dollar for dollar by a tax cut, it would violate the terms of the Pledge.”339  The letter
then urged Senator Jensen to vote against LB 505.  Handwritten on the copy of this letter (that
was located in tobacco industry files) was a note indicating that it was to be faxed to Betsy
Giles, a senior executive with Philip Morris.339  It is not known if similar letters were sent to
other members of the Legislature.
While LB 505 was on the floor of the Legislature, high level tobacco executives were
monitoring its status.  In the Weekly Status Report for the State Government Relations
Department for R.J. Reynolds, Roger Mozingo, the Vice President for that department,
informed T. J. Payne, R.J. Reynolds Senior Vice President of External Relations, that, as of
March 18, LB 505 had not yet been scheduled for debate.  Mozingo added, “A vote count of
‘hard votes’ was taken earlier this week and 20 no’s and 9 yes’s were counted.  There are 49
members of the Nebraska legislature, which leaves 20 ‘swayable’ votes.  An extensive
grassroots effort is underway by the industry.”340  
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Later that month, the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) sponsored a
luncheon for state senators.  ALEC is an association for state legislative members.  Two of its
major funding sources are Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds.341  At that luncheon, Michael
Flynn, Director of Legislation and Policy for ALEC repeated the tobacco industry position that
passing LB 505 could produce a black market for smuggled cigarettes that was run by the mob. 
After telling senators that a semitrailer full of smuggled cigarettes could produce over a half of
a million dollars in profit for the smuggler, he added, “That’s quite a temptation for organized
crime – a cash bonanza.”341  Flynn cited Michigan as an example of a state which had seen an
increase in cigarette smuggling as a result of increasing its excise tax.  He also reiterated the
tobacco industry’s stance that Nebraska would lose cigarette sales to neighboring states with
lower excise taxes which would result in lower tax revenue.341 
Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska responded to the luncheon by making sure that
senators were informed that ALEC received funding from the tobacco industry.341  As part of
this effort, they disseminated ALEC literature that thanked Philip Morris and R.J. Reynolds for
their “generous contributions”in sponsoring a States & Nation Policy Summit in 1998.341  
They received some help in this effort from Senator Donald Preister who was a member of
ALEC at the time but was also a strong tobacco control proponent (8.8 policy score). He noted
to reporters that ALEC received money from the tobacco industry and he said he recalled an
1993 ALEC “orientation” for newly elected legislators that he attended in which cigarettes and
lighters were given out to the state legislators that attended.341 
Their efforts, however, did not prevent the bootlegging message from being ascribed
some credibility.  Major Gale Griess of the Nebraska State Patrol was quoted in an Associated
Press article saying that if LB 505 passed, “Bootlegging will be a problem.”341
By March 31, LB 505 still had not come up for debate on the floor of the Legislature. 
In another weekly status report from Roger Mozingo to T. J. Payne, Mozingo wrote,
“Grassroots efforts continue at a heavy pace.  WKA has prepared economic impact books that
will be delivered to many of the legislators the first of next week.”342  It is not known what
WKA stands for but it likely refers to one the companies that produces economic studies that
are paid for by the tobacco industry. 
At the same time, another study was released by InContext, Inc., which produces
studies paid for by the tobacco industry, that predicted that if LB 505 passed then it would
“drive more shoppers and jobs” to Nebraska’s neighbors.343  This new report that focused on
Nebraska received mention in the Omaha World-Herald.  It was also reported that the study
was funded by Philip Morris.335  When asked how much Philip Morris paid for this study,
William Lilley III, chairman of InContext Inc. and former economics professor at Yale
University, declined to answer the question.335
The tobacco industry efforts seemed to have the desired effect.  When LB 505 came up
for debate on the floor of the Legislature, Landis and other senators in support of an excise tax
increase offered an amendment that would cut the increase more than in half, from $0.66 to
$0.30.344  Even so, supporters of the amendment were only able to garner 24 votes, one short of
the 25 needed to pass an amendment.344  The Legislature adjourned with no further action
being taken on LB 505.
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During the 1999 session, Senator Landis designated LB 505 as his priority bill.  Since
only a handful of priority bills remained from the previous legislative session, LB 505 was one
of the first bills to be debated during the 2000 session.  Once again, proponents of the bill tried
to amend the bill so that it only contained an increase of $0.30 but this time only 23 senators
voted in favor of the amendment.345  As a result, Landis pulled LB 505 from the legislative
agenda rather than have it get killed in a floor vote.
Despite the failure of LB 505, Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska regrouped and later
during the 2000 legislative session helped convince the Legislature to pass LB 1436 which
appropriated $21 million over three years from the tobacco settlement to be used for tobacco
control (See Use of MSA Money Section) 
Second Attempt at Passing a Large Excise Tax Increase - LB 792 (2001)
The following year, in 2001, Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska again pushed for a large
excise tax increase which was sponsored this time by Senator Jim Jensen (R - Omaha).  On
January 17, 2001, Senator Jensen introduced LB 792, which sought to raise the state’s excise
tax by $0.30.346  Newspaper reports dubbed LB 792 a “something-for-everyone” bill because
the over $30 million that would be raised by the excise tax increase was to be given to foster
care, water-quality monitoring, juvenile justice, emergency services, rural health and urban
redevelopment projects in Omaha and Lincoln.347  It also included a $0.05 earmark for Tobacco
Free Nebraska, which was already being funding at $7 million per year as part of LB 1436.348 
This tax increase was to continue until July 1, 2008 so it would have provided funds for
Tobacco Free Nebraska until FY2008 as compared to LB 1436 which only funded Tobacco
Free Nebraska through FY2002.307, 348
Befitting a bill that would have funded numerous different areas, there was a sizable
turnout of individuals in favor LB 792 at its hearing before the Revenue Committee.  In total,
25 people testified in favor of the bill.349  From the tobacco control community, five individuals
comprising most of the member groups of the Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska coalition
testified in favor of LB 792.349  Also testifying in support was Mark Welsch, President of
GASP of Nebraska, and Richard Hunt, the founder of GASP of Nebraska.
Numerous individuals from the tobacco industry and their allies appeared  again to
oppose an excise tax increase in Nebraska.  Included were Walter Radcliffe, lobbyist for
United States Smokeless Tobacco, Jim Moylan of the Nebraska Licensed Beverage
Association (and lobbyist for R. J. Reynolds), David Menke of No Frills Supermarkets and the
Nebraska Grocery Industry Association, Derek Crawford, lobbyist for Philip Morris, Cara
Potter of the Nebraska Retail Federation and David Schulte of the Nebraska Association of
Tobacco and Candy Distributors.349  During the testimony before the Revenue Committee, the
tobacco industry and its allies focused on themes similar to those expressed during the debate
of LB 505 the previous two years.  Radcliffe also criticized Senator Jensen’s strategy of
providing earmarks to numerous interests in LB 792.  Radcliffe stated, “It gives the money to
different people in hopes that those people will be able to persuade enough senators to vote for
the increase this year.  I don’t think they can.”347
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The supporters of LB 792 were not able to convince the Revenue Committee of the
bill’s merits.  They voted 5 to 2 to kill the bill by indefinitely postponing it.349 
While Nebraska’s excise tax remained at $0.34, two other events during the 2001
legislative session that would figure prominently into tobacco control in Nebraska.  One was
the passage of LB 692 which allocated the investment income from the tobacco settlement
money to improvements in healthcare (See Disbursement Section).   The other was the
announcement that the state was facing a huge deficit due to the downturn in the national
economy (See Disbursement Section). 
Passage of a $0.30 Excise Tax Increase - LB 1085 (2002)
Nebraska’s eventual passage of a 30 cent excise tax increase in 2002 first began with
LB 1149, a bill sponsored by Senator Jim Jensen.350  Undeterred by the failure of LB 792 the
previous year and believing that an excise tax increase could help the state balance the budget,
Senator Jensen proposed to raise the state’s excise tax by $0.50 from $0.34 to $0.84, which it
was estimated would generate approximately $58 million per year which was to be placed in a
trust fund created by the bill called the Nebraska Tobacco Tax Trust Fund.350, 351  Once again,
Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska led the push to pass this bill, primarily through lobbying
efforts.
  
A key provision of this bill was that $7 million was to be taken from the Tobacco Tax
Trust Fund and placed in the Tobacco Prevention and Control Cash Fund which is the funding
source for Tobacco Free Nebraska350.  At the time, Tobacco Free Nebraska was receiving
funding at $7 million per year.  If LB 1149 had been passed in its original form, Tobacco Free
Nebraska would have continued at $7 million with the funding source being excise tax money
instead of the tobacco settlement.
 
Another $5 million was to go to Nebraska’s Medicaid program to be used to provide
health coverage for children from middle-level income homes.  The funding for that program
was set to expire at the end of FY 2002-2003.352  The remaining amount of the Tobacco Tax
Trust Fund was to be placed in the Health Care Cash Fund which was the funding source for
the health-related improvements designated by LB 692.  This remainder of the money from the
excise tax, estimated to be $46 million, could have been used to help balance the state’s budget
but only by paying for health-related expenses.351
Before LB 1149's hearing before Revenue Committee, Senator Jensen, Citizens for a
Healthy Nebraska, and other proponents of the bill received some support for the tax increase
from an unexpected source.  Republican Governor Mike Johanns had been elected by running
on an anti-tax platform.  Throughout the budget crisis, he preached spending cuts as the only
way to solve the fiscal crisis.351  On February 4, 2002, Governor Johanns expressed interest in a
possible $0.50 excise tax increase after a meeting with Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska.  “I’ll
take a very, very close look at what they’re proposing,” he said.  “It depends on what the
legislation looks like.”351  Members of Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska were pleased by the
possibility of support from the governor.  “We don’t expect him to come out here and start
lobbying on our behalf, but it’s an encouraging sign,” said Dave Holmquist, the lobbyist for
the American Cancer Society in Nebraska.351     
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It was Holmquist and Dr. Paul Paulman of the Nebraska Medical Association that made
Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska’s case for an excise tax increase before the Revenue
Committee.  Also testifying in favor of the bill from the tobacco control community in
Nebraska was Mark Welsch of GASP of Nebraska.353
Many of the same names from previous years opposed LB 1149.  Testifying against an
excise tax increase again were Radcliffe of United States Smokeless Tobacco, Schulte of the
Nebraska Association of Tobacco and Candy Distributors, Crawford from Philip Morris,
Moylan of the Nebraska Licensed Beverage Association (and R. J. Reynolds).353  The
newcomers were Lon Alexander, a Tobacco Hut owner, Timothy Keigher of the Nebraska
Petroleum Marketers Association and Bill Peters, formerly with the Tobacco Institute, and now
testifying for Lorillard and Brown & Williamson.      
On February 28, 2002, Governor Johanns unveiled his budget which included a $0.50
excise tax increase in LB 1149, but, unlike LB 1149, the rrevenue <is the way I edited it
correct?> from the tax increase was to go to the General Fund and not to health expenses.354 
During March, the Revenue Committee still had not decided whether or not to advance
LB 1149 out of committee.  Instead, they were spending their time working to craft a tax
increase bill to help balance the state’s budget.  The bill that was advanced out of committee,
LB 1085, was written to raise $90 million in revenue primarily by expanding the sales tax base
and increasing the cigarette excise tax by only $0.20.355   Eighteen of the twenty cents in the
Revenue Committee’s excise tax increase went to the General Fund with the remaining two
cents going to the Building Renewal Allocation Fund.  With an excise tax increase included in
their tax bill, the Revenue Committee decided 6-0 to gut LB 1149 and replace it with a
Medicaid eligibility amendment.353
At this point, the excise tax increase no longer contained an earmark for the Tobacco
Prevention and Control Cash Fund.353  On March 25, Senator Jensen attempted to get support
for an amendment that would raise the excise tax increase back up to $0.50, but unable to find
the support necessary for such an amendment, Jensen began working toward a $0.30 tax
increase.356  In the morning of March 26, he was successful in getting an amendment to LB
1085 passed by a vote of 28-15 that increased the excise tax to $0.30.356  
By the afternoon, Jensen’s amendment had been jettisoned due to intense opposition
from Senator Ernie Chambers (I - Omaha).  Chambers, the Legislature’s only African-
American senator, was strongly opposed to an excise tax increase because he felt it was unfair
to target a minority of taxpayers especially since that minority contained more individuals who
were poor and non-white.357  Thirty-three votes were needed to overcome a Chambers’
filibuster so, with only 28 vote, the amendment was removed.  Instead, the Legislature began
focusing on using sales and income tax increases to balance the budget.358
The reversal did not surprise the members of Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska.  “This
was always going to come down to the 11th hour,” said Rich Lombardi, one of the lobbyists for
the coalition.  “We’ll be here right to the very end.”357  Governor Johanns was not happy with
the Legislature’s decision to utilize sales and income tax increases to balance the budget and
promised a veto.358  He accused the Legislature of trying to tax their way out of the budget
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crisis instead of making the cuts he recommended.358  On April 8, a cigarette excise tax
increase was again incorporated into LB 1085.359  It had become apparent that the sales and
income tax increases would not be enough to balance the budget so, by a vote of 32-16, the
Legislature again added an amendment to LB 1085 which increased the excise tax by $0.30.359 
This excise tax increase was written to sunset after two years.360 
Governor Johanns made good on his threat and vetoed LB 1085 because it increased
the state’s sales and income taxes.  The Legislature responded by voting 30-19 to override the
governor’s veto.361  With that vote by the Legislature, Nebraska increased its excise tax on a
pack of cigarettes from $0.34 to $0.64 for two years.  As a result of further budget woes, the
sunset clause for the $0.30 tax increase was removed in 2003 so that the increase became
permanent (See Use of the Settlement Section).  None of the revenues were  ever allocated to
tobacco control.  
HUGE FUNDING CUT FOR TOBACCO FREE NEBRASKA IN 2003
Governor Johanns’ Budget    
At the beginning of the 2003 session of the Legislature in January, Nebraska was facing
a $673 million gap in the budget.362  Unfortunately for health advocates in Nebraska, it was in
this climate that they had to pressure legislators to continue funding Tobacco Free Nebraska at
$7 million per year because the program (as part of LB 1436) was only funded out of the
tobacco settlement through FY2002.307, 325  In previous years, Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska
had pushed for an earmark for Tobacco Free Nebraska as part of an cigarette excise tax
increase (See Excise Tax Section).  While they had been successful in getting a temporary
$0.30 excise tax passed in 2002, the Legislature was unwilling to provide an earmark for
tobacco control because legislators wanted to use all of the increase to deal with the budget
crisis. 
Despite the fact that during the 2002 regular session, $5 million had not been
reallocated to Tobacco Free Nebraska and the Legislature had been unwilling to provide
continued funding for the program through an excise tax earmark, health advocates had some
reason to be optimistic at the beginning of the 2003 session in January.  On January 15, 2003
Governor Johanns unveiled his biennium budget which called for making the $0.30 excise tax
increase (which was scheduled to expire on October 1, 2004) permanent and enacting an
additional $0.20 excise tax increase that would devoted to the General Fund.363  Due in part to
the increased funds that the state would be taking in from the $0.20 excise tax increase that
was proposed, Johanns’ budget also included $3 million per year from the General Fund for
each of the next two years (FY2004 and FY 2005) to support Tobacco Free Nebraska.
Two characteristics of Johanns’ budget would have serious consequences for tobacco
control in Nebraska: it contained no other tax increases other than the cigarette excise tax
increase and  the $3 million for Tobacco Free Nebraska came out of the General Fund (because
the increased revenues from the $0.20 increase in cigarette excise taxes would be deposited in
the General Fund) and not directly from the cigarette excise tax or the tobacco settlement.
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Due to the fact that, once again, Johanns stuck to his anti-tax mantra and insisted on no
new taxes except an increase in the cigarette excise tax, his budget was largely discounted by
legislators as unfeasible to deal with such a large budget deficit.  To avoid raising taxes,
Johanns’ solution was to cut funding to K-12 and to higher education by 10%  for each of the
next two years.364  His budget also called for a similar 10% cut for most state agencies.  Many
in the Legislature were very displeased that Johanns seemed willing to make such deep cuts to
avoid increasing taxes.  Some senators went so far as to say that the governor was avoiding the
idea of raising taxes so the Legislature would take all the political heat for increasing taxes. 
“The way he’s handled it (the budget crisis) is fairly typical of the way governors in the past
have handled it - they usually do turn it over to the Legislature for the realistic solution,” stated
Senator Chris Beutler of Lincoln (D- 8.0 policy score).  “What he suggested certainly isn’t
realistic.  We need to do it ourselves.”365  Another critic of Governor Johanns’ budget was
Senator Nancy Thompson (D-Papillion).  She said, “A lot of us think he’s just abdicating his
leadership role - he just lobbed it over here.”365 
Because legislators were upset at the governor’s insistence that the budget crisis should
be remedied almost exclusively through spending cuts, a critical eye was turned towards the $3
million annually that he had in his budget for Tobacco Free Nebraska.  Since the program had
previously been funded out of the tobacco settlement and not out of the General Fund, many
legislators viewed the $3 million as new spending from the General Fund.325  This $3 million
was, however, a small fraction of the approximately $20 million that the $0.20 increase in
cigarette excise taxes would bring in to the General Fund.  The fact that the funding for
Tobacco Free Nebraska in the governor’s proposed budget was seen as new spending from the
General Fund while the Governor was also calling for 10% cuts to many other programs, such
as education,364 that had long be paid for out of the General Fund would be a huge pitfall for
health advocates in Nebraska.
The deep cuts to education were particularly unpalatable to many legislators and much
of the 2003 legislative session consisted of legislators attempting to find a way to moderate the
governor’s proposed cuts and still lower the budget deficit.  This effort was rendered even
more difficult when the budget deficit figure rose to $761 million in April.366  At this point,
senators were debating which taxes could be raised to best help with the budget deficit.  One
proposal, initially advanced in Governor Johann’s budget was to make the $0.30 excise tax
increase passed in 2002 (and set to sunset in 2004) permanent.366  Increasing the tax the
previous year and now making it permanent, however, meant that the Legislature was
unwilling to pass the additional excise tax increase of $0.20 proposed by Johanns. On May 6,
the Legislature voted 34-7 to advance LB 285 which extended the temporary excise, sales and
income tax increases passed in 2002 from the first round of debate.367 It was estimated that
enacting LB 285 would bring in $235 million over two years and by factoring in  additional
sales, income and alcohol tax increases that the Legislature was considering, the total in
revenue raised by all the tax increases was estimated to be $315 over the next two years.  Even
so, all these tax increases combined with spending cuts still left the Legislature $40 million
short of a balanced budget.367 
Funding Source Amendments 
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Up until early May 2003, tobacco control advocates in Nebraska had been unable to
convince the Legislature to return the funding level for Tobacco Free Nebraska to $7 million
per year; the $3 million per year proposed by the Governor, however, still remained in the
budget bill. With the legislative session almost over, legislator began reviewing this budget bill
(LB 407) for any additional areas that could be cut.  On May 8, Senator Ronald Raikes of
Lincoln (I - 5.5 policy score), chairperson of the Education Committee, proposed an
amendment (AM 1802) to the budget bill to completely remove the $3 million per year that
Tobacco Free Nebraska was to receive.  The same day, Speaker of the Legislature Curt Bromm
of Wahoo (R - 4.5 policy score) introduced an amendment (AM 1783) to the tax package bill
(LB 759) that sought to increase the cigarette excise tax by $0.03 to $0.67, which was
estimated to raise approximately $3.3 million, to all be placed in the Tobacco Prevention and
Control Cash Fund, Tobacco Free Nebraska’s funding source.     
 
With these two major amendments introduced on the same day, the health advocates in
Nebraska rapidly stepped up their lobbying efforts.  Telephone calls and e-mails went out to
individuals to mobilize them to contact their state senator to urge him or her to vote no on
Senator Raikes’ amendment and yes on Senator Bromm’s.  Tobacco control advocates also
held a press conference at the State Capitol.  In addition, they flooded Senator Raikes’ office
with calls protesting his amendment.  His response was that it was not his intention to gut the
Tobacco Free Nebraska program but that he felt that the program should be funded out of the
tobacco settlement and not out of the General Fund.368  He had not, however, introduced such
legislation or included a provision to do so in his amendment.
Throughout the legislative session, tobacco control advocates had been attempting to
garner more money for Tobacco Free Nebraska out of the tobacco settlement, without any
success.  All of the interest generated by the settlement was already committed to the $50
million per year in health-related expenses funded by LB 692 which was passed in 2001.316  In
contrast to earlier willingness to fund Tobacco Free Nebraska out of the settlement money,
many legislators stated their preference for funding tobacco control using an excise tax
increase instead of the tobacco settlement.  The reason why some of these legislators were not
supportive of using the tobacco settlement was because they were afraid that using the tobacco
settlement money for anything other than the package of programs funded through LB 692
would jeopardize the funding source for these programs.  Two of the senators that pushed for
excise tax increases instead of using tobacco settlement money were the heads of the Health
and Human Services Committee, Jim Jensen and Dennis Byars.  In 2001, both senators had
been major architects of LB 692 and had pushed for the tobacco settlement to be used for
public health improvements with Senator Jensen focusing on mental health services and
Senator Byars pushing for developmental disabilities and respite care (See Above).316  During
the 2003 session, these two senators introduced and passed LB 468, which refunded out of the
tobacco settlement all of the health-related programs first funded as part of LB 692.369  While
the funding for these programs was not increased due to the budget crisis, they were not cut
from their previous levels of funding either.  Biomedical research, which had been scheduled
to jump from $10 million to $12 billion for FY2004 and FY2005 remained at $10 million.369 
The result was that biomedical research, which was already received over $10 billion a year in
funding from the National Institutes of Health and other sources, continued to receive more
money from the tobacco settlement than the tobacco control program.
   
121
   Five days after it had been introduced, the Legislature voted 26-14 on May 13 to pass
Senator Raikes’ amendment which stripped Tobacco Free Nebraska of the $3 million it was to 
receive annually from the General Fund.  There was no evidence that the tobacco industry
directly lobbied for this amendment.  Because this amendment dealt exclusively with the
funding of a tobacco control program, if the tobacco industry had done so it would have
constituted a violation of the Master Settlement Agreement.289  The tobacco industry, however,
has a long history of using allies and third parties to lobby on its behalf on such matters.101, 370 
The passage of Senator Raikes’ amendment rendered a similar amendment, introduced by
Philip Erdman of Bayard (R - 1.8 policy score), which would also have stripped Tobacco Free
Nebraska’s funding out of the budget moot.  As of May 13, 2003, Tobacco Free Nebraska had
been zeroed out by the Nebraska Legislature.  
With the possibility of receiving funding out of the tobacco settlement looking slim,
tobacco control advocates focused their efforts in support of Senator Bromm’s amendment to
increase the cigarette excise tax by $0.03 to fund Tobacco Free Nebraska.  The tobacco
industry and its allies were permitted by the Master Settlement Agreement to lobby against
excise tax increases so they did lobby strongly in opposition to Senator Bromm’s amendment
to LB 759.
On May 15, Senator Bromm’s amendment was defeated when if failed by two votes
(23-8) to garner the 25 votes necessary to pass an amendment.  Especially disheartening for
tobacco control advocates was that six senators were not present for the vote.  Only one of
these senators was strongly pro-tobacco industry, Jim Cudaback of Riverdale (R- 2.5 policy
score) and two of these senators, Ray Aguilar of Grand Island (R - 8.2 policy score) and
DiAnna Schimek of Lincoln (D - 8.0 policy score), who would have almost certainly voted in
favor of the amendment had they been present.  These two senators and Senator Vickie
McDonald of Rockville (R - 6.2 policy score) later voted in favor of an almost identical
amendment to raise the tobacco excise tax by $0.03 to fund Tobacco Free Nebraska.  During
the vote on Senator Bromm’s amendment, Senator Aguilar was at a doctor’s appointment,
Senator Schimek was out of the state and Senator McDonald had left the floor of the
Legislature over a comment made about her deceased husband.  
   
Because the vote on Senator Bromm’s amendment was so close, Senator Thompson
introduced an almost identical amendment, AM 7153, to get funding to Tobacco Free
Nebraska through a $0.03 excise tax increase, but this amendment failed by a larger margin of
17-17 because it was later in the session and more legislators were absent.
Funding at $405,000 Per Year 
By this point, tobacco control advocates were frantic because it was very late in the
session and they still were without any funding.  They continued lobbying senators to fund
Tobacco Free Nebraska and finally had some measure of success.  They were able to convince
Senator David Landis of Lincoln (D - 5.4 policy score) to introduce an amendment, AM 2113,
to an appropriation bill, Legislative Bill 285A, on May 28 that sought to provide Tobacco Free
Nebraska with $405,000 per year for FY2004 and FY2005.371  During the special session in
2002, the Legislature had decided to reduce the discount that tobacco wholesalers are given for
what it costs them to put tax stamps on cigarettes from 3.4% to 1.7%, but the Legislature had
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not decided how to allocate the modest savings created by this change.372                                     
                       
The Legislature voted 29-17 to adopt Senator Landis’ amendment and it passed final
reading by a vote of 36-1 on May 30th, the last day possible.372  
The final result of the 2003 legislative session was that state funding for tobacco
control efforts in Nebraska dropped from $7 million per year to $405,000 per year.  Tobacco
Free Nebraska suffered a 94% cut program while biomedical research and the other programs
funded out of the tobacco settlement were not cut at all.
CONCLUSIONS
The tobacco industry has a long history of undermining efforts to protect the health of
Nebraskans.  Through the use of third-party allies, false arguments, lobbyists and campaign
contributions, the tobacco industry has been active in opposing efforts to reduce the harm
caused by smoking by preventing the strengthening of laws to protect the public from
secondhand smoke (See Clean Indoor Air section), by weakening laws that keep tobacco out of
the hands of children (See Youth Access section) and by opposing cigarette excise tax
increases which reduce tobacco consumption (See Excise Tax sections).  In an effort to
influence policymakers, tobacco companies spent over $1 million on lobbying expenditures
from 1997 to 2002 and approximately $315,000 in direct contributions to elected state officials
from 1979 to 2002 (See Appendix). Their investment has often paid off. 
 
It is often difficult to expose the extent of the tobacco industry’s role in weakening
tobacco control policies, especially due to the use of third-party allies such as the hospitality
industry; however, the tactics and rhetoric used by the tobacco industry have essentially
remained the same for the past twenty-five years in Nebraska.  For example, the arguments that
the tobacco industry used to oppose the creation of separate smoking and nonsmoking sections
in Nebraska in 197947 are the same arguments used in 2003 in the Legislature to oppose
making all restaurants smokefree and in Lincoln to make all workplaces and public places
smokefree.  In both 1979 and in 2003, the hospitality industry represented the public face for
the tobacco industry’s rhetoric.  This pattern of operating behind third-party allies and front
groups is no different that what was been seen in numerous other states when the tobacco
industry fights against tobacco control policies that would save lives.9, 101, 211, 251, 301  
The tobacco industry has remained a steadfast and powerful player in state politics
leaving the actions of health advocates, including those in elected offices, to determine the
outcome of tobacco control debates.  During the 1970s, it was largely senators within the
Nebraska Legislature, such as Shirley Marsh of Lincoln in 1974 and Larry Stoney of Omaha in
1979, that were responsible for Nebraska’s decisions to follow the examples set by Arizona
and Minnesota in enacting state clean indoor air laws (See Clean Indoor Air section).  Another
example of when a health advocate in government was largely responsible for a tobacco
control policy change was the five years of effort devoted to making state buildings and
vehicles smokefree by Senator Don Preister until he was successful in 1999 (See Clean Indoor
Air section).  Furthermore, these examples seem to demonstrate how aggressive and persistent
efforts by even a single legislative champion are generally much more key to overcoming
lobbying by the tobacco industry than weak support by a larger number of legislators.               
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In more recent years, health advocates outside of government have begun to play a
much larger role in tobacco control politics in Nebraska by devoting more time and energy to
policy change at both the state and local level; however, they are not sufficiently powerful and
organized to be consistently effective in opposing the tobacco industry.  From 1999-2002, the
largest tobacco control coalition in Nebraska, Citizens for a Healthy Nebraska, focused its
activities in the Legislature on passing a large cigarette excise tax increase in an effort to
reduce youth smoking and increase funding for tobacco control (See Citizens’ Excise Tax
section).  While coalition members were able to convince many legislators to support an excise
tax increase as a way to improve the health of Nebraskans, the tobacco industry was effective
in playing to the unpopularity of tax increases, thereby preventing excise tax increase
proposals from garnering the necessary number of votes on several different occasions.   
During this same period, there were several efforts emerging in the Legislature to
strengthen and modernize the state's clean indoor air law by making all restaurants in the state
smokefree (See Clean Indoor Air section).  Due to a narrow focus on achieving a cigarette
excise tax increase, the majority of tobacco control advocates did not mobilize to support these
bills.  The tobacco industry, with its resources and lobbyists, was not limited to focusing on
one issue and was active in opposing these smokefree restaurant bills which included a phone-
banking operation that was conducted by R.J. Reynolds.114  In spite of the imbalance between
efforts of health advocates and the tobacco industry, a bill requiring smokefree restaurants was
almost passed by the Legislature in 2000.105  
After two failed attempts to pass a cigarette excise tax increase in prior years, Citizens
for a Healthy Nebraska was successful in getting a $0.30 increase passed in 2002.360  While
this increase would not have come about without hard work by tobacco control advocates, the
large budget deficit faced by Nebraska in 2002 as a result of the nationwide economic slump
was a major contributing factor.  With the state’s budget in the red, the economic benefits of an
excise tax increase (and not the health benefits) convinced some legislators to vote in favor of
the proposed $0.30 increase.  While the Legislature did pass this cigarette excise tax increase,
all the money raised was devoted to dealing with the budget crisis and none was earmarked for
tobacco control efforts.360  
The budget deficit helped tobacco control advocates secure the passage of a cigarette
excise tax increase in 2002; however, it was also largely responsible for the massive cut
suffered by the state’s tobacco control program in 2003.12, 118  In 2000, after failing to provide
funding for tobacco control through a previous cigarette excise tax increase attempt, health
advocates switched their focus and were effective in convincing the Legislature and Governor
to appropriate $7 million per year for three years for tobacco control out of the funds provided
to Nebraska from the Master Settlement Agreement, which was about half the minimum level
of funding recommended by the US Centers for Disease Control.  (This level of funding put
Nebraska at 16 out of the 50 states.305)  The Department of Health and Human Services used
these funds to expand its existing Tobacco Free Nebraska program.  After this promising start,
the program came under financial attack due to the deteriorating state budget.  Tobacco control
had not been established in the eyes of many legislators as an important and necessary
government function for improving the health and well-being of Nebraskans.  To provide
political cover for themselves, the Legislature and the governor haggled over what the funding
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source should be (General Fund, cigarette excise tax increase or settlement money) instead of
insuring that the program was funding irregardless of the source. 
This situation allowed the Legislature and the Governor to provide nominal support for
the tobacco control program while allowing it to suffer a massive 94% cut in 2003,372 which far
surpassed the level of cuts to most state programs.  At the same time, funding for biomedical
research – which poses no short term threat to the tobacco industry and focused on treatment
instead of prevention – was maintained at $10 million per year.369 
Another example was Nebraska’s first attempt to pass a 100% smokefree workplace
ordinance at the local level.  Previously most tobacco control successes in Nebraska at the
local level had focused on youth access (See Youth Access section) or passing ordinances that
only made city or county facilities smokefree (See Clean Indoor Air section), but in 2003, the
Lincoln-Lancaster Health Department and other tobacco control proponents proposed a local
workplace ordinance before the Lincoln City Council.150  Due to pressure from the tobacco
industry and the hospitality industry, especially bar owners, the members of the Lincoln City
Council passed a confusing ordinance that was weakened to allow separately ventilated
“smoking rooms” and also allowed bars to be exempted.172-174  As of March 2004, it has not
been determine whether or not these “smoking rooms” can serve as work areas; thus, exposing
employees to the health hazards of secondhand smoke.   
The following are lessons that can be learned from tobacco control activities in
Nebraska:
• The tobacco industry and its allies used the same rhetoric in 1979 in opposing separate
smoking and nonsmoking sections in public places that they used in 2003 to oppose
smokefree public places.  The attention of the public and elected officials should be
drawn to the fact that the same arguments are used to paint smokefree efforts as
unreasonable as were formerly used to portray separate smoking and nonsmoking
sections as “a further example of government intrusion into the private sector.”47   
• The tobacco industry understands that its reputation is its biggest liability in a public
debate.  Health advocates must educate the public and elected officials about the role
that third-party allies play in any tobacco control fight.
• The tobacco industry has enough resources and influence to fight on many different
fronts at one time.  Health advocates need to become organized and strong enough to
mobilize on more than one issue at a time or else they will be constantly losing in some
areas while they gain in others.
• Unless tobacco control is well-established as a funding priority, legislators will use the
money taken in by the state from excise taxes and the tobacco settlement to fund areas
that have little impact on the tobacco industry because these areas, such as medical
research, are politically safer.    
Whether tobacco control advocates in Nebraska can consolidate their past successes and learn
from their failures in an effort to establish effective tobacco control as a priority in Nebraska at
both the state and local level remains to be seen.  
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Name of Candidate Dist. Party
Years 
in 
Office
Industry 
1999-2000 1999-2000
Industry 
2001-2002 2001-2002
Industry 
1999-2002 1999-2002
Lifetime 
Industry 
Total
Lifetime 
Total
Policy 
Score
Aguilar, Ray 35 R 5 $0 $1,026 $0 $0 $0 $1,026 $0 $1,026 8.2
Baker, Tom 44 R 5 $1,500 $2,500 $1,500 $2,699 $3,000 $5,199 $4,000 $6,721 2.0
Beutler, Chris 28 D 21 $0 $500 $0 $250 $0 $750 $5,000 $6,827 8.0
Bourne, Patrick 8 D 5 $2,000 $2,000 $1,500 $1,716 $3,500 $3,716 $4,000 $4,468 1.8
Brashear, Kermit 4 R 9 $1,500 $2,000 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,500 $7,000 $8,551 2.8
Bromm, Curt 23 R 11 $2,000 $2,800 $1,500 $1,750 $3,500 $4,550 $6,550 $8,050 4.5
Brown, Pam 6 D 9 $250 $250 $0 $350 $250 $600 $2,750 $4,152 7.3
Burling, Carroll 33 R 3 $0 $500 $0 $0 $0 $500 $0 $500 4.4
Byars, Dennis 30 R 13 $1,250 $1,250 $500 $750 $1,750 $2,000 $3,150 $4,178 7.7
Chambers, Ernie 11 I 33 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 7.7
Combs, Jeanne 32 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 4.2
Connealy, Matt 16 D 5 $500 $500 $500 $900 $1,000 $1,400 $1,500 $2,050 7.2
Cudaback, Jim 36 R 13 $1,500 $1,500 $1,000 $1,000 $2,500 $2,500 $5,350 $6,151 2.5
Cunningham, Doug 40 R 3 $1,400 $9,946 $1,049 $2,506 $2,449 $12,452 $2,449 $12,452 1.5
Engel, Pat 17 D 11 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500 $3,000 $3,000 $5,750 $6,045 3.2
Erdman, Philip 47 R 3 $0 $0 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 1.8
Foley, Mike 29 R 3 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 5.0
Friend, Mike 10 R 1 $0 $0 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 3.0
Hartnett, Paul 45 D 19 $0 $770 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,770 $1,750 $3,840 2.3
Hudkins, Carol 21 R 11 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $6,000 $6,357 4.2
Janssen, Ray 15 D 11 $2,300 $2,600 $500 $800 $2,800 $3,400 $8,550 $9,798 1.5
Jensen, Jim 20 R 9 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $427 8.5
Johnson, Joel 37 R 2 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 7.7
Jones, Jim 43 R 11 $750 $1,250 $0 $500 $750 $1,750 $1,500 $3,050 4.8
Kremer, Bob 34 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $541 $0 $541 $0 $875 4.7
Kruse, Lowen 13 D 3 $0 $0 $500 $733 $500 $733 $500 $773 7.6
Landis, David 46 D 25 $0 $0 $0 $327 $0 $327 $3,550 $6,910 5.4
Louden, LeRoy 49 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 4.0
Maxwell, Chip 9 I 3 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 $2,000 4.6
McDonald, Vickie 41 R 3 $0 $0 $0 $500 $0 $500 $0 $500 6.2
Mines, Mick 18 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $700 $0 $700 $0 $700 3.8
Mossey, Ray 3 R 2 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 3.4
Pedersen, Dwite 39 R 11 $2,650 $4,029 $1,000 $1,500 $3,650 $5,529 $7,600 $11,612 3.5
Pederson, Don 42 R 8 $500 $500 $500 $1,098 $1,000 $1,598 $2,000 $2,840 5.2
Preister, Donald 5 D 11 $0 $679 $0 $0 $0 $679 $0 $2,284 8.8
Price, Marian 26 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $252 $0 $252 $0 $352 7.7
Quandahl, Mark 31 R 5 $1,400 $2,617 $1,500 $1,800 $2,900 $4,417 $2,900 $4,417 2.6
Raikes, Ron 25 I 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $750 $1,899 5.5
Redfield, Pam 12 R 6 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 6.8
Schimek, DiAnna 27 D 15 $0 $300 $0 $0 $0 $300 $1,550 $5,215 8.0
Schrock, Ed 38 R 13 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $100 5.8
Smith, Adrian 48 R 5 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $300 1.7
Stuhr, Elaine 24 R 9 $500 $500 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000 $1,250 $1,492 4.3
Stuthman, Arnie 22 R 1 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 2.7
Synowiecki, John 7 D 3 $0 $0 $1,000 $1,300 $1,000 $1,300 $1,000 $1,300 5.7
Thompson, Nancy 14 D 7 $0 $371 $0 $0 $0 $371 $0 $926 8.7
Tyson, Gene 19 R 7 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $250 $250 1.5
Vrtiska, Floyd 1 R 11 $0 $1,241 $0 $0 $0 $1,241 $1,100 $2,265 6.2
Wehrbein, Roger 2 R 17 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $50 7.5
TOTALS $23,500 $43,129 $22,049 $31,472 $45,549 $74,601 $92,749 $144,703 5.0
Appendix 1: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions and Tobacco Policy Scores
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE Candy 
& Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
2001-2002 
Industry 
Total
2001-2002 
Total
Wehrbein, Roger 2 $0 $0
Kentsmith, David 2 $0 $0
Brashear, Kermit 4 $500 $1,000 $1,500 $1,500
Brown, Pam 6 $350 $0 $350
Pendrell, Tim 6 $500 $500 $500
Synowiecki, John 7 $500 $500 $100 $100 $100 $1,000 $1,300
Bourne, Patrick 8 $500 $1,000 $216 $1,500 $1,716
Friend, Mike 10 $500 $500 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000
Suttle, Deb 10 $400 $0 $400
Redfield, Pam 12 $0 $0
Koile, Bill 12 $0 $0
Thompson, Nancy 14 $0 $0
Allen, Brad 14 $0 $0
Connealy, Matt 16 $500 $400 $500 $900
Mines, Mick 18 $700 $0 $700
Kovarik, James 18 $500 $500 $500
Jensen, Jim 20 $0 $0
Stuthman, Arnie 22 $0 $0
Robak, Jennie 22 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000
Stuhr, Elaine 24 $500 $500 $500
Price, Marian 26 $252 $0 $252
Sullivan, Brice 26 $0 $0
Beutler, Chris 28 $250 $0 $250
Byars, Dennis 30 $500 $250 $500 $750
Combs, Jeanne 32 $0 $0
Biba, Dave 32 $0 $0
Kremer, Bob 34 $268 $273 $0 $541
Willhoft, Jerry 34 $0 $0
Cudaback, Jim 36 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Johnson, Joel 37 $0 $0
Schrock, Ed 38 $0 $0
Scheierman, Scott 38 $0 $0
Cunningham, Doug 40 $500 $549 $300 $278 $878 $1,049 $2,506
Dierks, Cap 40 $300 $0 $300
McDonald, Vickie 41 $500 $0 $500
Schmitt, Jerry 41 $500 $500 $500
Pederson, Don 42 $500 $300 $298 $500 $1,098
Munoz, Dave 42 $0 $0
Baker, Tom 44 $500 $1,000 $449 $750 $1,500 $2,699
Landis, David 46 $327 $0 $327
Carter, John 46 $0 $0
Smith, Adrian 48 $0 $0
Louden, LeRoy 49 $0 $0
Cycle Total $4,500 $9,549 $0 $0 $1,000 $0 $1,100 $1,612 $3,978 $100 $1,250 $15,049 $23,089
Off-Cycle
HIlgert, John 7 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000
Maxwell, Chip 9 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Kruse, Lowen 13 $500 $233 $500 $733
Janssen, Ray 15 $500 $300 $500 $800
Engel, Pat 17 $500 $1,000 $1,500 $1,500
Hudkins, Carol 21 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000
Bromm, Curt 23 $500 $1,000 $250 $1,500 $1,750
Quandahl, Mark 31 $500 $1,000 $300 $1,500 $1,800
Coordsen, George 32 $1,500 $1,500 $1,500
Kristensen, Doug 37 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000
Pedersen, Dwite 39 $1,000 $500 $1,000 $1,500
Jone, Jim 43 $500 $0 $500
Hartnett, Paul 45 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Erdman, Phil 47 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Wickersham, Bob 49 $500 $500 $500 $1,000
Off-Cycle Total $3,000 $11,500 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $533 $300 $0 $1,750 $14,500 $17,083
Total $7,500 $21,049 $0 $0 $1,000 $0 $1,100 $2,146 $4,278 $100 $3,000 $29,549 $40,172
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE Candy 
& 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1999-2000 
Industry 
Total
1999-2000 
Total
Vrtiska, Floyd 1 $650 $330 $261 $0 $1,241
Bartels, Lavern 1 $0 $0
Bruning, John 3 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000
Preister, Don 5 $300 $379 $0 $679
Hilgert, John 7 $500 $1,000 $628 $387 $1,500 $2,515
Maxwell, Chip 9 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Knudsen, Scott 9 $0 $0
Chambers, Ernie 11 $0 $0
Kruse, Lowen 13 $0 $0
Lynch, Daniel C. 13 $1,000 $526 $1,000 $1,526
Janssen, Ramon 15 $500 $1,000 $800 $300 $2,300 $2,600
Engel, L. Patrick 17 $500 $1,000 $1,500 $1,500
Cunningham, Doug 18 $500 $500 $400 $250 $300 $650 $7,346 $1,400 $9,946
Dickey, Bob 18 $200 $236 $200 $100 $0 $736
Tyson, Gene 19 $0 $0
Hudkins, Carol 21 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Bromm, Curt 23 $500 $1,500 $300 $500 $2,000 $2,800
Raikes, Ronald 25 $0 $0
Schimek, DiAnna R. 27 $300 $0 $300
Edwards, Paul 27 $0 $0
Foley, Mike 29 $0 $0
Hewitt, Jim 29 $500 $500 $500
Quandahl, Mark 31 $500 $500 $400 $300 $462 $455 $1,400 $2,617
Burling, Carroll 33 $500 $0 $500
Odom, Phil 33 $500 $500 $500
Aguilar, Ray 35 $250 $470 $306 $0 $1,026
Logan, Lonnie 35 $400 $400 $400
Kristensen, Doug 37 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000
Pedersen, Dwite 39 $1,250 $1,000 $400 $1,079 $300 $2,650 $4,029
McDonald, Richard 41 $1,000 $1,000 $1,000
Wells, Errol 41 $500 $500 $600 $1,000 $1,600
Jones, Jim 43 $750 $500 $750 $1,250
Trimble, Cleve 43 $0 $0
Hartnett, D. Paul 45 $330 $440 $0 $770
Erdman, Philip 47 $0 $0
Matzke, Gerald 47 $0 $0
Wickersham, Bob 49 $500 $500 $400 $443 $285 $1,400 $2,128
Cooley, Dana 49 $0 $0
Cycle Total $8,500 $10,000 $0 $0 $4,800 $0 $2,878 $4,255 $3,234 $1,050 $9,446 $23,300 $44,163
Off-Cycle
Brashear, Kermit 4 $1,000 $500 $500 $1,500 $2,000
Brown, Pam 6 $250 $250 $250
Bourne, Patrick 8 $1,000 $1,000 $2,000 $2,000
Suttle, Deb 10 $400 $0 $400
Thompson, Nancy 14 $371 $0 $371
Connealy, Matt 16 $500 $500 $500
Robak, Jennie 22 $1,000 $500 $1,000 $1,500
Stuhr, Elaine 24 $500 $500 $500
Beutler, Chris 28 $500 $0 $500
Byars, Dennis 30 $250 $1,000 $1,250 $1,250
Coordsen, George 32 $250 $1,500 $1,750 $1,750
Cudaback, Jim 36 $500 $1,000 $1,500 $1,500
Pederson, Don 42 $500 $500 $500
Baker, Tom 44 $500 $1,000 $1,000 $1,500 $2,500
Off-Cycle Total $4,250 $8,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $371 $400 $0 $2,500 $12,250 $15,521
Total $12,750 $18,000 $0 $0 $4,800 $0 $2,878 $4,626 $3,634 $1,050 $11,946 $35,550 $59,684
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE Candy 
& Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1997-1998 
Industry Total
1997-1998 
Total
Wehrbein, Roger 2 $0 $0
Howard, Robert 2 $0 $0
Brashear, Kermit 4 $1,500 $1,500 $504 $3,000 $3,504
Brown, Pam 6 $750 $1,000 $232 $225 $100 $125 $1,750 $2,432
Anderson, Paul 6 $0 $0
Bourne, Patrick 8 $500 $152 $100 $500 $752
Thomsen, Paul 8 $0 $0
Suttle, Deb 10 $253 $133 $100 $33 $0 $518
Kerrigan, R.L. 10 $500 $500 $500
Redfield, Pam 12 $0 $0
Richards, Linda 12 $500 $100 $500 $600
Thompson, Nancy 14 $160 $145 $100 $150 $0 $555
Alcala, Richard 14 $250 $250 $250
Connealy, Matt 16 $500 $100 $50 $500 $650
Ruwe, Paul 16 $316 $0 $316
Schellpeper, Stan 18 $1,750 $500 $218 $133 $2,250 $2,601
Jensen, Jim 20 $120 $100 $0 $220
Potter, Tim 20 $0 $0
Robak, Jennie 22 $1,750 $1,250 $222 $129 $3,000 $3,351
Stuhr, Elaine 24 $250 $100 $250 $350
Elwell, Bob 24 $0 $0
Raikes, Ron 25 $250 $500 $100 $276 $286 $200 $286 $750 $1,899
Zager, Dennis 25 $0 $0
Price, Marian 26 $100 $0 $100
Schneider, Ed 26 $300 $252 $230 $180 $0 $963
Beutler, Chris 28 $250 $1,500 $128 $1,750 $1,878
Byars, Dennis 30 $500 $130 $100 $248 $500 $978
Matzke, Stan, Jr. 30 $500 $0 $500
Coordsen, George 32 $1,000 $1,500 $2,500 $2,500
Casson, Joseph 32 $0 $0
Kremer, Bob 34 $334 $0 $334
Willhoft, Jerry 34 $500 $500 $182 $372 $598 $1,000 $2,152
Cudaback, Jim 36 $250 $1,550 $100 $124 $124 $124 $1,800 $2,271
Schrock, Ed 38 $0 $0
Dierks, Merton 40 $0 $0
Pederson, Don 42 $500 $500 $242 $1,000 $1,242
Baker, Thomas 44 $500 $500 $250 $244 $28 $1,000 $1,522
Smith, Steven 44 $0 $0
Landis, David 46 $1,000 $276 $554 $130 $1,000 $1,960
Price, Edward 46 $0 $0
Smith, Adrian 48 $300 $0 $300
Hillman, Joyce 48 $324 $127 $127 $227 $0 $806
Cycle Total $10,500 $13,300 $0 $0 $0 $0 $1,250 $4,814 $2,610 $1,251 $2,279 $23,800 $36,004
Off-Cycle
Bruning, John 3 $250 $500 $100 $750 $850
Hilgert, John 7 $500 $1,000 $460 $200 $148 $1,500 $2,309
Kiel, Shelley 9 $109 $0 $109
Abboud, Chris 12 $250 $250 $250
Lynch, Dan 13 $750 $500 $100 $750 $1,350
Withem, Ron 14 $250 $250 $250
Janssen, Ramon 15 $250 $1,000 $100 $100 $1,250 $1,450
Engel, L. Patrick 17 $250 $500 $750 $750
Tyson, Gene 19 $250 $250 $250
Hudkins, Carol 21 $500 $500 $500
Bromm, Curt 23 $250 $500 $750 $750
Wesely, Don 26 $500 $500 $500
Schimek, DiAnna R. 27 $227 $100 $100 $0 $427
Bohlke, Ardyce 33 $250 $250 $250
Kristensen, Doug 37 $250 $250 $250
Pedersen, Dwite 39 $750 $578 $127 $750 $1,455
Elmer, Owen 44 $250 $250 $250
Hartnett, Daniel P. 45 $245 $100 $0 $345
Wickersham, Bob 49 $500 $500 $398 $100 $100 $1,000 $1,598
Off-Cycle Total $6,000 $4,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,517 $0 $500 $875 $10,000 $13,892
Total $16,500 $17,300 $0 $0 $0 $0 $1,250 $7,332 $2,610 $1,751 $3,154 $33,800 $49,896
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1995-1996 
Industry 
Total
1995-1996 
Total
Vrtiska, Floyd 1 $100 $100 $601 $121 $321 $100 $1,244
Stalder, John 1 $0 $0
Bruning, John 3 $0 $0
Avery, Mike 3 $500 $1,500 $200 $348 $398 $48 $233 $2,200 $3,228
Preister, Don 5 $705 $200 $700 $0 $1,605
Krajicek, Tim 5 $750 $1,000 $27 $1,750 $1,777
Hilgert, John 7 $500 $419 $269 $169 $500 $1,356
Christiansen, Craig 7 $348 $0 $348
Kiel, Shelley 9 $100 $0 $100
Sivick, Robert 9 $500 $25 $225 $23 $500 $773
Chambers, Ernie 11 $0 $0
Lynch, Daniel C. 13 $1,700 $500 $300 $500 $1,143 $229 $130 $3,000 $4,502
Kruse, Lowen 13 $0 $0
Janssen, Ramon 15 $1,000 $1,500 $152 $152 $2,500 $2,803
Elliott, Ronald 15 $0 $0
Engel, L. Patrick 17 $750 $1,000 $200 $47 $47 $1,750 $2,045
Tyson, Gene 19 $100 $0 $100
Klein, Leland 19 $500 $156 $156 $500 $811
Hudkins, Carol 21 $1,000 $500 $500 $136 $136 $2,000 $2,271
Yoakum, Carol 21 $0 $0
Bromm, Curt 23 $1,000 $1,000 $300 $450 $2,300 $2,750
Pokorny, John 23 $0 $0
Warner, Jerome 25 $750 $1,000 $1,750 $1,750
Dumas, Hal, III 25 $0 $0
Schimek, DiAnna R. 27 $250 $727 $350 $300 $150 $250 $1,777
Nichols, Barb 27 $100 $0 $100
Crosby, LaVon 29 $250 $750 $1,000 $1,000
Witek, Kate 31 $950 $825 $100 $1,775 $1,875
Heintzman, Mimi 31 $0 $0
Bohlke, Ardyce 33 $500 $1,000 $200 $156 $108 $1,500 $1,964
Peterson, Chris 35 $0 $0
Fisher, Dan 35 $500 $1,000 $500 $700 $400 $200 $2,000 $3,300
Kristensen, Doug 37 $750 $1,500 $200 $2,250 $2,450
Pedersen, Dwite 39 $1,200 $1,500 $500 $778 $100 $3,200 $4,078
Stephens, Roy 39 $0 $0
Schmitt, Jerry 41 $0 $0
Hickman, Jerry 41 $0 $0
Pederson, Don W. 42 $142 $0 $142
Margritz, Dale 42 $0 $0
Jones, James 43 $250 $250 $250
Hartnett, D. Paul 45 $200 $0 $200
Matzke, Gerald 47 $200 $0 $200
Wickersham, Bob 49 $250 $1,500 $500 $449 $155 $2,250 $2,854
Ostrander, Cash 49 $0 $0
Cycle Total $12,450 $17,575 $0 $1,800 $1,500 $0 $200 $8,030 $2,896 $445 $2,756 $33,325 $47,652
Off-Cycle
Brashear, Kermit 4 $500 $500 $500
Brown, Pam 6 $500 $500 $500
Will, Eric 8 $500 $35 $500 $535
Pirsch, Carol McBride 10 $26 $26 $26 $0 $79
Abboud, Chris 12 $500 $400 $125 $123 $500 $1,148
Withem, Ron 14 $500 $500 $500
Schellpeper, Stan 18 $500 $500 $500
Robak, Jennie 22 $500 $100 $500 $600
Beutler, Chris 28 $500 $500 $500
Maurstad, David 30 $500 $500 $500
Coordsen, George 32 $500 $500 $500
McKenzie, Janis 34 $500 $500 $500
Elmer, W. Owen 44 $500 $500 $500
Landis, David 46 $500 $500 $500
Off-Cycle Total $6,500 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $400 $187 $0 $26 $250 $6,500 $7,363
Total $18,950 $17,575 $0 $1,800 $1,500 $0 $600 $8,216 $2,896 $472 $3,006 $39,825 $55,015
Appendix 5: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Members of the 1995-
1996 Nebraska Legislature
147
Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1993-1994 
Industry 
Total
1993-1994 
Total
Wehrbein, Roger 2 $0 $0
Howard, Robert 2 $0 $0
Brashear, Kermit 4 $500 $447 $100 $500 $1,047
Monen, Jim 4 $500 $47 $26 $500 $574
Brown, Pam 6 $250 $40 $190 $100 $40 $250 $620
Skutt, Tom 6 $500 $225 $25 $500 $750
Will, Eric 8 $250 $500 $200 $57 $491 $508 $950 $2,006
Folsom, John 8 $0 $0
Pirsch, Carol McBride 10 $500 $750 $500 $100 $550 $1,750 $2,400
Suttle, Deb 10 $0 $0
Abboud, Chris 12 $850 $750 $300 $20 $1,082 $20 $1,900 $3,021
Withem, Ron 14 $500 $250 $408 $1,463 $200 $137 $750 $2,957
Kelly, Gene 14 $0 $0
Robinson, C.N. "Bud" 16 $400 $250 $400 $100 $650 $1,150
Marvin, Larry 16 $0 $0
Engel, Leo "Pat" 17 $250 $250 $250
Schellpeper, Stan 18 $1,250 $1,250 $500 $228 $228 $100 $3,000 $3,555
Axen, L.Gail 18 $0 $0
Jensen, Jim 20 $54 $154 $0 $207
Rasmussen, Jessie 20 $350 $500 $26 $226 $126 $350 $1,228
Robak, Jennie 22 $600 $250 $850 $850
Stuhr, Elaine 24 $142 $0 $142
Hartmann, Bill 24 $100 $100 $100 $0 $300
Wesely, Don 26 $250 $50 $30 $180 $480 $250 $991
Van Valkenberg, Robert 26 $0 $0
Beutler, Chris 28 $250 $250 $400 $249 $100 $200 $500 $1,449
McShane, Carol 28 $0 $0
Maurstad, David 30 $500 $250 $500 $200 $100 $750 $1,550
Bennett, Bev 30 $0 $0
Coordsen, George 32 $1,000 $750 $300 $200 $2,050 $2,250
Eret, Don 32 $0 $0
McKenzie, Janis 34 $500 $250 $151 $384 $100 $484 $750 $1,869
Arnold, Gene 34 $0 $0
Cudaback, Jim 36 $800 $250 $165 $165 $1,050 $1,380
Smith, Glade 36 $0 $0
Schrock, Ed 38 $100 $0 $100
Miller, Kae 38 $0 $0
Dierks, Merton 40 $0 $0
Bernard-Stevens, David 42 $0 $0
Elmer, W. Owen 44 $500 $250 $200 $750 $950
Richards, Barry Fay 44 $0 $0
Landis, David 46 $500 $250 $1,000 $200 $250 $917 $225 $1,750 $3,343
Reinsch, Charles 46 $0 $0
Matzke, Gerald 47 $250 $250 $170 $500 $670
Nielsen, Elaine 47 $0 $0
Hillman, Joyce 48 $300 $300 $300
Cycle Total $10,000 $7,750 $0 $2,100 $1,000 $0 $750 $3,848 $6,789 $1,200 $2,471 $20,850 $35,907
Off-Cycle
Vrtiska, Floyd 1 $21 $0 $21
Lindsay, John 9 $100 $25 $0 $125
Lynch, Dan 13 $250 $0 $250
Witek, Kate 31 $100 $0 $100
Fisher, Dan 35 $400 $100 $0 $500
Pedersen, Dwite 39 $100 $0 $100
Off-Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $971 $0 $100 $25 $0 $1,096
Total $10,000 $7,750 $0 $2,100 $1,000 $0 $750 $4,819 $6,789 $1,300 $2,496 $20,850 $37,004
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1991-1992 
Industry 
Total
1991-1992 
Total
Vrtiska, Floyd 1 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000
Morrissey, Spencer 1 $500 $350 $339 $500 $1,189
Avery, Michael 3 $50 $200 $100 $0 $350
Thorpe, Lynda 3 $300 $200 $500 $250 $242 $42 $1,000 $1,533
Preister, Don 5 $0 $0
Munnelly, Brian 5 $300 $500 $500 $238 $1,300 $1,538
Hall, Tim 7 $500 $1,000 $250 $1,500 $339 $100 $139 $3,250 $3,827
Damasauskas, Teresa 7 $0 $0
Lindsay, John C. 9 $500 $1,000 $700 $400 $999 $158 $2,200 $3,756
Brown, William J. Beatty 9 $0 $0
Chambers, Ernie 11 $0 $0
Jones, Rick 11 $0 $0
Lynch, Daniel C. 13 $300 $500 $700 $437 $137 $1,500 $2,074
Janssen, Ramon 15 $500 $500 $1,000 $122 $22 $2,000 $2,145
Claasen, Donald 15 $0 $0
Hohenstein, Kurt 17 $0 $0
Conway, Gerald A. 17 $500 $1,000 $750 $1,000 $200 $77 $3,250 $3,527
Day, Connie 19 $0 $0
Dungan, Richard "Dick" 19 $0 $0
Maltas, Carl 19 $0 $0
Scheer, Jim 19 $0 $0
Hudkins, Carol 21 $500 $1,000 $43 $43 $1,500 $1,586
Sapp, Bill 21 $500 $1,000 $500 $1,500
Bromm, Curt 23 $0 $0
Schmit, Loran 23 $500 $1,500 $500 $750 $500 $1,750 $3,750 $5,500
Warner, Jerome 25 $300 $500 $200 $250 $200 $211 $100 $50 $1,000 $1,811
Wickenkamp, Mary 25 $0 $0
Schimek, DiAnna R. 27 $300 $500 $100 $100 $344 $100 $800 $1,444
Svoboda, Gerald 27 $0 $0
Crosby, LaVon 29 $300 $100 $100 $300 $500
Witek, Kathleen 31 $240 $100 $47 $0 $388
Huff, Kathy 31 $300 $500 $1,000 $251 $27 $1,800 $2,078
Bohlke, Ardyce 33 $300 $200 $500 $200 $1,000 $1,200
Krueger, Clarence 33 $0 $0
Fisher, Dan 35 $500 $500 $1,000 $1,000
Nelson, Arlene 35 $260 $118 $0 $378
Kristensen, Doug 37 $300 $1,000 $450 $200 $400 $1,950 $2,350
Ponticello, Nicholas 37 $0 $0
Pedersen, Dwite 39 $200 $250 $0 $450
Humpal, Mike 39 $500 $500 $500 $500 $50 $200 $176 $50 $100 $2,000 $2,576
Schmitt, Jerry 41 $50 $0 $50
Rogers, Carson 41 $500 $263 $311 $100 $199 $0 $1,372
Jones, James 43 $500 $550 $500 $1,050
Kirkpatrick, Jeff 43 $300 $1,000 $160 $1,300 $1,460
Hartnett, D. Paul 45 $500 $250 $100 $200 $100 $100 $750 $1,250
Foster, Clifton 45 $0 $0
Baack, Dennis 47 $750 $500 $500 $200 $1,223 $1,750 $3,173
Rhodes, Everett 47 $0 $0
Wickersham, Bob 49 $500 $800 $2,400 $500 $905 $100 $99 $3,700 $5,304
Knight, Eva 49 $200 $200 $200
Cycle Total $8,950 $11,300 $500 $4,550 $14,500 $0 $1,650 $9,173 $4,833 $750 $1,352 $39,800 $57,558
Off-Cycle
Abboud, Chris 12 $100 $100 $0 $200
Landis, David 46 $100 $0 $100
Off-Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $100 $100 $0 $100 $0 $0 $300
Total $8,950 $11,300 $500 $4,550 $14,500 $0 $1,750 $9,273 $4,833 $850 $1,352 $39,800 $57,858
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1989-1990 
Industry 
Total
1989-1990 
Total
Wehrbein, Roger 2 $0 $0
Horgan, Thomas 4 $250 $300 $250 $550
Henson, Denny 4 $500 $500 $500
Butler, Matt 4 $768 $0 $768
Ashford, Brad 6 $300 $500 $450 $950 $150 $136 $250 $1,250 $2,736
Will, Eric 8 $500 $250 $500 $1,250 $1,250
Beck, Sharon 8 $300 $625 $314 $150 $300 $1,389
Pirsch, Carol McBride 10 $300 $500 $500 $350 $200 $200 $1,300 $2,050
Bohn, Don 10 $0 $0
Abboud, Chris 12 $500 $1,000 $250 $500 $300 $1,750 $2,550
Stroh, Don 12 $200 $0 $200
Withem, Ron 14 $300 $500 $500 $500 $126 $500 $1,800 $2,426
Stevenson, Earlene "Dig" 14 $0 $0
Robinson, C.N. "Bud" 16 $300 $300 $300
Robb, George 16 $0 $0
Schellpeper, Stan 18 $500 $1,000 $500 $200 $134 $2,000 $2,334
Langemeier, Roland 18 $0 $0
Rasmussen, Jessie 20 $1,000 $0 $1,000
Riha, Jim 20 $500 $150 $500 $650
Robak, Jennie 22 $300 $150 $200 $450 $650
Volnek, Kathi 22 $0 $0
Moore, Scott 24 $500 $500 $1,050 $200 $2,293 $250 $2,050 $4,543
Havlet, Marvin 24 $0 $0
Wesely, Don 26 $300 $500 $470 $800 $1,270
Beutler, Chris 28 $300 $500 $750 $500 $2,050 $2,050
Tooley, William 28 $0 $0
Byars, Dennis 30 $400 $500 $300 $900 $1,200
Korslund, Paul 30 $500 $500 $500
Coordsen, George 32 $300 $500 $300 $500 $300 $1,100 $1,900
Molthan, Debra 32 $0 $0
Johnson, Rod 34 $300 $5,000 $5,300 $5,300
Hansen, Gary 34 $0 $0
Jones, Larry 34 $0 $0
Cudaback, Jim 36 $0 $0
Langford, Lorraine 36 $500 $500 $500 $1,050 $216 $216 $2,550 $2,982
Elmer, W. Owen 38 $300 $500 $500 $300 $1,300 $800
Dierks, Merton 40 $300 $158 $300 $158
Lingenfelter, Bob 40 $0 $0
Bernard-Stevens, David 42 $500 $500 $500 $250 $1,500 $1,250
Bade, Steven 42 $0 $0
Haberman, Rex 44 $500 $300 $500 $500 $500 $1,800 $1,500
Owens, Judith 44 $0 $0
Landis, David 46 $300 $300 $300 $300
Codr, Robert 46 $0 $0
Hillman, Joyce 48 $400 $500 $900 $500
Brower, Tom 48 $0 $0
Cycle Total $7,700 $12,300 $2,000 $8,500 $2,500 $1,450 $1,000 $4,326 $6,031 $350 $800 $33,000 $43,607
Off-Cycle
Off-Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Total $7,700 $12,300 $2,000 $8,500 $2,500 $1,450 $1,000 $4,326 $6,031 $350 $800 $33,000 $43,607
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1987-1988 
Industry 
Total
1987-1988 
Total
Morrissey, Spencer 1 $0 $0
Remmers, R. Wiley 1 $1,000 $400 $500 $100 $225 $100 $1,400 $2,325
Beyer, Emil E., Jr. 3 $225 $100 $0 $325
Miller, Wayne 3 $0 $0
Labedz, Bernice 5 $200 $500 $100 $200 $800
Hall, Tim 7 $500 $500 $250 $500 $100 $350 $100 $1,250 $2,300
Buzzello, Gene 7 $0 $0
Lindsay, John C. 9 $500 $225 $262 $100 $125 $500 $1,212
Mendenhall, Frances 9 $0 $0
Chambers, Ernie 11 $0 $0
Pluth, Michael 11 $0 $0
Beck, James W. 11 $0 $0
Bryant, Ernest E. 11 $0 $0
Guy, John A. 11 $0 $0
Hytche, Goldmon 11 $0 $0
Lund, Mark T. 11 $0 $0
Lynch, Daniel C. 13 $250 $500 $100 $250 $850
Hoer, Martin R. 13 $0 $0
Johnson, Lowell C. 15 $100 $0 $100
Conway, Gerald A. 17 $500 $250 $500 $500 $200 $1,250 $1,950
Nelson, Tore 17 $0 $0
Hefner, Elroy M. 19 $100 $200 $100 $0 $400
Evans, Bert M. 19 $0 $0
Peterson, Richard 21 $225 $100 $0 $325
Stinson, T. Patrick 21 $0 $0
Robak, Jennie 22 $50 $0 $50
Cambell, Helen 22 $500 $225 $340 $500 $1,065
Schmit, Loran 23 $250 $500 $300 $250 $1,050
Fauver, James 23 $0 $0
Warner, Jerome 25 $0 $0
Schimek, DiAnna R. 27 $500 $500 $267 $500 $1,267
Crosby, LaVon 29 $200 $100 $0 $300
Lineweber, Ray L. 29 $500 $1,000 $100 $200 $500 $1,800
Chizek, Gerald 31 $500 $250 $500 $500 $100 $150 $300 $120 $1,250 $2,420
Dulaney, David Michael 31 $25 $0 $25
Smith, Jacklyn 33 $225 $100 $0 $325
Nelson, Arlene 35 $384 $100 $0 $484
Quandt, Gary 35 $0 $0
Kristensen, Doug 37 $1,000 $200 $50 $1,000 $1,250
Miller, Jerry D. 37 $100 $0 $100
Barrett, William E. 39 $225 $100 $0 $325
Rogers, Carson 41 $225 $250 $100 $0 $575
Bredthauer, Jake 41 $0 $0
Bernard-Stevens, David 42 $250 $500 $141 $100 $250 $991
Bieber, Carl E. 42 $0 $0
Lamb, Howard A. 43 $162 $100 $262 $0 $524
Kirkpatrick, Jeff 43 $0 $0
Hartnett, D. Paul 45 $500 $100 $100 $0 $700
Cash, Mel 45 $0 $0
Baack, Dennis 47 $250 $225 $250 $475
Scofield, Sandra 49 $250 $225 $100 $250 $575
Cycle Total $0 $5,000 $1,000 $2,600 $1,000 $8,125 $100 $2,453 $2,077 $2,025 $507 $9,600 $24,888
Off-Cycle
Johnson, Vard 8 $500 $0 $500
Pirsch, Carol McBride 10 $200 $0 $200
Schellpeper, Stan 18 $50 $0 $50
Moore, Scott 24 $100 $100 $0 $200
Owen, W. Elmer 38 $150 $0 $150
Off-Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $500 $0 $300 $0 $300 $0 $0 $1,100
Total $0 $5,000 $1,000 $2,600 $1,000 $8,625 $100 $2,753 $2,077 $2,325 $507 $9,600 $25,988
Appendix 9: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Members of the 1987-
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Tobacco 
& Candy
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1985-1986 
Industry 
Total
1985-1986 
Total
Wehrbein, Roger R. 2 $50 $0 $50
Hallstrom, Robert H. 2 $50 $0 $50
Hannibal, Gary 4 $500 $1,000 $750 $100 $626 $100 $1,500 $3,076
Henson, Denny 4 $0 $0
Ashford, Brad 6 $750 $0 $750
Cunningham, Robert G. 6 $750 $100 $200 $100 $0 $1,150
Johnson, Vard 8 $750 $200 $777 $0 $1,727
Beck, Sharon 8 $0 $0
Pirsch, Carol McBride 10 $500 $900 $100 $350 $250 $100 $1,400 $2,200
Stock, Bob 10 $0 $0
Abboud, Chris 12 $500 $900 $500 $100 $400 $246 $150 $1,400 $2,796
Koch, Jerry 12 $100 $0 $100
Withem, Ron 14 $750 $60 $400 $796 $75 $0 $2,081
Hirsch, John 14 $0 $0
Korshoj, Frank 16 $0 $0
Severens, Kathleen S. 16 $0 $0
Schellpeper, Stan 18 $100 $100 $0 $200
Reininger, Roger 18 $0 $0
Goodrich, Glenn A. 20 $250 $100 $100 $150 $0 $600
Rupp, Lee 22 $200 $750 $200 $200 $1,150
Ternes, Dick 22 $0 $0
Moore, Scott 24 $500 $200 $500 $224 $700 $1,424
Hartman, Bill 24 $272 $295 $0 $566
Wesely, Don 26 $250 $300 $800 $100 $0 $1,450
Van Valkenburg, Robert 26 $0 $0
McFarland, James 28 $200 $500 $100 $200 $800
Parker, Virgil 28 $100 $100 $0 $200
Morehead, Patricia 30 $200 $750 $661 $150 $200 $1,761
Maurstad, David I. 30 $100 $150 $50 $0 $300
Coordsen, George 32 $200 $0 $200
Eret, Don 32 $500 $900 $500 $100 $150 $50 $1,400 $2,200
Johnson, Rod 34 $500 $400 $510 $500 $1,410
Langford, Lorraine 36 $750 $160 $131 $0 $1,041
Knapp, James M. 36 $200 $200 $200
Elmer, W. Owen 38 $200 $500 $550 $100 $200 $1,350
Vickers, Tom 38 $500 $100 $211 $500 $811
Dierks, Merton L. 40 $750 $200 $0 $950
DeCamp, John 40 $1,500 $750 $100 $1,213 $200 $200 $1,500 $3,963
Pappas, James E. 42 $100 $400 $450 $389 $0 $1,339
Hord, William D. 42 $0 $0
Haberman, Rex 44 $500 $250 $350 $544 $150 $500 $1,794
McDermott, Sandra 44 $0 $0
Landis, David M. 46 $50 $0 $50
Weihing, John L. 48 $500 $0 $500
Morrison, Clinton 48 $200 $0 $200
Cycle Total $0 $3,000 $0 $7,400 $0 $11,250 $1,210 $5,832 $6,658 $2,890 $200 $10,400 $38,439
Off-Cycle
Higgens, Marge 9 $100 $0 $100
Lynch, Dan 13 $125 $154 $0 $279
Hartnett, Paul 45 $150 $25 $0 $175
Off-Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $375 $0 $179 $0 $0 $554
Total $0 $3,000 $0 $7,400 $0 $11,250 $1,210 $6,207 $6,658 $3,069 $200 $10,400 $38,993
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1983-1984 
Industry 
Total
1983-1984 
Total
Remmers, Wiley R. 1 $50 $200 $462 $50 $0 $762
Merz, Nelson 1 $0 $0
Beyer, Emil E., Jr. 3 $150 $600 $100 $0 $850
Garvin, Linda 3 $200 $200 $200
Labedz, Bernice 5 $600 $100 $600 $700
Hall, Tim 7 $200 $0 $200
Buzzello, Gene 7 $300 $0 $300
Keenan, Carol 7 $0 $0
Higgens, Marge 9 $100 $500 $700 $500 $100 $600 $1,900
Davis, C. Bruce 9 $0 $0
Chambers, Ernie 11 $0 $0
Lynch, Dan 13 $300 $500 $675 $250 $300 $1,725
Duda, Walter J. 13 $0 $0
Withem, Ronald E. 14 $325 $100 $500 $466 $425 $1,391
Harrison, Tracey 14 $0 $0
Johnson, Lowell C. 15 $100 $200 $100 $0 $400
Larsen, Judy 15 $0 $0
Conway, Gerald A. 17 $300 $399 $300 $699
Von Minden, Merle 17 $50 $600 $433 $150 $0 $1,233
Hefner, Elroy M. 19 $300 $200 $50 $50 $500 $600
Evans, Bert M. 19 $0 $0
Peterson, Richard 21 $50 $400 $100 $0 $550
Peterson, J. R. 21 $0 $0
Schmit, Loran 23 $300 $500 $50 $700 $200 $250 $800 $2,000
Matulka, Erwin 23 $0 $0
Warner, Jerome 25 $0 $0
Gove, Charles 25 $0 $0
Harris, Bill 27 $300 $200 $40 $200 $100 $500 $840
Hoffman, Pat 27 $0 $0
Marsh, Shirley 29 $50 $210 $25 $0 $285
Dankert, Eugene 29 $0 $0
Chizek, Jerry 31 $300 $700 $500 $350 $250 $1,000 $2,100
Sigerson, Chuck 31 $100 $0 $100
Smith, Jacklyn 33 $150 $0 $150
Crowley, Jack 33 $450 $0 $450
Nelson, Arlene 35 $100 $100 $100
Peterson, Howard L. 35 $100 $400 $50 $0 $550
Miller, Jerry D. 37 $100 $250 $0 $350
Kahle, Martin F. 37 $600 $0 $600
Barrett, William E. 39 $100 $0 $100
Rogers, Carson 41 $200 $560 $160 $339 $200 $1,259
Rademacher, Harold C. 41 $0 $0
Lamb, Howard A. 43 $50 $400 $0 $450
Kemp, Karl R. 43 $0 $0
Hartnett, Paul 45 $0 $0
Fenger, George 45 $300 $300 $600 $600
Baack, Dennis 47 $200 $150 $0 $350
Narjes, Ed 47 $200 $0 $200
Scofield, Sandra 49 $50 $300 $0 $350
Bowen, Robert W. 49 $0 $0
Cycle Total $1,925 $0 $0 $4,200 $0 $0 $790 $8,560 $4,104 $2,764 $0 $6,125 $22,344
Off-Cycle
Johnson, Rod 34 $100 $0 $100
DeCamp, John 40 $200 $200 $0 $400
Off-Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $200 $0 $300 $0 $0 $500
Total $1,925 $0 $0 $4,200 $0 $0 $790 $8,760 $4,104 $3,064 $0 $6,125 $22,844
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1981-1982 
Industry 
Total
1981-1982 
Total
Carsten, Calvin F. 2 $220 $0 $220
Linder, Boyd 2 $0 $0
Hannibal, Gary 4 $0 $0
Christie, Wanda L. 4 $0 $0
Lating, Bev 4 $0 $0
Hoagland, Peter 6 $0 $0
Stock, Gayle L. 6 $0 $0
Johnson, Vard 8 $0 $0
Hohndorf, Wayne 8 $0 $0
Pirsch, Carol McBride 10 $200 $0 $200
Beutel, Jim 10 $0 $0
Abboud, Chris 12 $0 $0
Koch, Gerald D. 12 $200 $200 $200
Doyle, Thomas 14 $200 $200 $150 $200 $550
Withem, Ron 14 $0 $0
Goll, James E. 16 $0 $0
Schmidt, Shirley 16 $0 $0
Chronister, Harry B. 18 $0 $0
Goodrich, Glenn A. 20 $0 $0
Rupp, Lee 22 $0 $0
Sand, Francis 22 $0 $0
Sieck, Harold F. 24 $200 $200 $200
Marxhausen, Dorris 24 $0 $0
Wesely, Don 26 $200 $0 $200
Brown, Jim L. 26 $200 $0 $200
Beutler, Christopher 28 $200 $200 $200
Butler, John 28 $0 $0
Morehead, Patricia 30 $0 $0
Pentz, Gordon C. "Bud" 30 $0 $0
Eret, Don 32 $0 $0
Apking, Sharon 32 $200 $200 $200
Johnson, Rod 34 $200 $0 $200
Regier, Ted 34 $0 $0
Lundy, Ray E. 36 $200 $200 $200
Langford, Lorraine 36 $0 $0
Vickers, Tom 38 $0 $0
DeCamp, John W. 40 $200 $0 $200
Lingenfelter, Bob 40 $200 $0 $200
Wolf, Jim 40 $0 $0
Pappas, James E. 42 $250 $0 $250
Jochum, Corinne J. 42 $0 $0
Haberman, Rex 44 $0 $0
Landis, David 46 $200 $130 $0 $330
Heider, Stanley L. 46 $0 $0
Nichols, William E. 48 $200 $200 $0 $400
Brower, Tom 48 $0 $0
Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $1,200 $0 $0 $800 $1,220 $530 $200 $0 $1,200 $3,950
Off-Cycle
Off-Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0
Total $0 $0 $0 $1,200 $0 $0 $800 $1,220 $530 $200 $0 $1,200 $3,950
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Name of Candidate Dist. PM RJR STC TI UST
NE Candy 
& 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1979-1980 
Industry 
Total
1979-1980 
Total
Remmers, R. Wiley 1 $0 $0
Merz, Nelson N. 1 $0 $0
Beyer, Emil E., Jr. 3 $0 $0
Keyes, Orval A. 3 $200 $0 $200
Labedz, Bernice 5 $200 $0 $200
Landmichael, T. L. 5 $0 $0
Kilgarin, Karen 7 $0 $0
Venditte, Patrick L. 7 $300 $0 $300
Higgins, Marge 9 $200 $0 $200
Powers, Ray 9 $200 $200 $0 $400
Newell, David R. 13 $285 $0 $285
Syas, George 13 $1,000 $0 $1,000
Johnson, Lowell C. 15 $0 $0
Reutzel, Barry L. 15 $250 $0 $250
Von Minden, Merle 17 $400 $0 $400
Conway, Gerald A. 17 $0 $0
Peterson, Richard 21 $200 $0 $200
McIntosh, Paul 21 $0 $0
Schmit, Loran 23 $500 $500 $0 $1,000
Warner, Jerome 25 $300 $0 $300
Fowler, Steve 27 $0 $0
Sellentin, Jerry L. 27 $1,000 $200 $0 $1,200
Marsh, Shirley 29 $0 $0
Crosby, LaVon 29 $0 $0
Wiitala, Steve J. 31 $0 $0
Sawyer, Russell E., Jr. 31 $400 $0 $400
Walker, Neal R. 31 $0 $0
Marvel, Richard D. 33 $0 $0
Peterson, Howard 35 $200 $0 $200
Wagner, Donald L. 41 $0 $0
Fenger, George 45 $0 $0
Lewis, Frank 45 $300 $0 $300
Clark, Robert L. 47 $400 $0 $400
Cycle Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $5,500 $1,535 $200 $0 $0 $7,235
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Name of Candidate Party PM RJR STC TI UST Kraft Miller
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1999-2002 
Industry Total
1999-2002 
Total
Governor
Johanns, Mike R $9,500 $1,000 $1,051 $3,320 $0 $14,871
Dean, Stormy D $0 $0
Rosberg, Paul I $0 $0
Lt. Governor
Heineman, Dave R $1,500 $1,000 $0 $2,500
Chesterman, M. D $0 $0
Richards, Barry I $0 $0
Attorney General
Bruning, Jon R $500 $500 $500 $824 $1,000 $2,324
Meister, Mike D $0 $0
Auditor of Public 
Accounts
Witek, Kate R $1,500 $500 $0 $2,000
Wilken, D. D $0 $0
Rosberg, Kelly I $0 $0
Secretary of State
Gale, John R $1,340 $525 $0 $1,865
Stoddard, Jay D $0 $0
Rosberg, Jos. I $0 $0
Lewis, Tudor I $0 $0
State Treasurer
Byrd, Lorelee R $0 $0
Sheckler, Bob I $0 $0
Total $500 $500 $0 $0 $0 $12,500 $2,500 $0 $0 $2,891 $4,669 $0 $0 $1,000 $23,560
Appendix 14: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Constitutional Officers and Candidates 
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Name of Candidate Party PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1995-1998 
Industry 
Total
1995-1998 
Total
Governor
Johanns, Mike R $2,235 $1,317 $200 $2,234 $0 $5,986
Hoppner, Bill D   $200 $1,025 $0 $1,225
Lt. Governor
Maurstad, Dave R $250 $613 $500 $250 $1,363
Batallion, Pamela D $0 $0
Attorney General
Stenberg, Don R $1,000 $500 $1,000 $1,500
Knapp, Pat D $0 $0
Sullivan, Andrew I $0 $0
Auditor of Public 
Accounts
Witek, Kate R $250 $250 $250
Hahn, Kandra D $0 $0
Lieske, Gus I $0 $0
Secretary of State
Moore, Scott R $2,000 $550 $121 $221 $293 $2,000 $3,185
Bernbeck, Kent D $0 $0
State Treasurer
Heineman, Dave R $200 $0 $200
Tagart, David D $0 $0
Spilker, Sam I $0 $0
Total $3,500 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,785 $121 $2,852 $900 $3,552 $3,500 $13,710
Appendix 15: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Constitutional Officer
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Name of Candidate Party PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1991-1994 
Industry 
Total
1991-1994 
Total
Governor
Nelson, Ben D $13,800 $10,000 $1,750 $1,000 $16,711 $250 $552 $5,458 $3,811 $2,012 $43,261 $55,344
Spence, Gene R $0 $0
Lt. Governor
Robak, Kim D $518 $837 $0 $1,355
Witek, Kate R $0 $0
Attorney General
Stenberg, Don R $2,500 $500 $500 $190 $400 $3,000 $4,090
Scherr, Steve D $0 $0
Auditor of Public 
Accounts
Breslow, John D $0 $0
Secretary of State
Moore, Scott R $1,000 $500 $3,544 $234 $1,500 $5,278
Eurek, Allan D $0 $0
State Treasurer
Heineman, Dave R $0 $0
Rockey, Dawn D $419 $0 $419
Total $17,300 $10,000 $1,750 $1,500 $17,211 $500 $440 $552 $10,338 $4,648 $2,246 $47,761 $66,485
Appendix 16: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Constitutional Officer and Candidates
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Name of Candidate Party PM RJR STC TI UST
NE 
Candy & 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1987-1990 
Industry 
Total
1987-1990 
Total
Governor
Nelson, Ben D $1,566 $0 $1,566
Orr, Kay R $2,000 $1,000 $125 $150 $3,000 $3,275
Sullivan, Mort I $0 $0
Lt. Governor
Moul, Maxine D $0 $0
Maddux, Jack R $0 $0
Attorney General
Stenberg, Don R $200 $600 $0 $800
Crump, Gene D $0 $0
Auditor of Public 
Accounts
Breslow, John D $0 $0
Johnson, Ray A. C. R $170 $0 $170
Secretary of State
Beerman, Allen R $0 $0
Hansen, Nancy Sue D $0 $0
State Treasurer
Rockey, Dawn D $0 $0
Marsh, Frank R $0 $0
Total $2,000 $0 $0 $1,000 $0 $0 $0 $200 $2,462 $0 $150 $3,000 $5,812
Appendix 17: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Constitutional Officers and Candidates
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Name of Candidate Party PM RJR STC TI UST
NE Candy 
& 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1983-1986 
Industry 
Total
1983-1986 
Total
Governor
Orr, Kay R $0 $0
Boosalis, Helen D $0 $0
Lt. Governor
Nichol, William R $3,960 $0 $3,960
McGinley, Donald D $161 $0 $161
Attorney General
Spire, Robert R $0 $0
Glaser, Bernard Sr. D $0 $0
Auditor of Public 
Accounts
Johnson, Ray A. C. R $0 $0
Wilken, David D $0 $0
Secretary of State
Beerman, Allen R $0 $0
Stein, Harold D $0 $0
State Treasurer
Marsh, Frank R $346 $0 $346
Schimek, DiAnna D $0 $0
Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $4,307 $0 $161 $0 $4,468
Appendix 18: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Constitutional 
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Name of Candidate Party PM RJR STC TI UST
NE Candy 
& 
Tobacco
NE Rest 
PAC
Petro 
PAC
Walter 
Radcliffe*
Retail 
PAC Others
1979-1982 
Industy 
Total
1979-1982 
Total
Governor
Kerrey, Robert D $0 $0
Thone, Charles R $0 $0
Lt. Governor
McGinley, Donald D $0 $0
Luedtke, Roland R $700 $0 $700
Attorney General
Douglas, Paul R $0 $0
Chambers, Ernest D $0 $0
Auditor of Public 
Accounts
Johnson, Ray A. C. R $0 $0
Naumann, Darl Allen D $0 $0
Secretary of State
Beerman, Allen R $0 $0
State Treasurer
Orr, Kay R $0 $0
Keyes, Orval D $0 $0
Total $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $700 $0 $0 $0 $700
Appendix 19: Summary of Tobacco Industry Campaign Contributions to Constitutional Officers and Candidate
Nebraska, 1979-1982
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Lobbyist Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Lobbyist 
Reimbursement
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Jensen, Ronald (Philip Morris) $11,220 $0 $214 $0 $11,434
Rasmussen, Dennis (Philip Morris) $26,026 $1,336 $1,285 $0 $28,646
Young, Philip (Philip Morris) $1,500 $100 $0 $0 $1,600
Moylan, James (R. J. Reynolds) $32,250 $772 $0 $0 $33,022
Radcliffe, Walter (United States Tobacco) $53,000 $0 $529 $0 $53,529
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $123,996 $2,208 $2,027 $0 $128,231
Company Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Lobbyist 
Reimbursement
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Philip Morris $37,789 $1,435 $1,235 $0 $40,459
R. J. Reynolds $32,250 $0 $0 $5,958 $38,208
United States Tobacco $53,000 $0 $0 $0 $53,000
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $123,039 $1,435 $1,235 $5,958 $131,666
Appendix 20: Summary of Tobacco Industry Lobbying Expenditures in Nebraska, First Quarter - Third Quarter
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Lobbyist Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Lobbyist 
Reimbursement
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Jensen, Ronald (Philip Morris) $16,532 $100 $49 $0 $16,681
Rasmussen, Dennis (Philip Morris) $33,796 $100 $1,092 $0 $34,988
Moylan, James (R. J. Reynolds) $46,000 $1,423 $0 $811 $48,235
Radcliffe, Walter (United States Tobacco) $51,000 $0 $643 $0 $51,643
Peters, William (Lorillard and Brown & Williamson) $50,000 $0 $0 $0 $50,000
Kelley, Michael (Smokeless Tobacco Council) $15,100 $0 $82 $11 $15,193
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $212,428 $1,623 $1,867 $822 $216,740
Company Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Lobbyist 
Reimbursement
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Philip Morris $53,340 $200 $1,092 $10,092 $64,724
R. J. Reynolds $46,000 $0 $0 $0 $46,000
United States Tobacco $51,000 $0 $0 $782 $51,782
Lorillard $25,000 $0 $0 $0 $25,000
Brown & Williamson $25,009 $0 $0 $0 $25,009
Smokeless Tobacco Council $15,100 $0 $0 $0 $15,100
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $215,449 $200 $1,092 $10,874 $227,615
Appendix 21: Summary of Tobacco Industry Lobbying Expenditures in Nebraska, 2002
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Lobbyist Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Lobbyist 
Reimbursement
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Jensen, Ronald (Philip Morris) $15,155 $0 $684 $3 $15,842
Rasmussen, Dennis (Philip Morris) $33,576 $645 $1,101 $0 $35,322
Moylan, James (R. J. Reynolds) $41,000 $1,644 $0 $770 $43,414
Radcliffe, Walter (United States Tobacco) $51,000 $0 $922 $0 $51,922
Peters, William (Brown & Williamson) $10,000 $0 $0 $0 $10,000
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $150,731 $2,289 $2,707 $773 $156,501
Company Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Lobbyist 
Reimbursement
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Philip Morris $36,467 $64 $2,136 $0 $38,667
R. J. Reynolds $41,000 $0 $150 $13,913 $55,063
United States Tobacco $51,000 $0 $0 $0 $51,000
Brown & Williamson $10,000 $0 $0 $0 $10,000
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $138,467 $64 $2,286 $13,913 $154,730
Appendix 22: Summary of Tobacco Industry Lobbying Expenditures in Nebraska, 2001
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Lobbyist Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Jensen, Ronald (Philip Morris) $20,000 $86 $55 $20,141
Rasmussen, Dennis (Philip Morris) $46,051 $1,732 $0 $47,783
Moylan, James (R. J. Reynolds) $41,430 $0 $631 $42,061
Radcliffe, Walter (United States Tobacco) $48,000 $1,779 $558 $50,337
Peters, William (Brown & Williamson) $18,500 $0 $126 $18,626
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $173,980 $3,597 $1,370 $178,947
Company Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Philip Morris $66,051 $1,745 $28 $67,823
R. J. Reynolds $40,000 $0 $631 $40,631
United States Tobacco $48,000 $0 $0 $48,000
Brown & Williamson $18,500 $0 $0 $18,500
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $172,551 $1,745 $659 $174,954
Appendix 23: Summary of Tobacco Industry Lobbying Expenditures in Nebraska, 2000
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Lobbyist Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Jensen, Ronald (Philip Morris) $18,333 $99 $0 $18,432
Rasmussen, Dennis (Philip Morris) $41,594 $1,764 $0 $43,358
Moylan, James (R. J. Reynolds) $35,490 $375 $667 $36,531
Radcliffe, Walter (United States Tobacco) $54,000 $2,070 $0 $56,070
Peters, William (Brown & Williamson) $16,500 $0 $69 $16,569
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $165,916 $4,308 $736 $170,960
Company Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Philip Morris $59,927 $1,765 $0 $61,692
R. J. Reynolds $32,972 $1,662 $667 $35,301
United States Tobacco $54,000 $0 $0 $54,000
Brown & Williamson $16,500 $0 $6,058 $22,558
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $163,399 $3,427 $6,725 $173,550
Appendix 24: Summary of Tobacco Industry Lobbying Expenditures in Nebraska, 1999
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Lobbyist Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Jensen, Ronald (Philip Morris) $24,000 $394 $0 $24,394
Rasmussen, Dennis (Philip Morris) $49,722 $2,220 $87 $52,029
Moylan, James (R. J. Reynolds) $39,461 $375 $1,126 $40,962
Radcliffe, Walter (United States Tobacco) $45,000 $1,082 $275 $46,357
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $158,184 $4,072 $1,487 $163,742
Company Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Philip Morris $73,722 $1,949 $0 $75,671
R. J. Reynolds $37,000 $375 $1,126 $38,501
United States Tobacco $45,000 $0 $0 $45,000
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $155,722 $2,324 $1,126 $159,172
Appendix 25: Summary of Tobacco Industry Lobbying Expenditures in Nebraska, 1998
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Lobbyist Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Jensen, Ronald (Philip Morris) $12,000 $545 $0 $12,545
Rasmussen, Dennis (Philip Morris) $41,833 $1,763 $594 $44,190
Moylan, James (R. J. Reynolds) $36,378 $0 $697 $37,075
Radcliffe, Walter (United States Tobacco) $45,000 $1,521 $42 $46,562
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $135,212 $3,829 $1,332 $140,372
Company Reports
Lobbyist 
Compensation
Entertainment 
Expenses
Miscellaneous 
Expenses Total
Philip Morris $53,833 $2,503 $0 $56,336
R. J. Reynolds $35,000 $0 $707 $35,707
United States Tobacco $45,000 $0 $0 $45,000
Total Lobbying Expenditures Reported $133,833 $2,503 $707 $137,043
Appendix 26: Summary of Tobacco Industry Lobbying Expenditures in Nebraska, 1997
